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Modulating false and veridical memory: The effects of repetition 
and alcohol at encoding. 
ABSTRACT 
Alcohol and study list repetition were used to manipulate encoding quality to gain 
insight into the mechanisms underlying false memories. The DRM paradigm (Deese 
1959b; Roediger & McDermott 1995) was used to elicit false memories. Participants 
studied lists of words (veridical items) which were semantically related to a critical 
non-presented item, which, if erroneously endorsed, served as the measure of false 
memory. Implicit and explicit tests of memory were used, and remember know 
judgments were also taken. An anterograde impairment of memory after alcohol was 
obtained for veridical items using explicit tests, although no effect of alcohol was 
found using implicit measures. Alcohol reduced false memory levels relative to 
placebo for material viewed once at encoding. In accordance with previous en1pirical 
research, repetition was found to increase, decrease or have no effect on false memory 
levels. The introduction of distinctive pictorial stimuli at encoding resulted in an 
inverted U -shaped relationship between repetition and false memories, though this 
effect was confined to remember judgments only. The increase in false memories as a 
function of repetition was greater in the alcohol group than in the placebo group_ 
whilst the placebo group was better able to use extended repetitions to reduce false 
memories. These results are accounted for using the Activation and Monitoring 
Framework (Gallo & Roediger 2002). It is suggested that reduced levels of false 
memories under alcohol for material viewed once can be attributed to reduced 
activation within semantic networks resulting from superficial encoding under alcohol 
(Craik 1977) and impoverished attentional resources when intoxicated (Steele & 
Josephs 1988). The selective impairment of recollective traces under alcohol (Duka ('/ 
al. 2001) may limit the potential for extended repetitions to diminish false memories 
under alcohol. The role of metacognitive factors in affecting false memory 
endorsement is also discussed. 
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1 
Chapter 1. General introduction 
1.1. False memory 
Empirical investigators have not adopted anyone standardised definition of what 
constitutes a false memory, yet there is broad agreement that they occur when "people 
believe that they have experienced an item or event which is actually novel" (Dodson 
et al. 2000, pg. 392). This process is thought to involve either "remembering events 
that never happened, or remembering them quite differently from the way they 
happened" (Roediger & McDermott 1995, pg. 803). The first empirical research into 
the reconstructive nature of memory is largely credited to Bartlett (1932), who made 
the distinction between reproductive and reconstructive memory. The principle of 
reconstruction suggests that remembering is not necessarily a faithful reproduction of 
the past, but instead is an active process that is guided and shaped by people's 
knowledge and beliefs about the world. Bartlett (1932) thus established a potential 
theoretical basis for erroneous accounts of past occurrences. It was almost half a 
century later, however, before research into the nature of the malleability of memory 
began in earnest. This was initially fuelled by an acknowledgement on the part of 
non-psychologists of the implications of the possibility that memory is not a faithful 
representation of the past, especially with regard to the legal system (Wright & Loftus 
1998). Initially, false memory research was preoccupied with the aetiology and 
consequences of inaccurate, yet 'honest' eyewitness testimonies. Research focused on 
the potential role of impassioned questioning in 'instilling' false memories through 
the power of suggestion (e.g. Loftus 1997). In addition, Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) attributed the primary impetus for the surge of interest in false memory 
research to an increase in the number of cases in which memories of previously 
unrecognised abuse were reported during therapy. Such a claim is substantiated by 
research which indicated that the nature of therapeutic practices themselves in 
'recovering' such memories could actually lead to their inception (Lindsay & Read 
1994; Loftus 1993). Beckett (1996) noted that, between the years 199~-1994, a shift 
occurred in the way in which the media portrayed sexual abuse allegations, whereby 
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an emphasis was placed on the inaccuracy of memories, along with their potential for 
false allegations. It was in reference to contested memories of sexual abuse that the 
actual term 'false memory' initially gained prominence (DePrince et al. 2004). 
DePrince et al. (2004) observe that once the term 'false memory' gained notoriety in 
the popular media, it then started to be adopted in the cognitive empirical literature. 
By the early 1990s, the genesis of memory errors had become one of the principle 
issues for memory research (Stadler et al. 1999). This interest went beyond question 
of the validity of eyewitness testimony and the recovered memory debate, and moved 
on to a consideration of the intrinsic worth and implications of memory inaccuracies. 
Previously, errors in memory were largely only deemed relevant insofar as they 
obscured the true values of accurate memory (Roediger et al. 2001). Consequently, 
they were incorporated in the calculations of researchers to correct veridical memory 
from what were viewed simply as guesses. Such erroneous memories were thus 
considered a nuisance, as opposed to being seen as interesting in their own right. In 
his article 'The seven sins of memory', Schacter (1999) identifies seven distinct 
transgressions of memory, labelled transience, absentmindedness, blocking, 
persistence, misattribution, suggestibility and bias. The first three reflect different 
types of forgetting, persistence refers to pathological remembrances, whilst the final 
three are concerned with memory distortion and hence are implicated in false 
memories. Schacter (1999) argues that these 'sins' should not be viewed as flaws in 
the system, but rather as by-products of an adaptive memory system. Crucially, this 
reflects a shift in how false memories are considered, and a new acknowledgement 
that investigation into the habitual ways in which memory fails has the potential to 
provide insight into the nature of underlying memory processes. Similarly, through 
the use of variables at encoding - such as alcohol - further insight can be gained into 
the mechanisms underlying false memories and the effect of such variables on 
memory processes. 
3 
1.1.1. Paradigms 
There are different paradigms for the empirical investigation of false memories. yet it 
has been proposed that the distinct ways in which they elicit false memories reflect 
different underlying processes (e.g. Schacter 1999). False memory paradigms which 
feature eye witness testimonies depend largely upon suggestibility, the phenomenon 
whereby the memory for an event incorporates extraneous information, such as 
misleading questions (e.g. Loftus et al. 1978). In such studies, 'witnesses' typically 
observe an event and are subsequently SUbjected to misleading questions or 
information which is later incorporated into the memory for the initial event (see 
Loftus et al. 1995). Empirical eye witness studies gained prominence under the 
pioneering work of Loftus and colleagues in the late 1970s, fuelled by the apparent 
real world implications of the vulnerability of eye witness testimony to suggestion. 
The principle of suggestion also gained notoriety due to the controversy surrounding 
the debate concerning the validity of recovered memories for childhood sexual abuse. 
Consequently, studies were conducted which did not incorporate an initial encoding 
episode, but were able to demonstrate that suggestion alone had the potential to instill 
false recollections of autobiographical episodes in a substantial proportion of 
preschool children (Ceci & Bruck 1993). In addition, hypnotic suggestions have been 
shown to implant illusory events within up to 50% of highly hypnotisable individuals 
(Laurence & Perry 1983), and 'dream interpretation' by an experimenter has been 
shown to lead to the recall of events in accordance with a particular dream 
interpretation (Mazzoni & Loftus, 1998). 
Schacter (1999) argues that, whilst such studies demonstrating false memories of real 
occurrences may be compelling, they are constrained by the fact that experimenters 
can not determine definitively whether a target event actually did occur or not. Studies 
which control the encoding of the initial event in question as a means to overcome 
this failing (e.g. Loftus et al. 1978), are dependent upon the presence of extraneous 
information provided by the experimenter as a means to instill the false memory. 
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In contrast, paradigms exist which can give rise to 'spontaneous' false memories, 
which can occur due to perceptual or conceptual similarity to experienced events 
(Schacter 1999). In 1959 Deese published a paper that reported a false memory effect 
whereby people erroneously recalled a word which was associated with a list of 
studied semantically related words. This paradigm remained largely neglected until it 
was subsequently revived and restructured by Roediger and McDermott (1995) (see 
also Read et at. 1996). Now termed the DRM paradigm, it is composed of lists of 
associated veridical words which are viewed in the encoding phase (e.g. hill, l'alley, 
climb, summit, etc.), with each list related to a non-presented semantic associate (e.g. 
mountain), termed the critical item. The probability that this non-presented critical 
item will subsequently be erroneously recalled or recognised as having been 
previously presented serves as the measure for false memory. Thus the DRM 
procedure offers an unadorned technique to elicit and to investigate false memories in 
a standard list-learning paradigm. 
Since its revival, the DRM paradigm has been the basis for much recent empirical 
false memory research. Its popularity can in part be attributed to the robustness with 
which it generates false memories in both recall and recognition. Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) found mean levels of false recognition memory to be marginally 
greater than veridical recognition for items within the centre of the serial position 
curve. Many subsequent studies found roughly equivalent levels of false and veridical 
memory using the DRM paradigm (e.g. Mather et at. 97; Payne et al. 1996). More 
recently Stadler et at. (1999) developed a series of norms denoting the standard false 
recall and recognition rates for various lists. The probability that a given list would 
give rise to a subsequent false memory varied considerably for different lists. For 
example, the probability of erroneously recalling the critical false memory item 
window was .65. This value was far higher than the probability of erroneously 
recalling the critical item king, which was calculated to be .10 (Stadler et af. 1999). 
Whilst these two examples are polarised extremes, they are indicative of the variation 
inherent within individual lists in giving rise to different false memory levels. 
Consequently, when designing experiments, it is imperative that lists are matched for 
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levels of false memory and that a fully counter-balanced design is employed to ensure 
that group variations in false memory levels to not stem from the materials. 
1.2. Models of memory 
The DRM procedure generates quantitative measures of both veridical and false 
memory. Consequently, cognitive models of both veridical memory and false memory 
will be discussed. It is necessary to match the theoretical underpinnings of models 
which account for veridical memory with false memory models. This will ensure 
consistency for the mechanisms addressed. A number of studies have investigated the 
extent to which single-process signal detection models are in accordance with false 
memory data (e.g. Westerberg & Marsolek 2003). Certain theorists have argued that 
the graded RTs and confidence ratings for false memory items are compatible with a 
single dimension model of recognition memory based upon familiarity (e.g. Jou et al. 
2004). Brainerd et al. (2003), however, state that there is a "general consensus that 
some type of dual-process theory is necessary to account for false recognition and 
false recall data that have been reported for the DRM paradigm" (pg. 462). 
Consequently, discussions of memory models will be limited to dual process models. 
1.2.1. Veridical Memory 
Dual-process models of recognition memory have dominated over single strength 
memory models over the last 40 years. They typically postulate the existence of two 
distinct memory processes which serve to affect memory judgements - one which is 
based upon familiarity, and another which requires recollection (e.g. Atkinson & 
Juola 1974; Jacoby 1991; Mandler 1980; Yonelinas 1994). Familiarity is assumed to 
be the faster process, reflecting global memory strength (e.g. Yonelinas 2001: 
Yonelinas 1999). In contrast. recollection is consider to be a slower process, whereby, 
when making a nlemory decision. individuals . search' their memories as a means to 
recall quantitative aspects of studied stimuli. 
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Dual-process theories, whilst all postulating the existence of recollecti e and 
familiarity processes, differ in how they conceptualise these distinct processes and in 
how these processes should be measured (Yonelinas 2001). Jacoby (1991) argued that 
recollection and familiarity should be perceived in terms of attentional control ; 
therefore the relative contributions of these processes in memory decisions should be 
reliant on the degree to which control over the memories can be exercised. The 
process dissociation procedure was devised by Jacoby as a means to assess 
quantitative estimates of recollection and familiarity. Jacoby argued that tasks were 
not process pure, thus by putting these two processes both in opposition to each other 
and in concert with each other, their relative contributions to a given task could be 
determined. 
Yonelinas (1994) proposed an alternative approach to distinguish between 
recollective and familiarity based processes. He put forward a dual-process model 
which incorporated a signal-detection component based on familiarity (see Figure 
1.1), and a threshold-based retrieval component founded upon recollection (see Figure 
1.2). 
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It is assumed that, during retrieval, both processes aid responses, but that recollection 
processes lead to high confidence responses, whilst familiarity assessment supports a 
wider range of memory confidence responses (Y onelinas 2001). Thus the distinction 
which Y onelinas makes between recollection and familiarity can be differentiated 
based upon response confidence (Y onelinas 2001). 
In contrast to both Yonelinas and Jacoby, Tulving (1985) argued that recollection and 
familiarity are distinguished as a function of conscious experience associated with the 
act of remembering. He postulated that familiarity was founded upon the principle of 
'noetic consciousness' which constituted memory in the absence of conscious 
awareness for the learning episode, whereby at test, the item in question elicited a 
sense of 'knowing' that the item was previously presented. In contrast, recollection 
was associated with 'autonoetic consciousness', which, at retrieval, resulted in the 
conscious re-experience of episodic aspects of the memory in question. Tulving 
developed the remember / know procedure to measure these distinct types of memory 
which required positive recognition decisions to be accompanied by a remember or 
know response, with remember responses reflecting recollective processes, and know 
responses being indicative of familiarity based processes. In the adult false memory 
literature, the use of the remember / know procedure has tended to be the method of 
choice to gain insight into recollective and familiarity based processes (e.g. Mather et 
al. 1997; Pernot-Marino et al. 2004; Dewhurst & Farrand 2004; Dewhurst & 
Anderson 1999). 
Problems of the prominence of remember responses for false memories 
The empirical false memory literature which has utilised the remember/know 
procedure has found recollective experience for false memory items to be comparable 
to remember responses found for hits (e.g. Gallo et al. 2001; Roediger & McDermott 
1995). Higham and Vokey (2004) point out that, according to dual process theory, 
recollection is thought to involve "the conscious retrieval of veridical episodic 
information from an earlier encounter with a stimulus and gives rise to a feeling of 
reliving a past event" (pg. 714) and familiarity is "associated with fluent conceptual 
and perceptual processing, stimulus similarity and a vague. source non-specific 
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feeling of remembrance" (pg. 714). Consequently, they argue, it follows on from dual 
process theory that both familiarity and recollective processes potentially underlie 
veridical memory, whereas false recognition decisions are based only on familiarity 
(Higham & Vokey 2004). Indeed, Yonelinas (2002) assumes that recollection is 
always accurate. Higham and Vokey make the argument that dual process theory - as 
it is traditionally conceived - cannot account for false remember data. Higham and 
V okey acknowledge the different theories which have attempted to account for false 
recollection in a dual process framework (see pg. 716). In addition, they propose two 
alternative revisions which could be made to the assumptions underlying dual process 
theory to accommodate false recollection. They favour a revision to the recollection-
remember identity assumption - this would allow for familiarity processes to affect 
recollection judgements (see pages 733-734). 
1.2.2. False Memory Models 
Different theories have been proposed to account for the mechanisms underlying false 
memories. Benjamin (2001) argues that these theories can broadly be classified into 
two distinct types. Those labelled multistorage theories, account for false memories in 
terms of different types of memory traces, the leading example being fuzzy trace 
theory (FTT) (e.g. Reyna & Brainerd 1995). In contrast, those theories termed 
multioperational, posit the presence of additional processes. The Activation 
Monitoring Framework (AMF) (Gallo & Roediger 2002) is a recent framework that 
incorporates a number of these processes, uniting them in a unitary framework. FTT 
will firstly be defined, and the reasons for not pursuing it as the principle explanatory 
framework with be outlined. Discussion will then centre upon the AMF. with an 
initial theoretical focus on the mechanisms it incorporates, followed by supportive 
empirical evidence. 
1.2.2.1. Fuzzy Trace Theory 
Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) was first introduced in two seminal papers by Reyna and 
Brainerd in 1990 (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). The most conlprehensive account of FTT 
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was outlined by Reyna and Brainerd (1995), though peripheral reVISIOns haye 
occurred since then (Reyna & Brainerd 1998). It was devised to address the 
mechanisms underlying false and veridical memory, and specifically to address the 
issue of age variability for false memory generation, by relating this to developmental 
changes in the nature of memory traces (e.g. Reyna & Lloyd 1997). FTT is a dual 
process theory, and its central assumption is that memories are not unitary 
representations. Instead, FTT argues that memories involve two distinct traces; 
verbatim traces, which are thought to be perceptual in nature and composed of an 
item's surface form, and gist traces, which are considered to represent the semantic. 
relational and elaborative processes of a stimulus (Brainerd & Reyna 1998). Non-
unitary, in this context, refers to the core assumption of FTT that gist and verbatim 
representations are stochastically independent (Reyna & Brainerd 1990). When 
applying FTT to the DRM paradigm, both verbatim and gist traces can underlie 
veridical items, but memory for critical items is supported by gist traces alone, as no 
perceptual traces exist for these non-presented items (Payne et al. 1996). In order to 
address how gist memories give rise to false recollections of perceptual details. three 
mechanisms have been suggested using FTT: firstly, through gist reconstruction 
(Reyna 1992); secondly, due to the process of forgetting induced by trace 
disintegration, isolated perceptual details may survive and be recalled in conjunction 
with gist traces (Brainerd et al. 1990; Reyna & Brainerd 1995); lastly, repeated cueing 
of gist traces has been hypothesised to give rise to a process termed 'phantom 
recollection' whereby gist memories are strengthened untill they give rise to vivid 
recollections (Brainerd et al. 2001). 
Whilst FTT was born out of the investigation of developmental variations in false 
memories, many studies exist which demonstrate the breadth of explanatory and 
power inherent within FTT. As noted by Reyna (2000), FTT has contributed to the 
understanding of infantile amnesia (Leichtman & Ceci 1995), ageing (e.g. Koutstaal 
& Schacter 1997) and a variety of brain disorders, such as amnesia (e.g. Schacter et 
al. 1996). With regard to the false memory literature, empirical research exists which 
supports the notion that memory is composed of two distinct traces with different 
properties. In particular, a prolonged retention interval has sho\\TI that false memories 
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persist to a greater extent than true memories; a finding which is consistent with the 
differential deterioration rates of gist and verbatim traces (Thapar & McDermot, 
2001). Crucially, active manipulation of encoding strategies which emphasised either 
verbatim or gist encoding, found corresponding changes in false memory levels as 
predicted by FTT (e.g. Libby & Neisser, 2001) 
FTT, although it is a number of researchers theoretical framework of choice to 
account for false memories (e.g. Brainerd et al. 2001; Reyna, 2000), will not be 
pursued within this thesis. Fierce battles currently exist within the literature regarding 
the relative merits of different explanatory frameworks to account for false memories 
(e.g. Reyna 2000; Lindsay & Johnson 2000). As argued by Higham and Vokey 
(2004), the explanatory power of FTT comes at the cost of 'precision and testability'. 
This stems from the fact it posits more than one mechanism which can give rise to 
false memories - allowing for post-hoc accounts which best fit the patterns of data 
(Higham & Vokey 2004). In addition, FTT is classified as a multistorage theory, in 
that factors which serve to inhibit or facilitate both false and veridical memories are 
accounted for in terms of their differential effect on gist and verbatim traces. This 
poses a problem if it is not known how the factors in question impact upon these 
traces. In contrast, multiprocess based theories use terminology and processes (e.g. 
source monitoring and semantic activation) which are consistent with memory 
research that was conducted outside the sphere of false memory research. When, for 
example, doing investigative research with factors which have limited previous 
research in false memories, it is possible to devise grounded predictions about the way 
in which these factors will affect false memory levels, provided empirical research 
exists which document how these factors affect processes thought to underlie false 
memones. 
1.2.2.2. Activation Monitoring Framework 
The Activation Monitoring Framework (AMF) was proposed by Roediger and 
colleagues (e.g. Roediger et al. 2001; Gallo & Roediger 2002). It postulates dual 
opponent processes which determine false memory levels; an activation component 
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and a monitoring component. False memories are thought to be elicited via their 
activation, and false remembering is thought to subsequently occur when monitoring 
fails and individuals misattribute the source of this activation to prior presentation. 
Under the AMF, activation of the critical item can occur via two discrete pathways. 
Firstly, conscious thought of the critical item during the processing of list items 
results in its representation within semantic networks being directly activated. This 
pathway builds on the theory proposed by Underwood (1965) and is founded upon the 
assumption that critical items come to conscious thought as the result of the formation 
of explicit associations between veridical items at encoding. Goodwin et al. (2001) 
designed an experiment to investigate the conscious activation route. During the 
encoding of word lists, participants were required to verbalise semantic elaborations. 
Using a path analysis, it was demonstrated that participants' verbalisation of critical 
items during encoding served to predict subsequent levels of false recall. Seamon, Lee 
et al. (2002), following on from the findings of Goodwin et al. (2001), designed a 
study to determine whether such conscious thought of the critical item was essential 
for subsequent false recall. It was found that overt-rehearsal of the critical-word at 
study enhanced false recall, thus supporting Goodwin et al. (2001). In contrast, 
conscious thought of the critical item had no effect on false recognition or remember 
judgments for falsely recognised critical words. Thus, thinking of critical words 
during study was demonstrated to enhance false recall but have no effect on false 
recognition levels and consequently cannot be deemed as essential for eliciting a false 
memory, particularly in regard to recognition testing. The alternative route leading to 
activation of the critical item is thought to be the automatic spread of activation within 
semantic networks. Under this route, conscious thought of the critical item is not 
deemed necessary, as the mere processing of veridical items is considered sufficient 
for activation to spread to the critical item. The monitoring component within the 
AMF functions to ascertain the source of this activation, with erroneous attribution of 
familiarity thought to derive from prior presentation leading to false memory. 
Correctly identifying the source of the activation reflects a successful 'reality 
monitoring process' (e.g. Johnson et al. 1993), as it supposedly demonstrates the 
ability of individuals to successfully attribute the activation of the critical items to 
internal (e.g. thinking of the critical items) as opposed to external (e.g. prior 
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presentation) factors. It has been argued that such a process is dependent upon intact 
recollective memory (e.g. Benjamin 2001). 
A large body of empirical evidence exists which is in accordance with the AMF. As 
the AMF is formed of opponent processes, it can accommodate both an increase and 
decrease in false memory levels dependent upon the extent to which factors 
differentially affect activation and monitoring potential. Fundamentally, one can 
predict that any process which selectively enhances activation should lead to an 
increase in false memory, whilst any manipulation that increases monitoring should 
cause a decrease in false memory. A review of how factors which selectively affect 
activation and monitoring process serve to affect false memory processes will be 
conducted. 
1.2.2.2.1. Activation 
Empirical research has demonstrated that the manipulation of factors which increase 
semantic activation can result in a consequential increase in false memories, III 
particular: level of processing manipulations (Toglia et al., 1999~ Thapar & 
McDermott, 200 1 ~ Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000), semantic relatedness, particularly in 
regard to backwards associative strength, (Gallo & Roediger 2002~ Deese, 1959b~ 
Roediger et al., 2001; Robinson & Roediger 1997) and the role of expertise (Baird 
2001). 
Levels of processing 
The levels of processing (LOP) framework was originally devised by Craik and 
Lockhart (1972). It detracted from the view of memory as a series of stores and 
stages, and stated that the depth at which information is processed denotes the 
probability the information will be remembered. Processing depth was assumed to run 
along a spectrum from shallow perceptual and sensory analysis requiring little 
attention, to deep semantic elaborative processing. As semantic processing is thought 
to involve the interpretation and enrichment of stimuli through the use of associations 
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within stored knowledge, manipulation of processing depth thus serves to vary the 
extent to which semantic networks in the brain are activated. Consequently, LOP 
manipulations serve as a methodological construct with which to investigate the 
degree of semantic activation on subsequent false memory levels. 
Toglia et al. (1999) manipulated the task performed during encoding. Subjects were 
required to perform a semantic task (pleasantness rating) or a graphemic task (does 
the word contain the letter "a"). The standard level of processing effect was found for 
veridical items as semantic processing increased the number of words recalled relative 
to graphemic processing. In addition, an increase in false recall paralleled this finding; 
more semantic false memories were produced under semantic processing than under 
graphemic processing. This finding was replicated by Rhodes and Anastasi (2000), 
who demonstrated that participants who engaged in deeper levels of processing 
(concrete/abstract ratings and category sorting) recalled significantly more veridical 
and critical items than participants who engaged in more superficial processing tasks 
(vowel counting). Thapar and McDermott (2001) also demonstrated this level of 
processing effect for the recall of both veridical and critical items, and expanded this 
finding to the domain of false and veridical recognition. Depth of processing by 
definition increases semantic processing and the extent of semantic processing is 
thought to directly impact the degree of activation within semantic networks. 
Consequently, the monotonic relationship found between processing depth and false 
memory levels supports the activation component of the AMF as being integral to the 
formation of false memories. 
Backwards associative strength (BAS) 
Another way in which to investigate how semantic activation affects false memories 
is to examine the way in which semantic relatedness of veridical to critical items 
affects subsequent false memory. Backwards associative strength is a value indicative 
of the strength of connections from the veridical item to the critical item, and can thus 
be taken as a measure of the degree of activation of the critical item when processing 
corresponding veridical items (Gallo & Roediger 2002). 
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Deese (1959) found that false recall was highly correlated (r = .87) to the mean 
associative strength of veridical items to the critical item. This finding was supported 
by a series of experiments performed by Gallo and Roediger (2002), who found a 
strong positive correlation between mean backwards associative strength (MBAS) and 
probability of false recall. In addition, a multiple regression analysis performed by 
Roediger et al. (2001) isolated BAS (associative connections from the study words to 
the critical item) as the single most predictive factor determining subsequent false 
recognition. 
Experiments performed by Robinson and Roediger (1997) appeared to indicate that 
total BAS, as opposed to MBAS appeared to be the dominant determinant of FM. 
They manipulated list length (3, 6, 9, 12 or 15 words) and found that a proportionate 
relationship existed between list length and probability of false recall. When filler 
words were added as a means to standardise list length, length of list did not increase 
false memories. The lists which had the fewer items tended to have a higher MBAS; 
the greatest associates are presented at the beginning, and thus longer list have a 
tendency to have a lower MBAS due to the inclusion of less related associates. 
Consequently, the sum of the total associative strength appeared to be the determinant 
factor of FM levels. 
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Figure 1.3. The hypothesised phenomenological consequences of the different 
activation routes 
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Increased BAS would serve to increase the activation of the critical item, either 
through the spread of activation within semantic networks, or through an increased 
likelihood that the critical item will come to conscious thought. Gallo and Roediger 
(2002) hypothesise that these two distinct routes could be considered to increase the 
familiarity of the item in question. In addition, increased probability of conscious 
activation could subsequently increase the strength of 'remember responses' due to 
subsequent recall and misattribution at test (see figure 1.3). This theorising appears to 
be supported by confidence ratings made to critical items. It was found their 
confidence levels for both familiarity and recollection based judgments for critical 
items increased as MBAS increased. Such a finding is compatible with activation 
based explanations: if BAS increases the familiarity and/or recollection felt for critical 
items, then the concordant increase in confidence ratings serves as a behavioural 
manifestation of supposedly increased activation. 
Expertise 
Expertise within a particular domain has been found to increase the number and 
strength of associations between terms and concepts within that domain (Baird 2001). 
Under principles of semantic activation, items processed within a particular 
knowledge framework should be more likely to activate associative but non-presented 
words (i.e. the critical items). In addition, the strength of the connection is more likely 
to lead to a superthreshold activation of the non-presented item and should thus lead 
to the increased endorsement of the critical item, providing this activation is 
misattributed to prior presentation. 
Baird (2001) tested students with and without expertise in the domain of investment. 
Veridical and false memory was tested for words either in the domain of investment 
(domain-relevant), or words in a different area (domain-irrelevant). It was found that 
investment and non-investment students did not differ in their levels of false or 
veridical memory for domain-irrelevant words, indicating comparable base-line 
veridical and false memory across the two populations. In contrast. inYestment 
students recalled significantly more veridical and false inyestment-related words. As 
inyestment students \\"ere found to haye more connections bet\\'een investment related 
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terms (Baird 2001), this result is compatible with a notion of the integral role of 
associative connections within semantic networks in the aetiology of false memories. 
1.2.2.2.2. Monitoring 
The monitoring component of the AMF is based upon the source monitoring 
framework (SMF) (e.g. Johnson et at. 1993). The SMF assumes that memory for an 
item is composed of a number of components such as semantic and perceptual 
features, in addition to records of the cognitive operations performed on the item in 
question. These can take the form of emotional responses to the item, cognitive 
processes performed in interpreting the item and associations with the item. At 
retrieval, participants have the potential to assess the qualitative nature of the 
memories to determine their source, with source confusions ansmg from 
misattribution of the memory to an erroneous source. For example, in the DRM 
paradigm, participants may mistakenly attribute the familiarity of a critical item to 
prior presentation, whereas it actually derives from semantic relatedness to presented 
items, and hence should lack the perceptual detail accompanying memory for 
veridical items. Indeed, studies have demonstrated that phenomenological differences 
between true and false memories exist. When the memory characteristics 
questionnaire was used to assess the qualitative nature of veridical and false 
memories, it was found that false memory items contained less auditory detail and 
fewer remembered reactions and feelings than were reported for veridical memories 
(Mather et at. 1997). It follows that if studied material is presented from distinct 
sources, participants are better equipped to utilise their enriched memories for 
veridical items to 'suppress' familiarity from critical items and consequently reduce 
their false memories. 
Hicks and Marsh (1999) performed a series of experiments in an attempt to reduce 
false recall levels by employing source monitoring techniques. They investigated the 
assumption that when false memories were learnt from more than one source, the 
incidence of false memories would decline. It was found that such a decline was only 
found when sources were sufficiently distinct from one another. For example. sources 
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which were both external (e.g. pronounced by a male versus female experimenter) 
were not found to reduce false recall, relative to a single source control condition. 
Similarly, when sources were both internal in nature (e.g. words given pleasantness 
ratings versus words given frequency ratings) no subsequent reduction in false 
memories was found. In contrast, when sources were either internal or external (e.g. 
words generated from anagrams versus words pronounced by a male experimenter), 
the incidence of false recall was found to decline relative to a single source control by 
approximately 50% (Hicks & Marsh 1999). Hicks and Marsh (1999) interpreted their 
findings within the context of the source monitoring framework, arguing that 
presenting the DRM paradigm from different sources potentially provides diagnostic 
evidence which can be used to 'edit out' false memories. It was also argued that 
sources which were sufficiently distinct provided enriched memories which served to 
make the decision process at retrieval more conservative. Thus if the recalled memory 
lacked accompanying source-specific detail, it was thought that participants would 
reject it. As the benefits afforded by source were only found for reality monitoring 
judgments (i.e. internal versus external sources), Hicks and Marsh (1999) argued that 
only highly discriminable sources enriched memories sufficiently to enable 
individuals, as a means to suppress false recall, to differentiate between items from 
the two presented sources and critical non-presented items. 
Distinctiveness 
Varying the degree of distinctiveness of stimuli (e.g. presenting veridical words with 
accompanying pictures) at encoding acts to enrich memories and thus could be 
viewed as increasing the potential for source monitoring. Much recent work on false 
memories has used distinctiveness at encoding as a way to reduce subsequent false 
memories (e.g. Israel & Schacter 1997). Research has shown that veridical and false 
memories differ in phenomenological complexity, specifically in regard to the detail 
inherent in them, and the reported feelings when 'encoding' them (Neuschatz et at. 
2001). Consequently, as critical words were never encountered at encoding, 
increasing the complexity of veridical items increases the potential for a greater 
phenomenological disparity between veridical and critical words. This would thus aid 
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their differentiation when monitoring, which could account for the decrease in false 
memories when information at encoding is made distinctive. 
Retention interval 
Empirical investigations have been conducted which investigated the role of varying 
retention intervals on true and false memories using the DRM. Retention interval has 
been shown to affect veridical and false memory differently, but studies have been 
somewhat inconsistent in the methodologies they have employed, and thus their 
findings differ. McDermott (1996) found a pattern whereby, as retention interval 
increased, the relative proportion of false memory to veridical memory increase. 
Veridical memory initially exceeded false memory on immediate testing, but a delay 
of 2 days produced a greater proportion of false memory than veridical memory. 
However, this study can be criticised for not equating the memory tests used; initially 
memory was assessed using single test recognition, whereas memory was assessed 
after 2 days using free recall, and memory for all presented lists was tested. Toglia et 
al. (1999) also varied retention interval, and found that veridical memory always 
exceeded false memory, but that whilst veridical memory declined as retention 
interval increased, false memory remained constant. This finding mirrored that of 
Seamon, Luo et al. (2002), who found an inverse relationship between retention 
interval and veridical memory levels, but that retention interval had no effect on false 
memory. One can interpret these findings as being in accordance with the AMF, as 
they can be accounted for in terms of the effect of retention interval on source 
monitoring ability. Traces become less distinct with time, leading to their demise and 
a subsequent drop in memory levels (Thapar & McDermot, 2001). This decline is 
likely to be more detrimental for veridical memories, since any eroding of their traces 
simply results in a reduced probability of later memory of that item. In contrast, whilst 
the erosion of memory traces for critical items also reduces the probability of memory 
for those items, memory for critical items also benefits from retention induced 'lack 
of clarity' for veridical items. This is because as memories for the words become less 
distinct, participants are less able to source monitor and counteract the familiarity 
elicited by critical items, a process which could increase the probability of false 
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memory. These two opponent processes could be hypothesised to 'cancel each other 
out', which could account for the finding that retention interval has not been found to 
affect false memory levels (Toglia et al. 1999; Seamon et al. 2002). 
Ageing and false memories 
Older adults have been found to be more susceptible to false memones, despite 
possessing equivalent or reduced veridical memory relative to younger adults (e.g. 
Balota et al. 1999; Norman & Schacter, 1997). One of the mechanisms proposed to 
account for this finding is a reduced ability for the elderly to source monitor. The 
elderly have been found to be less accurate than younger adults at determining 
whether an event was witnessed in a videotape or viewed in a photograph (Schacter et 
al. 1997), and at distinguishing between whether an item was seen or imagined 
(Henkel et aI.1998). The impairment amongst the elderly in source monitoring ability 
cannot be viewed as an artefact stemming from poorer overall memory, for even when 
their veridical memory is equivalent to younger adults, their source memory has been 
found to be impaired (e.g. Henkel et al. 1998). Benjamin (2001) investigated how 
false memory levels varied with the repetition of DRM study lists in young and older 
adults. It was found that in the younger group, false memory levels were reduced with 
subsequent repetitions, whereas in the elderly group repetition of study lists increased 
false memory levels. Benjamin (2001) accounted for this finding by arguing that with 
successive repetitions, younger adults were able to recollect veridical items, whist 
critical items were supported primarily by familiarity based proceses. At retrieval, 
younger participants were better able to utilise these recollections as a means to derive 
more accurate allocations of source - prior presentation versus familiarity deriving 
from semantic relatedness to veridical items. Consequently, younger participants were 
thought to counteract the familiarity of critical items with an absence of their 
recollection I, leading to a reduction in false memories with repetition. In contrast 
repetition served to increase false memories in the elderly. Benjamin argued that an 
impairment of recollection in the elderly (e.g. Cohen & Faulkner 1989) meant they 
did not increase their potential to source monitor with successive repetitions, and 
I Although not acknowledged by Benjamin C~OOI), theories have been proposed to account for the 
erroneous recollection of false memory items - such as 'phantom recall' (Brainerd el at. 2003). 
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consequently false memories increased monotonically with repetition. Such a finding 
indicates that the potential to source monitor is largely dependent on participants' 
ability to recollect. 
1.3. Repetition at encoding 
It can be argued that repetition has the potential to affect both the activation and 
monitoring processes hypothesised to underlie false memory. With increased 
repetition, there is the potential for repeated activation of critical associates, resulting 
in a greater net strength and a subsequent rise in false memories. In addition, 
increased repetitions also provide the opportunity for richer encoding, which would 
aid monitoring processes and hence assist subjects in differentiating between items 
which were presented and those which were not, resulting in a decrease in false 
memories. The potential for repetition to both increase activation of critical associates 
and increase monitoring ability, and the divergent effect that these two processes have 
on false memory levels, can account for the differential effect of repetition on false 
memory. Repetition has been shown to both increase false memories (e.g. Seamon et 
af. 2002; Benjamin 2001; Schacter et af. 1998) and decrease them (e.g. Benjamin 
2001; Schacter et al. 1998 ;). In the cases where false memory has been shown to 
increase with repetition, specific methodologies employed, or the nature of the 
subjects used, meant that monitoring processes were impaired. For example, Seamon 
et al. 2002 showed an increase in false memory with repetition when subjects encoded 
the DRM lists at a 20m/s exposure rate. Seamon et af. (2002) hypothesised that such 
an exposure rate was sufficient for participants to encode the words and for this 
encoding process to give rise to automatic activation within semantic networks. Yet it 
was hypothesised that this time was insufficient for participants to encode item 
specific information. Consequently, at test, subjects were impaired in their ability to 
differentiate between familiarity incurred from previously viewing a word, and 
fan1iliarity which derived from semantic activation. In contrast, when Seamon et af. 
(2002) gave n10re time for subjects to encode the lists, repetition sen'ed to decrease 
false memory. Seamon I!{ af. (2002) claimed that this time was sufficient for item-
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specific information to be encoded, aiding the processes of determining which items 
were indeed presented. Similarly, Benjamin (2001) found an increase in false 
recognition with repetition when subjects were forced to make speeded recognition 
decisions. Consequently, as argued by Benjamin, these subjects were reliant on 
familiarity alone as the criterion for prior presentation as they did not have time 
employ monitoring processes which could have served to derive the source of that 
familiarity. In addition, Schacter et al. (1998) found that repetition of study lists and 
testing trials increased false memories in Korsakoff amnesic patients. Schacter et al. 
(1998) argue that this is evidence for how veridical episodic memory can suppress 
levels of false memory. In addition, that subjects can use veridical episodic traces as 
evidence for prior presentation, and use the lack of such traces for critical items as 
evidence that they were not presented during encoding (Schacter et al. 1998). Such 
episodic traces are impaired amongst Korsakoff amnesics, thus reducing their 
potential to counteract the increased familiarity engendered by critical items due to 
repetition. In contrast, adults who did not have Korsakoff amnesia, demonstrated a 
reduction of false memory with repetition (Schacter et al.1998). 
1.3.1. Inverted V-shaped curve 
As previously mentioned, a number of experiments have independently demonstrated 
the potential for repetition of DRM study lists to selectively increase or decrease false 
memory. To date, only one experiment has used, within a single study trial, varying 
amounts of repetition on a within-subjects basis to demonstrate a rise, and then 
subsequent fall, of false memory with repetition (Seamon et al. 2002). One can equate 
repetition with the degree of learning. This differential effect of repetition can be 
accounted for by inferring a relationship between the extent activation and monitoring 
processes will influence memory decisions based upon the degree of learning. 
Initially, activation of critical items occurs, accounting for the initial increase in false 
memories with repetition. With increased repetitions, at some point, the potential for 
monitoring and thus distinguishing between items presented and those which were not 
is possible, and a subsequent drop in false memories results. Benjamin (1001) forms a 
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parallel between activation and familiarity based processes. He argues that the 
activation of critical items results in a subjective sense of familiarity felt for those 
items which underlies their endorsement at test. Benjamin then goes on to argue that 
with increased learning, the potential to recollect veridical items and thus better 
distinguish between items which were presented and those which were not is 
increased. Consequently, based on arguments by Benjamin (2001) a causal 
relationship between increased learning, recollection and the ability to source monitor 
is formed. This perspective is somewhat simplified as it fails to acknowledge the 
potential for the erroneous recollection of false memory items (e.g. Brainerd et al. 
2003). Nevertheless, recollection of false and veridical items has been shown to differ 
in the complexity of the memories (Neuschatz et al. 2001), thus when source 
monitoring, it should still be able to differentiate between present and non-presented 
items. Using the AMF and familiarity/recollection distinctions, it should be possible 
to modify the inverted u-shaped curve by manipulating factors which differentially 
affect these dual processes. Alcohol serves as a variable with which do this. 
1.4. Alcohol and memory 
The effects of alcohol on veridical memories has been researched extensively since 
the mid 1960s (see section 1.4.1). In contrast, the effect of alcohol on false memories 
has received very little attention (the noticeable exceptions being Milani & Curran 
2000; Mintzer & Griffiths 2001, see section 1.4.2.). Further research into the way in 
which alcohol affects false memories thus warrants investigation. Moreover, alcohol 
can also be used as a tool to investigate the mechanisms underlying false memories. 
This follows on from a tradition where researchers have used pharmacological agents 
as a means to provide insight into underlying mechanisms: "A number of 
investigators, however, have systematically used drugs as tools to explore cognition; 
for these researchers drugs are seen as tools with which to create reversible and 
graded lesions which can be used to investigate dissociations in different cogniti\'e 
dOInains. Their agenda is clearly driven by cognitive issues rather than by pure 
psychopharmacology" (Duka et at. 1996, pg. 408). 
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1.4.1. Alcohol and veridical memory 
The effect of alcohol on memory - whether it has a deleterious or facilitative effect-
has been shown to be dependent upon the temporal relationship between alcohol 
administration, the encoding of stimuli and the administration of the test (Brinbaum & 
Parker 1977). Alcohol can have a deleterious effect on memory for infonnation 
encoded when intoxicated, and this effect is well established (e.g. Parker and 
Birnbaum 1976). In contrast, memory for information encoded prior to an alcoholic 
drink has been shown to be enhanced relative to when a placebo is consumed (e.g. 
Parker et al. 1980). Both these effects will be addressed in turn. 
1.4.1.1. Anterograde effects 
The detrimental anterograde effects of alcohol on episodic long tenn memory are now 
well established. Alcohol, like other psychoactive drugs such as benzodiazepines, has 
consistently been shown to result in a dose-dependent amnesia for material learnt 
post-consumption (e.g. Parker & Birnbaum 1976). For example, Parker et al. (1974) 
found that the ability of participants to recall words and organise material decreased 
with increasing doses of alcohol. Ryback (1971) characterised the detrimental effects 
of alcohol on memory as a dose-related continuum, with minor impairments at one 
end, and with far greater doses culminating in the alcoholic blackout. (e.g. Goodwin 
et al. 1970). Experiments which have manipulated the time of intoxication have 
determined that the locus of the anterograde impainnent is thought to act primarily at 
encoding (Parker et al. 1976). For example, Birnbaum et al. (1978) equated the initial 
storage of two groups, and provided alcohol only at retrieval for one of the groups. It 
was found that alcohol intoxication [mean BAC = .8g/l] did not impair memory 
relative to a placebo control on measures of speed, accuracy nor the benefit afforded 
by cues, yet alcohol was found to impair new learning [when mean BAC = .07g/ml]. 
The effect of alcohol for material learnt whilst intoxicated has been found to be more 
marked for recall than for recognition; for example, Hashtroudi et al. (1984) found 
that verbal recognition memory tasks appeared to be relatively resistant to the effect 
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of alcohol. Such a finding indicates that the anterograde amnesic effect induced by 
alcohol does not affect all memory processes equally and consequently cannot be 
viewed as a unitary phenomenon. In line with this analysis is the consistent finding 
that alcohol differentially affects dual memory processes, with the greater impairment 
reserved for controlled explicit memory processes. In contrast, automatic familiarity 
based processes, especially when assessed using implicit tasks, appear largely 
unaffected by alcohol intoxication (e.g. Kirschner & Sayette 2003). The differential 
effect of alcohol on implicit and explicit and explicit memory was empirically 
demonstrated by Lister et al. (1991). In an elegantly designed experiment, it was 
demonstrated that a dose of 0.6g1kg of alcohol served to impair significantly free 
recall of material relative to a placebo control group. In contrast, they were able to 
show that memory for the same material was found to remain intact when tested under 
implicit conditions, as demonstrated using both backwards reading and stem 
completion. Similarly, alcohol has been found to affect controlled memory processes, 
as assessed by free recall, whilst leaving automatic memory processes, such as 
frequency estimations, largely unaffected (Tracey & Bates, 1999). These findings 
have been substantiated by recent work done by Kirchner and Sayette (2003) who 
used the process dissociation procedure (PDP) (see Jacoby 1998) to derive 
quantitative estimates of controlled and automatic memory processes and their 
relative impairment under alcohol. They concluded that alcohol affected controlled 
influences on a memory task, whilst appearing to not affect automatic influences, and~ 
through the use of the PDP, they were able to demonstrate the magnitude of this 
differential impairment. 
1.4.1.2. Retrograde effects 
The effects of alcohol on memory are not confined to memory reduction, instead, the 
temporal relation between drinking and encoding has been demonstrated to determine 
whether alcohol can serve to facilitate or impair memory. Material learned prior to 
alcohol consumption has been demonstrated to be enhanced, relative to a placebo 
control. Parker ct al. (1980) found that 1.0ml/kg [O.8g/kg] of alcohol consumed 
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immediately after encoding served to improve significantly next day recall, relative to 
a placebo control group. Lamberty et al. (1990) demonstrated that this retrograde 
facilitation could be extended to the domain of recognition for prose leant prior to 
consuming 1.0ml/kg [0.8g/kg] alcohol relative to a placebo control group. In addition, 
the conception of alcohol-induced retrograde facilitation has been demonstrated using 
recognition of scenic slides (Parker et al. 1981). Two principle theories exist with 
which to account for the mechanism underlying the facilitation effect, one which 
utilises principles of interference, the other which focuses upon the significance of 
trace consolidation. Proponents of the consolidation hypothesis (Parker et al. 1980; 
Parker et al. 1981) argued that the consolidation of memory traces were enhanced by 
the neural stimulant properties of alcohol, an effect thought to be particularly 
influenced by rising blood alcohol concentrations. In contrast, interference based 
explanations argue that the facilitation effect under alcohol can be accounted for using 
principles of retroactive interference. It is specifically argued that a reduced ability for 
intoxicated subjects to form new memories serves to reduce the degree of retroactive 
interference for the material learnt prior to the drink being consumed (Mensink & 
Raaijmakers 1988; Moulton et al. 2005). The findings that alcohol affects memory 
acquisition and that there are stronger retroactive effects on recall than on recognition, 
have been cited as evidence for interference based explanations (Tyson & Schirmuly 
1993). In addition, an experiment conducted by Mueller et al. (1983) specifically to 
investigate the validity of both the interference and consolidation based explanations, 
found an immunity to time delays for the retroactive effect. As the degree of 
consolidation is thought to be time-specific, a corresponding variation in the extent of 
the retroactive facilitation would have been predicted. Consequently, this finding has 
been interpreted as ceding support for the interference based account. 
104.2. Alcohol and False Memory 
To date, only two published studies have investigated the effect of alcohol on false 
memories using the DRM paradigm (Mintzer and Griffiths, 2001; Milani and Curran, 
2000), with somewhat equivocal findings. 
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Milani and Curran (2000) conducted double-blind cross-over design, and either a 
relatively small dose of alcohol (0.26-0.28 g/kg) or a placebo beverage was 
administered before the encoding phase. An almost immediate free recall test revealed 
no significant differences between the placebo and alcohol group in either mean levels 
of veridical recall (mean respective levels of 54 and 51 percent) nor critical recall (39 
and 40 percent respectively). Results from the subsequent recognition test 
demonstrated that the placebo participants provided a significantly larger proportion 
of studied words than critical items, but that this difference was not significant in the 
alcohol condition. Thus alcohol did not reduce veridical recognition relative to the 
placebo group (72 versus 74 percent respectively) but the increase in false recall for 
the alcohol group relative to the placebo group (65 versus 54 percent) rendered the 
difference between false and veridical memory non-significant in the alcohol 
condition, but significant in the placebo group. This meant recognition was more 
accurate in the placebo group. In addition, alcohol affected the nature of recollective 
experience for critical items recognised (as measured using remember / know 
responses, Gardiner (1988)), resulting in significantly more remember responses for 
critical items in the alcohol condition relative to the placebo group. 
The second study investigating the effect of alcohol on false memories using the 
DRM paradigm was a dose-response study devised by Mintzer and Griffiths (2001). 
Either a placebo beverage, or one of two doses of alcohol were administered prior to 
the encoding phase, one of which was comparable to the dose used by Milani and 
Curran (0.27 g/kg), the other was a somewhat larger dose of 0.60 g/kg. The study was 
conducted in response to the finding of Milani and Curran (2000) which found the 
tendency for false recognition rates to increase under alcohol. It was this finding 
which Mintzer and Griffiths found counter intuitive based upon the similarities 
between alcohol and benzodiazepines. Recent findings that benzodiazepines have no 
effect on false memory using the DRM paradigm (Huron et af. 2001) or serve to 
decrease false memory (Mintzer & Griffiths 2001) thus led Minzer and Griffiths to 
conduct a dose response study to investigate further the effect of alcohol on false 
memories. Furthermore, Mintzer and Griffiths (2001) argued that a limitation of 
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Milani and Curran (2000) was that the increase in remember responses to critical 
items in the recognition test amongst the alcohol group relative to the placebo 
controls, occurred only for words which had been previously recalled in a free recall 
test. They argued that such a difference in recollective experience could be accounted 
for by an alcohol induced impairment in distinguishing between items presented to 
them in the study phase, and items they had recalled in the free recall test. This would 
amount to a source monitoring error, as opposed to increased susceptibility to false 
memones per se. 
Mintzer and Griffiths (2001) found a significant effect of alcohol on false recognition 
only for the high alcohol dose (0.6 g/kg), where alcohol significantly reduced the 
amount of veridical recognition responses. Neither dose affected the proportion of 
recognition responses made to critical items. This applied to relative false remember 
and know responses, for both doses relative to the placebo, and was thus in contrast to 
the finding by Millani and Curran (2000). This lead Mintzer and Griffiths (2001) to 
conclude that Miliani and Curran (2000) had simply detected more false remember 
recognition responses due to source confusion. This source confusion was 
hypothesised to have arisen from an alcohol induced impairment in participants 
ability to distinguish between words that had been presented to them during the initial 
study phase and words they had falsely recalled during the free recall test. 
1.4.2.1. Benzodiazepines and false memory 
To date, there have only been two studies investigating the effect of alcohol on false 
memories using the DRM paradigm. Insight into the way in which alcohol may affect 
false memories can be gained through looking at the ways in which other drugs have 
been found to effect false memories. Benzodiazepines are known to have a similar 
pharmacology to alcohol, with both drugs acting to enhance the actions of the 
neurotransmitter GABA. The effects of benzodiazepines on veridical memory are 
well established (e.g. see Taylor and Tinklenberg 1987 for a review). The transient 
anterograde amnesia induced by benzodiazepines for e\'ents encoded prior to their 
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consumption has been compared to the effects of alcohol (Duka et al. 1996). Thus, the 
findings of studies that have assessed the effects of benzodiazepines on false memory 
using the DRM paradigm are worth noting, as one could predict that since alcohol 
mirrors the effects of benzodiazepines in veridical memory, such parallels may also 
exist in false memory (Mintzer & Griffiths 2001). Hurron et al. (2001) tested the 
affects of lorazepam and diazepam, two widely prescribed benzodiazepines, on false 
memories using the DRM paradigm. The study employed a double-blind placebo 
controlled design, and participants were assigned to either one of three groups; 
lorazepam, diazepam or the placebo control group. Drugs were administered prior to 
the encoding phase, and timed such that learning would coincide with their peak 
plasma concentrations. Immediate free recall was performed after the presentation of 
each list, and a recognition test was performed 15 minutes after the learning phase 
was completed. Analysis of the veridical items demonstrated that both lorazepam and 
diazepam served to reduce correct recognition, and exploration of this effect revealed 
that this was primarily due to a reduction in 'remember responses', with levels of 
veridical 'know' responses remaining comparable, and indeed slightly elevated, 
compared to the placebo group. In contrast, neither lorazepam nor diazepam reduced 
levels of false memory relative to the placebo control group, in terms of overall false 
recognition rates, and rates of 'remember' responses to false memory items. Huron et 
al. (2001) account for this pharmacological dissociation by proposing that 
benzodiazepines seemingly do not impair the 'gist' trace which is formed during 
encoding. Consequently the preservation of this trace results in levels of false memory 
which do not differ from the placebo control group. In addition, they argue that, in 
accordance with Curran et al. (1993), benzodiazepines impair the encoding of 
contextual episodic information and/or the binding of this information to studied 
items. This can account for the selective impairment of veridical 'remember' 
responses. Since no such reduction was found for false remember responses, they 
argue that, "Evidence that false recognition was intact indicates that benzodiazepines 
do not affect the ability to form a representation of the semantic gist of the study list, 
generate episodic content and context from studied items and bind this information to 
the more general gist information" (pg. 208). Whilst such an argument fits the data 
obtained, Huron ct al. (2001) do not offer an explanation of \\"h1' the processing of 
29 
contextual episodic information and/or its subsequent binding to memory traces 
should be impaired for veridicical verbatim traces, but remain intact for gist traces. 
Without proposing a mechanism which acts selectively to processes and bind 
contextual information for gist traces and not verbatim traces, this interpretation is 
lacking. Such an explanation can be classified as falling within a multistorage 
framework (Benjamin 2001), as it is dependent upon the explanatory power of distinct 
gist and verbatim traces to account for the effect in question, in accordance with the 
terminology used in fuzzy trace theory. However, an alternative hypothesis can be 
formed using the AMF. Under this explanatory framework, the presence of contextual 
episodic information for veridical items serves to lower false memories, providing 
participants accurately monitor at test and use the absence of such information to 'edit 
out' false memories. Thus, providing that the activation of critical items remains 
intact, an absence of such contextual information would act to increase false memory 
levels, and indeed a trend increase in critical items was observed for participants in 
the Lorazepam condition, but not for participants in the diazepam group. 
1.4.2.2. Alcohol and false memory: Mechanisms of action 
Investigation into the effect of alcohol on false memories is still required for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, based on previous research, the results obtained to date (Millani & 
Curran 2000; Mintzer & Griffiths 2001) are still equivocal and have yet to be 
empirically reconciled. Secondly, regarding the theoretical basis of how alcohol may 
impair false memories, only highly limited speculations currently exist (Millani & 
Curran 2000) and these are not grounded in contemporary theories of false memories. 
The AMF provides a compatible framework to combine with the known effects of 
alcohol as a means to make grounded predictions about the way in which alcohol 
should modulate false memory levels. Indeed, a strong prediction can be made that 
alcohol n1ight impair false memory levels. Such a hypothesis is founded on alcohol's 
propensity to impair semantic encoding (e.g. Weissenborn & Duka 2000), blocking 
the activation of critical items. In addition, a tentative prediction can be formed 
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regarding the propensity for alcohol to impair monitoring. Whilst such a speculation 
is not yet demonstrated in the literature, empirical evidence does exist which 
substantiates its formation. As previously established, the AMF is an opponent 
process theory as it postulates the existence of two distinct mechanisms; an activation 
component, which, when enhanced, can result in an increase in false memories, and a 
monitoring component, which, when successfully executed, can decrease false 
memories. Consequently, arguments surrounding the possible potential for alcohol to 
disrupt both activation and monitoring processes has opposing consequences for false 
memory levels. Impaired activation is thought to decrease false memories (Thapar & 
McDermott 2001), whilst impaired monitoring is thought to increase false memories 
(Benjamin 2001). One can argue that if alcohol were to affect both activation and 
monitoring mechanism, their opposing effects on false memory levels would not serve 
to cancel each other out: in accordance with argument relating to the inverted U-
shaped relationship between repetition and false memory levels, one can derive the 
conclusion that, effects on activation processes must prevail. Only when a threshold 
of activation is reached within critical items can their successful monitoring be 
executed. Thus, the primary prediction is for alcohol to impair false memories through 
decreased activation. A tentative second hypothesis can also be formed that, with 
increased learning, monitoring processes may be disrupted under the effect of alcohol. 
The discussion will therefore first centre on alcohol's propensity to disrupt semantic 
processing and consequent semantic activation - leading to a potential decrease in 
false memories. Secondly, reasons to expect that alcohol may impair monitoring will 
be addressed and there will be a discussion of the potential implications of this for 
false memories. 
1.4.2.2.1. The effect of alcohol on semantic activation 
As previously mentioned, there are two hypothesised routes for the activation of the 
critical item under the AMF (Roediger et al. 2001). The first is by conscious thought 
of the critical item at encoding, the likelihood of which is increased though encoding 
techniques which employ organisational and elaborative processing strategies. The 
second is the automatic spread of activation within semantic networks. In order to 
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hypothesise how alcohol may effect the semantic activation of critical items the way 
, . 
in which alcohol might affect these two possible routes of activation must be 
considered. 
Conscious route 
Parker et al. (1974) hypothesised that "the more demanding the task the greater the 
impairment from alcohol" [pg. 826]. Johnson (1977) qualified this claim by defining 
'demanding' as being the extent to which a task necessitates the "finding or 
generating [of] associations, interrelationships or structures"(pg. 46). These processes 
can be viewed as analogous to those implicated in the elaborative semantic processing 
of DRM lists. As elaborative strategies are shown to increase false memory levels 
(Libby & Neisser, 2001), an impairment induced by intoxication could serve to reduce 
false memories under an alcohol challenge. Likewise, the attention-allocation model 
(AAM) proposed by Steel and Josephs (1988) argued that alcohol has two central 
detrimental effects on attentional processing. Firstly, alcohol impairs the capacity for 
controlled and effortful processing, and secondly alcohol narrows attention to the 
most salient internal and external cues. It is these dual effects, as argued by Steel and 
Josephs, which are thought to give rise to an alcohol myopia, which results in the 
processing of "fewer cues, and because of the impairment of one's ability to engage 
in control processing, the cues that one perceives are poorly understood and difficult 
to relate to existing knowledge". This model is thus in accordance with the theorising 
of Johnson (1977), and provides a theoretical basis for the reduction in conscious 
elaborative processing under alcohol, which could result in a reduction of false 
memories. Work done by Parker et al. (1974) empirically investigated the potential 
for alcohol to disrupt cognitive processes. It was demonstrated that a high dose of 
alcohol served to impair category clustering in free recall. They took this to mean that 
higher-order conceptual processes were impeded during intoxication. In addition, 
Parker et al. (1976) found that a high dose of alcohol (1.0mllkg [0.8g/kg], which leads 
to a typical peak BAC of 0.7g/l) impaired paired associative learning. The authors 
hypothesised that this effect could possibly be attributed to the inefficient utilisation 
of associative strategies under intoxication. The impairment of such processes has 
implications for the forming of conscious associations between veridical items, a 
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process which is thought to be a potential route to increasing false memones 
(Roediger et al. 2001). 
Automatic Route 
Levels of Processing 
In 1977 Craik published an article that made comparisons between the effects of 
aging and alcoholic intoxication on memory performance, and used the levels of 
processing (LOP) framework to account for these similarities. According to his 
argument, alcohol serves to reduce the depth at which items are processed, with depth 
being defined as "a continuum of processing running from shallow sensory analyses 
requiring little attention to deeper semantic processes through which the stimulus is 
identified, interpreted and enriched by associations with stored knowledge" (pg. 10). 
Since studies which have increased depth of processing found a resultant increase in 
false memory levels (Tog1ia et al. 1999; Rhodes & Anastasi 2000; Thapar & 
McDermott 2001), the effect of alcohol on LOP has implications for the way in which 
alcohol may affect false memory. 
The amnesic effects of alcohol consumed prior to encoding are well documented, with 
studies consistently demonstrating an impairment of free recall (Birnbaum et al. 1978) 
and cued recall (e.g. Duka et al. 2001) relative to a placebo control group. Craik 
(1977) argues that such a pattern of impaired memory parallels the findings of 
experiments which manipulate encoding level, with impaired retention for shallowly 
processed items relative to memory levels for items deeply processed (e.g. Craik 
1975). This leaves open the possibility that a reduction in processing depth is the 
mechanism by which retention is impaired in intoxicated participants. 
Craik and Tulving (1975) argued that retention is enhanced as a result of deeper 
processing by greater degrees of elaboration of traces, with elaboration being defined 
as the richness and complexity of operations performed on stimuli at encoding (Craik 
1977). As alcohol has been shown to reduce attentional and processing resources (e.g. 
Schweizer, Vogel-Sprott, Dixon, & Jolicoeur. 2005). it can be hypothesised that the 
performance of complex elaboration processing under alcohol is likely to be impaired. 
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In addition, Craik and Tulving (1975) suggest that elaboration is enhanced when 
integration occurs between the remembered item and its encoding context, resulting in 
the formation of a coherent unit. The selective impairment of 'remember' responses 
under alcohol, with the preservation of know responses (Duka et al. 2001) has been 
taken as evidence for the severing of item and context in memory under alcohol. This, 
combined with the speculations of Craik and Tulving (1975) could account for one of 
the mechanisms by which alcohol impairs memory. 
Priming 
One of the ways in which the effect of alcohol on the depth of processing can be 
assessed is though examination of the empirical literature surrounding the effect of 
alcohol on semantic priming, as semantic priming is found to increase with depth of 
processing (Bentin, Kutas & Hillyard, 1993). The effect of alcohol on semantic 
priming has implications for how an alcohol challenge will affect the generation of 
false memories using the DRM paradigm. As the AMF theorises that the key 
mechanism which elicits false memories is activation within semantic networks, it 
follows that if alcohol disrupts semantic processing, as demonstrated by semantic 
priming, then this may serve as a possible route through which alcohol may lower 
levels of false memories. 
At present, the literature surrounding the effect of alcohol on semantic priming is 
somewhat contradictory. Lister et al. (1991) found that an alcohol challenge of 
0.6g/kg did not affect semantic priming as determined by backwards reading of words 
which were associated to previously studied words (semantically related pair 
presented immediately before, N = 9). This apparent preservation of semantic 
priming under alcohol was supported by a recent study by Ray et al. (2004), who 
investigated the effect of alcohol on an implicit semantic priming task. Semantic 
priming was assessed using a lexical decision task for semantically related words, and 
alcohol was found not to impair reaction times, relative to a control condition. 
However, a study performed by Sayette ef al. (2001) used a mediated semantic 
priming task, and found that an alcohol challenge disrupted semantic priming. \\nen 
trying to reconcile this apparent discrepancy in the way in which alcohol affects 
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semantic pnmIng, it can be argued that these studies differed in the strength of 
semantic activation required in order to detect a priming effect. Lister et al. (2001) 
minimised the retention interval between the target word and the semantic prime, and 
Ray et al. (2004) employed a encoding technique for the studied words which 
maximised semantic priming (Craik & Lockhart 1972), as it required participants to 
make liking ratings. Since activation within semantic networks increases with depth 
of processing (e.g. Thapar & McDermott 2001), such an encoding technique would 
increase the likelihood of semantic activation, and thus the probability of obtaining 
semantic priming. This could serve to mask any impairment caused by alcohol, and it 
remains a possibility that the 'spontaneous' spread of semantic activation when 
processing is passive/not controlled may be impaired under alcohol. Sayette et al. 
(2001), who found that alcohol impaired semantic priming, used a mediated semantic 
priming task. In this task, processing of an initial word took place (e.g. lion), but 
priming for its direct semantic associate was not assessed (e.g. tiger). Rather, 
semantic priming for a semantic associate of this (e.g. stripes) was assessed. As this 
task used second order semantic priming as its measure, and alcohol was found to 
impair this process, it can be suggested that alcohol has the potential to disrupt 
semantic priming, but whether this effect is detected or not depends on the sensitivity 
of the priming test used. This poses a problem in regard to making definite predictions 
about whether alcohol will affect semantic priming, and if so, whether this effect will 
extrapolate into a reduction in false memory. 
Semantic Processing and Associations 
It has been hypothesised that the consumption of alcohol acts to block semantic 
processing (Craik, 1977). A variety of different empirical studies have demonstrated 
the different ways in which alcohol has the potential to affect the forming of 
associations. Research done by Birnbaum et al. (1980) demonstrated that alcohol at 
encoding served to disrupt the production of semantic context required to encode the 
meaning from information being processed. Similarly, research by Rosen and Lee 
(1976) demonstrated that alcohol acted to inhibit the implementation of semantic 
processing required to organise recall strategies. More recent research conducted by 
Weissenborn and Duka (2000) found that alcohol at encoding eliminated the benefit 
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afforded by the presentation of high associations as a contextual cue for retrieval. 
Participants studied pairs of related words that were either high or low semantic 
associates. It was found that the group which consumed alcohol at both encoding and 
at retrieval recalled significantly fewer words than the placebo group, but this was 
true only for words from the high association and not the low association pairs. As 
false memories have been shown to decrease with an encoding strategy that is not 
semantically focused (Libby & N eisser 2001), alcohol could thus be hypothesised to 
reduce false memories. 
1.4.2.2.2. The effect of alcohol on monitoring 
Johnson (1977) makes the proposition that drinking alcohol might impair a persons' 
ability to distinguish fact from fantasy, a type of source monitoring termed 'reality 
monitoring'. Johnson mentions that this hypothesis would mean that even in the event 
of similar processing at encoding, such impairment will manifest itself at the time of 
retrieval. As the process of reality monitoring is dependent on ones' ability to 
differentiate between items presented and items not presented, it can be argued that 
the potential for successful reality monitoring is dependent upon the detail inherent 
within memories. Consequently the extent to which recollective experience is affected 
by alcohol has implications for monitoring ability, and must therefore be addressed. 
Curran and Hildebrandt (1999) conducted a study to investigate the dissociative 
effects of alcohol on recollective experience. They found that alcohol selectively 
impaired remember responses, but left know responses relatively intact. Curran and 
Hildebrandt (1999) point out that, remember responses require not only memory for 
the item in question, but actual conscious recollection of prior exposure to the item. 
and thus the processing of context is integral to the remember response. This lead to 
the argument that alcohol may disrupt the ability to encode contextual information, or 
to associate the encoding context with the study items. \vhich could account for the 
selecti ve reduction in remen1ber memories tmder alcohol. Curran and Hildebrandt 
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(1999) cite Steele and Joseph's (1990) model of "alcohol induced myopia" as a 
possible theoretical framework that could account for such an effect. The model 
proposes that alcohol reduces attentional capacity by virtue of a 'myopia' whereby 
intoxicated participants focus only on the most salient cues. Consequently, the range 
of cues attended to are reduced under alcohol, resulting in the possible impairment of 
peripheral cues, such as context. 
This effect could have implications for false memories under alcohol. The activation 
monitoring framework postulates the necessity for context enriched memories as a 
means to differentiate between words that were presented, and critical words that 
appear familiar by virtue of their association to presented words. In addition, 
Schacter and colleagues proposed a 'distinctiveness account' of false memories, 
arguing that as material learnt becomes increasingly distinctive, a corresponding drop 
in false memories is observed (Dodson & Schacter 2001; Israel & Schacter 1997; 
Schacter et al. 1999). This is because, at retrieval, participants are able to use this 
distinctive information to differentiate between which items where presented and 
which items were not, aiding the monitoring process. Thus, if alcohol reduces the 
encoding of contextual information and enriched item-specific information, then it 
follows that participants will be impaired in their ability to source monitor, leading to 
a possible rise in false memories under alcohol at encoding. Such a hypothesis is 
substantiated by Milani and Curran (2000), who cite work done by Gardiner et al. 
(1998) which discusses the mechanisms that may underlie false remember responses 
and suggest that such mistakes can either occur when recollected details are 
mistakenly attributed to the study context, or if details from the study context are 
retrieved, but wrongly attributed a non-presented item. Consequently, Milani and 
Curran propose that enhanced remember responses to critical items under alcohol 
"may reflect source misattribution induced by alcohol" (pg. 401). This conclusion is 
consistent with the 'myopia' -induced disruption of context encoding under alcohol. 
since correct source attribution can be viewed as dependent upon the encoding of 
context. 
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A final perspective regarding a possible increase in false memory under alcohol is 
made by Milani and Curran (2000), who put forward the proposition that the effect of 
alcohol on false memory may resemble that of aging, as a greater susceptibility to 
illusory memory has been found in the elderly. Research in the elderly suggests that 
they have a greater susceptibility to false memories due to a deficit in source 
monitoring (e.g. Dehon & Bredart 2004), an effect which has been attributed to a 
relative impairment in recollective as opposed to familiarity based processes within 
the elderly (Benjamin 2001). 
1.4.2.3. Alcohol, false memories and repetition. 
To summanse, it has been argued that alcohol will lead to a decrease in false 
memories relative to a placebo control group resulting from decreased semantic 
activation when intoxicated. In addition, the potential for alcohol to impair monitoring 
processes has also been raised as a possibility. As monitoring processes operate once 
a threshold in learning has been surpassed (Seamon et al. 2002), only then could any 
potential impairment in monitoring under alcohol be observed. As previously 
discussed, repetition serves as a variable with which to increase learning. 
Consequently, repetition acts as a useful manipulation to use in conjunction with 
alcohol. Based on previous research, it can be expected that, once lists are sufficiently 
well learnt, repetition will lead to a decline in false memories (Seamon et al. 2002; 
Benjamin 200 I). It can be predicted that this decline should be more readily obtained 
in the placebo group relative to the alcohol group, because of two different 
hypothesised mechanisms. Firstly, due to impaired learning in the alcohol group, 
baseline false memory levels will be initially lower in the alcohol group than the 
placebo group. Consequently, the rise in activation levels as a function of repetition is 
likely be greater in the alcohol group than the placebo group. and this could translate 
into greater increases in false memories with repetition. Alternati\'ely. due to the 
potential ill1pairment in monitoring ability, intoxicated participants may be less able to 
differentiate between \'eridical and critical items. Research has shown that intact 
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recollection is required in order to be able to reject false memory items with the 
increased repetition of study lists (Jones 2005). As recollective memory is selectively 
impaired under alcohol, participants may not be able to reject false memories with 
increased repetitions. 
1.5. Aims and summary of experiments 
Understanding the effect of alcohol on false memories was a primary aim of this 
thesis. Study list repetition was employed to explore the potentially complex ways in 
which alcohol may affect the dual mechanisms underlying false memories, as 
specified by the AMF. Observation of the way in which repetition and alcohol 
modulated false memory levels was used to gain insight into the mechanisms 
underlying false memories. 
All experiments used repetition as a manipulation. Initial experiments [Experiments 1 
and 2] investigated the way in which the retrograde facilitative effects and 
anterograde impairment effects of alcohol affected false memories. Due to the 
differential effect of alcohol on implicit and explicit memories, both memory 
measures were taken. Based on the complexity of the findings from the first two 
experiments, subsequent studies did not pursue an investigation of the facilitative 
effects of alcohol on false memories. 
Experiment 3 focused on the anterograde effects of alcohol on false memones. 
Explicit memory was assessed using free recall. Implicit memory was also assessed 
and awareness measures were taken. 
Experiments 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were a series of cognitive experiments designed to elicit 
the inverted U-shaped relationship between false memories and repetition. A number 
of manipulations were made to elicit this relationship; reduced retention intervaL a 
warning about the nature of the false memory paradigm and a source monitoring 
paradigm were all employed. 
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Experiment 9 investigated how alcohol modulated the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between false memories and repetition. Words were presented with pictures and a 
source monitoring procedure was administered at test. This experiment provided 
insight into how alcohol shifted the inverted U. 
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Chapter 2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Rational 
This chapter is concerned with common methodologies and stimuli that are used 
within this thesis. Firstly, the type of alcohol and placebo drinks administered 
remained constant throughout experiments which employed drink as a between 
subjects factor (Chapters 3, 4, & 6). Section 2.2. provides details of a pilot study 
designed to test the extent the alcohol and placebo beverages could be discriminated. 
Section 2.3. deals with the stimuli presented at encoding. The DRM (Deese 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott 1995) paradigm was used as the task throughout the thesis to 
elicit false memories. Whilst this paradigm remained constant, the actual stimuli used 
varied dependent on the specific task demands. DRM lists taken from the Stadler et 
al. (1999) norms were used in Chapters 3-6. In addition, in experiments where 
implicit stem completion tests were used (Chapters 3 & 4), these lists were modified 
and additional ones were created to ensure they fit the criteria for stem completion, as 
specified by McKone and Murphy, (2000) (see section 2.3.). Section 2.4. deals with a 
series of pilot studies run to determine whether newly created lists differed from those 
in the Stadler et al. (1999) norms in terms of key features, specifically BAS, baseline 
stem completion rates and probability of eliciting a false memory. Methodological 
details concerning presentation rates of stimuli, amounts of repetitions used, retention 
interval and type of test employed varied between experiments. Specific details can be 
found in the individual experimental chapters (Chapters 3 - 6). Lastly, section 2.5. 
deals with issues around consent and common questionnaires and tasks. 
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2.2. Drinks 
2.2.1. Pilot 1: Drinks 
Pilot study 1 was designed to determine the extent to which the alcohol and placebo 
beverages could be discriminated when angostura bitters was the masking agent. 
Method 
Participants 
10 participants, all of whom were postgraduate students at the University of Sussex. 
Materials and procedure 
The methodology employed by Duka et al. (1999) was followed, and the alcohol 
beverage consisted of 0.2g/kg participants' body weight alcohol, diluted with tonic 
water plus making agent. The placebo drink was identical to this, but alcohol was 
excluded. 
Participants were in one of four conditions, and were provided with either two alcohol 
beverages, two placebo beverages, alcohol followed by placebo, or placebo followed 
by alcohol. The beverages were provided consecutively and, for each drink, 
participants were required to state whether they thought it was alcohol or placebo and 
provide liking ratings on a ten-point scale. 
Results 
Discriminatory ability 
Beverage 1 
Alcohol Placebo 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
2 (50%) :2 (50(%) 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 
Beverage 2 
Alcohol Placebo 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
3 (50%) 3 (50(%) I :2 (50%) 2 (500/0) 
I 
Table 2.1. Identification of drink consumed 
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Table 2.1. shows that participants were at chance when determining whether a drink 
was either alcohol or placebo, and that they remained at chance for their second 
beverage. As subjects consistently performed at chance, there was no difference 
between participants' ability to recognise whether a drink was placebo or alcohol. The 
expectancy that one has consumed alcohol has been shown to increase false memory 
levels (Assefi & Garry 2003). Consequently, by making the alcohol and placebo drink 
indistinguishable, the expectancy effects induced by the taste of the drink would have 
been minimised. 
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Figure 2.1. Graph to show mean liking ratings for alcohol and placebo 
beverages. 
Inspection of figure 2.1. demonstrates that mean liking ratings for placebo and alcohol 
beverages were comparable, and did not change for the second drink consumed. 
Ensuring that the beverage is pleasant and that this liking rating does not sufficientl 
differ between alcohol and placebo beverages is necessary in memory research. 
Pharmacological agents which manipulate mood have been shown to affect memory 
perforn1ance. Agents which enhance cheerfulness (e.g. the herbal anxiolytic kava-
ka a) nhance cogniti e functioning (Munte et af. 1993). In addition. a recent study 
ha den10nstrat d that the n1anipulation of mood prior to enc ding activat diff! r nt 
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brain circuitry in the encoding and recognition of neutral items dependent on mood 
induced (Erk et af. 2005). Mood at encoding also has implications for memory 
performance according to semantic network approaches (Bower 2003). It has been 
hypothesised that mood influences the nature of the activation within semantic 
networks, since mood (at either encoding or retrieval) will affect which pathways and 
nodes become activated and the likelihood that their activation will be above 
threshold (Lewis & Critchley 2003). Since the Activation Monitoring Framework 
(AMF) uses semantic network theory to account for the activation of false memory 
items, any factors which may lead to different patterns of activation within semantic 
networks should be equivalent for the alcohol and placebo groups. 
2.3. DRM lists 
In order to investigate false memories under implicit stem completion instructions, 
critical items had to adhere to the specifications outlined by Graf and Schacter, 
(1985), which had been followed by other researchers using the DRM paradigm (e.g. 
McKone & Murphy 2000). These were: critical items were a minimum of five letters 
long, all three letter stems had a minimum of eight different word completions, stems 
were required to not form words in themselves, all stems used were distinct and not 
the same as the opening three letters of any veridical words and that baseline stem 
completion rates were not higher than a 50% probability of completion, as a means to 
avoid ceiling effects on priming scores. (McKone & Murphy 2000). 
Only 12 lists included with Stadler et af. 's (1999) norms fulfilled the above criteria. 
As the experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 used a maximum of 24 lists, a total of 12 new 
lists were created with the aid of the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus (EAT: 
http://www.eat.rl.ac.ukl). The EAT is a set of word association norms, displaying the 
counts of word association elicited in association to target words, as collected 
empirically from participants following the methodology employed by Kiss et al. 
1973). Following the procedure used by Roediger and McDermott (1995), lists were 
forn1ed of the top veridical associates of 12 new critical words, (see Appendix 1). 
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2.3.1 Pilot studies: DRM stimuli 
A series of pilot studies were performed to ensure that the newly created lists did not 
differ from the established DRM lists in terms of backwards associative strength from 
the veridical items to the critical items, baseline stem completion rates and probability 
that the critical item would be erroneously recalled. 
2.3.1.1. Pilot 2: Backwards associative strength 
Backward associative strength (BAS) is an "index of strength of associative 
connections from the study words to the critical item", (Roediger et al. 2001,389). In 
a multiple regression analysis which determined the factors that contributed to false 
recall of critical items, BAS was identified as the largest predictor (Roediger et al. 
2001). 
To determine that old and newly created lists did not significantly differ in their mean 
backwards associative strength, the procedure originally used by Nelson et al. (1999) 
and later adopted by Roediger et al. (2001) was employed. This gauged the 
probability that the various veridical items would elicit the critical item. 
Method 
Participants 
The ten participants were students at the University of Sussex. 
Materials 
The 12 lists taken from Stadler et al. (1999) which fulfilled the criteria for implicit 
stem completion (McKone & Murphy 2000) served as the old lists. These IS-word 
lists were reduced to 10-word lists by choosing the ten veridical items most closely 
associated to their respecti\'e critical item. The new lists were the 12 ten-word lists 
created using the specifications outlined by McKone and Murphy (as described in 
section 2.3). 
45 
Procedure 
All ten words on each list were given to participants on sheets of paper. Each list was 
presented as a single block of words in decreasing associative strength to the critical 
item. The order of lists (old vs. new) was randomly intermixed. Participants were 
instructed to read each word in tum and next to it write the first word that came to 
mind evoked by the word in question. If they thought of a word they had already used, 
participants were instructed to use that word again 1. Participants worked at their own 
pace until they had provided an associate for every list item. 
Results 
The dependent variable was the average number of critical free associates generated 
for each list. This dependent variable was collapsed across the 12 new lists and the 12 
old lists for each participant. It was found that the average number of critical free 
associates for old and new lists did not significantly differ [t(9) = -1.507, p =.166]. 
I This procedure was adopted as it was the one used by other researchers when constructi~g DRM lists 
(e.g. Nelson el at. 1999), however it is acknowledged that it could have served to overestImate BAS 
due to repetition priming. 
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Critical Associations for New and Old 
Lists 
1 1 
New Lists Old Lists 
Figure 2.2. Graph to show mean critical associates generated in response to 
veridical words for both new and old lists (see Appendix 7a). 
2.3.1.2. Pilot 3: Probability of baseline stem completion 
Previous empirical research investigating implicit false memories, have used stem 
completion as a mode of assessment (e.g. McDermott 1997). In order to ensure the 
possibility of obtaining a priming effect, McKone and Murphy (2000) argued that 
baseline stem completion rates should not exceed 50 percent. Pilot 3 was designed 
specifically to assess baseline stem completion rates for the critical items. This would 
ensure that they were all below 50 percent, and that old and new lists did not 
significantly differ in terms of baseline stem completion rates. 
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Method 
Participants 
Ten participants were recruited from the postgraduate population at the University of 
Sussex. 
Materials and Procedure 
Stimuli consisted of 24 three-letter stems of critical items: 12 of these stems were 
from the newly created lists whilst the remaining 12 stems were from Stadler et al. 
(1999) and were designated 'old'. Participants were provided with instructions that 
stated they were to "complete the stem to form the first word that comes to mind". 
Results 
The dependent variable was the probability that a stem would be completed to form a 
critical item. This dependent variable was collapsed across the 12 new lists and the 12 
old lists for each participant. It was found that the average number of critical baseline 
stem completion rates for old and new lists did not significantly differ t(9) = .387, p 
=.708. 
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Figure 2.3. Probability of stem completion for critical items from new and old 
lists (see Appendix 7b). 
2.3.1.3. Pilot 4: Probability of eliciting a false memory 
A pilot study was conducted in order to determine whether old and new lists differed 
in their ability to induce a false memory. 
Method 
Participants 
32 pruiicipants undergraduates at the University of Sussex were given a cash payment 
fo r participating in the experiment. 
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Materials 
The twelve lists used by Stadler et al. (1999) which fulfilled the criteria for implicit 
stem completion (McKone & Murphy 2000) served as the old lists. The twelve ten-
item newly created lists were the new lists. Two sets of lists were created (list A and 
list B), each comprising 6 newly created and 6 old lists. Participants were either 
exposed to list A or list B in the encoding phase. 
Procedure 
Prior to encoding, participants received standard intentional learning instructions 
which stated that they were about to be shown twelve lists of words and that they 
were to attempt to learn these words as their memory for them would later be tested. 
The order of lists was completely randomised. Each list was shown in blocked format. 
with veridical items being presented by decreasing associative strength to the critical 
non-presented item. Veridical items remained on the screen for 3-seconds, with a 1-
second interval between words. A 5-second 'New List' warning preceded each list. 
This mode of presentation was identical to that employed by Benjamin (2001) and 
was used in Experiments 1, 2 & 3. 
Participants returned to the lab 24 hours later for the memory test. They received 
standard free recall instructions stating that they were to write down all the words they 
recalled from the previous days encoding phase. 
Results 
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Figure 2.4. The probability that a critical item would be erroneously recalled, 
divided into old and new lists (see Appendix 7c). 
The dependent variable was the probability that a critical item would be erroneously 
recalled. This dependent variable was collapsed across the 12 new lists and the 12 old 
lists for each participant. The average number of critical words recalled was not found 
to significantly differ between old and new lists [t(15) = 1.192, p =.252]. 
Discussion 
BAS, baseline stem completion rates and probability of eliciting a false memory, were 
not found to significantly differ between old and new lists. Inspection of Figures 2.2 
2.3. and 2.4. reveal the extent to which lists varied from each other in terms of these 
measures. Establishing quantitative values for different lists in terms of the e 
Ineasures will assist with the balancing of stimuli in future studies. Li t were found 
t vary in the extent to which they induced a false memory, consistent \ ith the tadl r 
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et at. (1999) norms. Having lists which vary in their ability to induce a false memory 
is particularly necessary when dealing with factors which either increase or decrease 
false memories to ensure that both floor and ceiling effects are avoided. 
2.5. Consent and prohibitions 
The ethics committee of the University of Sussex approved all experiments within this 
thesis. Participants provided informed consent (Appendix 2). For the studies 
providing alcohol, participants were only permitted to take part on the basis of their 
responses to the Nuffield Medical Questionnaire (Appendix 3) and a medical 
interview. Exclusion criteria included: a history of severe mental illness, a history of 
drug or alcohol misuse, an altered metabolism of alcohol (as determined by impaired 
liver function or gastroenteritis), anyone displaying current symptoms of mental 
illness or neurological disease. For studies involving alcohol, participants were asked 
to abstain from illicit recreational drugs for a minimum of 7 days, from sleeping 
tablets or hayfever medication for 48 hours, and from drinking tea or coffee 
immediately prior to the commencement of the experiment and were required to have 
a low fat breakfast the morning of the experiment. In addition, participants were told 
to abstain from drinking for 24 hours prior to the beginning experimental session, and 
were breathalysed on entering the lab as a means to determine whether they had 
complied with this requirement. 
2.5. Materials and measures 
2.5.1. Blood Alcohol Concentrations (BAC) 
A standard breathalyser with a detection limit equiYalent to 0.01 gil of alcohol in the 
bloodstrean1 was llsed to measure BAC le\'els (Alcolmeter S-D3~1. Loborser\'ice 
52 
GmbH, Bonn, Germany). The dependent variable measured was BAC measured in 
gil. 
2.5.2. Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ) 
Participants' weekly alcohol consumption was assessed using the AUQ (Mehrabian & 
Russell 1978, Appendix 4). The AUQ consists of 12 questions designed to evaluate 
consumption ofbeerlcider, wine and spirits in terms of frequency and quantity. Due to 
the recent changes in drinking trends, an updated version was used which 
incorporated questions about the consumption of alcopops (Knowles & Duka 2004). 
The dependent variables produced by the AUQ are: 8g UK units of alcohol units 
drunk each week and an overall AUQ score which represents speed and frequency of 
drinking and intoxication. In addition, a separate binge drinking score based just on 
speed of drinking and frequency of intoxication developed by Townshend and Duka 
(2002) was also determined. The questionnaire was administered to ensure that 
participants met the specifications for participating - that they were a social drinker 
who consumed on average between 5 to 50 units a week. In addition, group analyses 
could ensure that the alcohol and placebo participants were matched in terms of units 
consumed per week, AUQ score and binge drinking score alcohol. 
2.5.3. Visual Analogue Scales 
To assess mood, both in terms of baseline measures and the acute effects of alcohol 
on mood, participants were asked to complete a set of 100mm V ASs (Duka et al. 
1998). These provided measures of how participants were feeling at that particular 
moment. Dependent variables were 0-100 scores for the following adjectives: 
contented, light-headed, relaxed and irritable (see Appendix 5). 
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2.5.4. Assessment of baseline memory 
Baseline memory was assessed to ensure that no differences existed between alcohol 
and placebo groups. 15-member word lists - lists A and B from the Rey Auditory-
Verbal Learning Test Word Lists which were validated for frequency and complexity 
by Lezak (1983) were administered prior to drink consumption. The dependent 
variable was the mean number of words recalled from the two lists (five minutes after 
presentation) (see Appendix 6). 
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Chapter 3. Exploring the anterograde impairment and retrograde facilitation 
effects of alcohol on false and veridical memories 
3.1. Introduction 
A number of different studies have demonstrated that alcohol can both impair (e.g. Parker 
et al. 1976) and facilitate memory (e.g. Parker et al. 1974) relative to a placebo control 
group. The nature of the effect - whether it is deleterious or facilitative - is dependent 
upon the temporal relationship between the encoding of stimuli, alcohol consumption and 
the testing of memory (Birnbaum & Parker 1977; Knowles & Duka 2004). Memory for 
information encoded prior to an alcoholic drink is facilitated relative to a placebo control 
as assessed using free recall (Parker et al. 1980) and recognition (Parker et al. 1981). 
These facilitative effects are not uniform for all types of memory. Instead, a selective 
enhancement for emotional memory versus neutral memory, relative to a placebo control 
group, has been found (Knowles & Duka 2004). Regarding the anterograde impairments 
of alcohol, alcohol has a deleterious effect for memory when information is encoded post 
consumption of alcohol as assessed using explicit tests of memory. In contrast, when 
implicit tests are used, memory remains intact (Lister et al. 2001; Duka et al. 2001). 
The presence of two encoding phases (pre and post ingestion) has the advantage of being 
naturalistic (Knowles & Duka 2004). That is to say, because learning does not take place 
in isolation, including a pre and post drink encoding phase more accurately models how 
alcohol affects memory in the natural environment. In addition, inclusion of two 
encoding phases provides the opportunity to modulate false memory levels via both the 
potential facilitative and impairing effects of alcohol. Regarding the retrograde effects, to 
date no studies have investigated whether the retrograde facilitation effects of alcohol 
extend to false memories. Determining whether a retrograde facilitative effect can be 
observed for false memories accords with an approach undertaken by researchers who 
investigate whether false and veridical memories act in comparable ways. For example, 
recent research into retrieval induced forgetting has demonstrated that false memories are 
55 
prone to inhibitory mechanisms in the same way as veridical memories (Starns & Hicks 
2004) as demonstrated using a retrieval practice paradigm (Anderson et al. 1994). 
Investigation into whether the anterograde impairment of alcohol extends to false 
memories is equivocal. Two studies to date have used alcohol in conjunction with the 
DRM paradigm. Miliani and Curran (2002) found alcohol increased false memories, 
whilst Mintzer and Griffiths (2001) found that alcohol impaired veridical memory whilst 
false memory levels remained intact relative to a placebo control group. Detailed 
arguments relating to the potential for alcohol to decrease false memories are outlined in 
Chapter 4. These centre on the propensity for alcohol to induce superficial processing 
(Craik 1977) resulting in decreased activation of critical items. In addition, the reduction 
of processing resources when intoxicated (Steele & Josephs 1988) could reduce the 
amount of elaborative processing. These dual effects of alcohol would, under the 
principles of the AMF, result in decreased false memories (Gallo & Roediger 2002). 
Repetition of study list material will be manipulated at encoding. Repetition has been 
shown to increase false memories (Seamon et al. 2002), decrease false memories 
(Benjamin 2001), have no effect on false memories (Tussing & Greene 1999), and affect 
memories in an inverted U-shaped function by initially increasing them then 
subsequently decreasing them (Seamon et al. 2002). Repetition is thought to increase 
false memories via increased activation of the critical items (Benjamin 2001). In addition, 
repetition provides an opportunity for increased learning of veridical items which can aid 
source monitoring decisions, leading to a decrease in false memories (Benjamin 2001). 
Consequently, it can be argued that the way in which repetition affects false memory 
levels can provide insight into whether repetition is differentially affecting activation or 
monitoring processes, and which processes are prevailing in memory judgements. As 
both recollective processes (Duka et al. 2001), and semantic activation (Craik 1977) are 
thought to be impaired under alcohol, repetition may have a differential effect on false 
memory levels in intoxicated participants relative to a placebo control group. 
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The primary aim of Experiments 1 and 2 is to assess the anterograde and retrograde 
effects of alcohol on false and veridical memory. A consequence of the two encoding 
phases also enable investigation of potential proactive, retroactive and negative transfer 
interference effects (Anderson 1999)1. Repetition has been shown to increase false 
memories in information which is less well learnt (Seamon et al. 2002). Presumably this 
arises from a threshold of learning needing to be attained before effective monitoring can 
operate. Consequently, repetition may differentially affect false memory levels dependent 
on the extent to which interference effects generated by the two encoding phases impedes 
learning. 
As a means to assess false and veridical memory levels, measures of implicit and explicit 
memory were taken at test. McKone and Murphy (2000) propose that using implicit as 
well as explicit tests serves as an additional means to assess the similarities and 
differences between false and veridical memories. McDermott (1997) demonstrated a 
priming effect for false memory items, as assessed using stem completion and word 
fragment completion2. McKone and Murphy (2000) also obtained a significant priming 
effect for false memory items using the DRM paradigm specially modified for the 
purpose of stem completion instructions. It was found that the priming effect for false 
memory items mirrored veridical memory in that the effect was modality specific; a shift 
from auditory encoding to a visual test eliminated the priming effect for both types of 
items. As alcohol has been demonstrated to differentially affect implicit and explicit 
memory (Lister et al. 1991), it would be interesting to explore whether the false memory 
tested under implicit instructions are preserved to the same extent as veridical memories 
in intoxicated subjects. 
I Proactive interference refers to the phenomenon whereby the material initially learnt can accelerate the 
forgetting of later learnt material.. Retroacti~e interferen~e is when later I.earnt material accelerate~ t~e 
forgetting of initially learnt matenal. Negative transfer IS when the learning of subsequent materIal IS 
impeded by material previously learnt (.~nderson 1999). . 
2 Stem completion refers to the completion of a 3-letter stem (e.g. sle ... ). Word fragment completion 
requires the blank spaces to be filled in order to form a word (e.g. s_ e_ p). 
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3.2. Methods 
There were two experiments: Experiment 1 assessed explicit memory, whilst Experiment 
2 assessed implicit memory. Their procedures were largely identical prior to the testing 
phase. Consequently, their joint procedures will be described in parallel, with any 
variations between the two studies stated. Separate accounts will then be provided 
regarding their different testing procedures. 
Twenty-four (Experiment 1) and thirty-two (Experiment 2) volunteers were recruited 
from the undergraduate and postgraduate population at the University of Sussex. Each 
experiment was composed of half male and half female participants. All subjects were 
native English speakers, not dyslexic and aged 18-34 years and were given a cash 
payment for participating. 
Volunteers were screened prior to participating on the basis of their medical history and 
all met the criteria for inclusion (as outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.5). 
Alcohol administration 
Alcohol was administered at the dose of 0.6 g/kg, with 90% v/w alcohol diluted with 
tonic water to make up a 300 ml beverage. The drink was divided into lOx 30 ml 
portions and each portion was mixed with 4 drops of Angostura bitters. The placebo 
beverage consisted of 300ml of tonic water and Angostura bitters only. The experimenter 
provided participants with the 30 ml portions at 3-mins intervals, making the total time of 
alcohol administration 30 minutes. 
Design 
The experiment was double-blind, and participants were randomly assigned to either the 
placebo (Exp. 1 N = 12, Exp. 2 N = 16) or alcohol (Exp. 1 N = 12, Exp. 2 N = 16) group. 
All participants took part in two encoding phases; one pre drink and one post drink. List 
repetition was a within subjects variable, with all participants viewing six lists once and 
six lists three times in each encoding phase. Item type (veridical and critical) was also a 
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within subjects variable. Whilst the materials for the test remained constant, the test 
instructions varied between experiments. Participants in Experiment 1 had explicit cued 
recall instructions, whilst participants in Experiment 2 had implicit instructions (see 
procedure for details). 
Materials 
Memory task: Encoding 
Word lists were in DRM format, and were selected from Stadler et al. (1999) provided 
that they conformed to the specifications deemed necessary for stem completion tests, as 
outlined by McEvoy et al. (1999) (see Chapter 2 for details). All lists contained the ten 
veridical words most closely related to the critical non-presented item. Nine additional 
lists were created, following the same specifications, to ensure a sufficient amount of lists 
were available. Pilot studies ensured that created lists and those used by Stadler et al. 
(1999) were balanced in terms of probability of false recall, probability of veridical 
recall, baseline stem completion rates and word frequency3 (see Chapter 2). 24 lists were 
divided into four 6-list sets (set A, B, C, and D). These sets were divided into two groups 
(group I and group 2) each comprising three lists. The grouping of the lists determined 
whether lists were to be repeated or presented once. Half of participants viewed lists in 
group 1 once, whilst lists from group 2 were viewed three times. The other half of the 
participants viewed lists from group 1 three times, and group 2 lists only once. 
Participants saw two sets; one in the encoding phase before the drink, and one in the 
encoding phase after the drink. All sets and groups were fully counter balanced to ensure 
that any given list had an equal probability of being presented pre or post drink, as well as 
an equal probability of being presented once, or repeated three times. The presentation of 
list order was fully randomised, with the constraint that list repetitions were consecutive. 
Memory task: Test 
The memory task consisted of 48 3-letter word stems. Half of these stems were the first 
three letters of the critical items corresponding to the 24 different lists. The remaining 24 
3 familiarity and Kucera-Francis ratings were obtained using the MRC Psycholinguistic Database. 
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stems were the first three letters of 24 veridical words, one from each of the 24 lists. The 
veridical word from each list matched the critical item from that same list in terms of 
familiarity rating and Kucera-Francis written frequency rating and baseline stem 
completion rates. For each participant, six stems corresponded to veridical items vie\ved 
in the encoding phase, three of which had been repeated and three that had been 
presented once. Similarly, six stems corresponded to critical words semantically related 
to these lists, resulting in three corresponding to singularly presented list, and three 
corresponding to repeated lists. The remaining 24 stems corresponded to 12 veridical 
items from lists not viewed in the encoding phases, and their respective 12 critical items. 
The presence of these 12 non-studied veridical and critical items served to provide 
baseline stem completion rates and to reduce the chance of explicit contamination in the 
implicit test (McKone & Murphy 2000). 
Procedure 
On arrival at the lab, participants completed the AUQ and Medical questionnaire to 
ensure they fulfilled the inclusion criteria. They were then breathalysed to ensure no 
alcohol was in their system. Their height and weight was taken and their drinks were 
mixed for them whilst they consumed their lunch (a small roll and a glass of water). They 
completed the Lezak memory test to provide a measure of baseline memory. 
Prior to the encoding phase participants were informed that they would be exposed to 
lists of words, some of which were to be presented once, whilst others were to be 
repeated. They were told to learn these words, as their memory for them would later be 
tested. Each encoding phase took 14 minutes. All lists were preceded by a 5-second 'New 
List' warning. Veridical items remained on the screen for 3-seconds, with a I-second 
blank screen interval between each item. Repetitions of lists were blocked, and so ran 
consecutively, with the order of veridical items within each list remaining constant. 
Veridical items were ordered in each list according to decreasing associative strength to 
the critical non-presented item. 
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Once the first encoding phase was complete, participants were taken to the medical room 
where the drinks were administered. Drinks were divided into ten 30 ml portions (see 
section on alcohol administration) and participants were given one measure every three 
minutes. After half an hour, once all drinks had been consumed, participants were 
required to wait for a further ten minutes. This ensured that BAC levels peaked during 
encoding. Participants then completed the V AS for a first time, rinsed their mouths out 
with water and were breathalysed. They then underwent the second encoding phase. They 
then were sent to the waiting room and all participants were breathalysed at half hourly 
intervals. Once participants' BAC levels had dropped to below 0.23 (a quarter of the legal 
drink drive limit) they were admitted to the test phase. In all cases this resulted in 2 liz 
hours of waiting time. Placebo participants were also kept waiting for 2 liz hours to ensure 
the retention interval was matched between groups and that all participants remained 
blind to which drink they had consumed. 
At test, 48 3-letter word stems were presented on two sheets of paper. Participants wrote 
their responses on the sheet. They were asked to consider each stem in tum and were 
requested not to go back to earlier items. Subjects in Experiment 1 were given explicit 
cued recall instructions. They were told to complete only those stems that could form a 
word viewed in either of the two encoding phases. They were also informed that not all 
stems could be completed to form a word viewed earlier, and thus if they could not think 
of one to fit a particular stem, they were to leave that stem blank. Participants in 
Experiment 2 did the NART before their memory was tested. The NART data was not 
analysed and was administered for the purpose of distracting participants from the 
purpose of the implicit test. They were then given implicit instructions, where they \\ere 
told to complete the stem as quickly as possible to form the first word to come to mind. 
Once all stems were completed, participants were required to circle all words they were 
"aware" of having viewed in the encoding phase and then make R or K judgements for 
these endorsed words. No time limit was enforced in either of these two testing 
procedures. 
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Once the testing phase was over, participants completed the YAS for a second time and 
were then allowed to go home. Participants were informed which drink they had 
consumed, and those in the alcohol condition were reminded not to drive, cycle, or 
operate any heavy machinery for a minimum of four hours. 
Statistical analysis: Rationale 
The data from each encoding phase will be analysed separately, consistent with analyses 
followed of researchers wanting to isolate the potential facilitative and impairing effects 
of alcohol (Moulton et al. 2005). In addition, different analyses will also be performed on 
the veridical and critical items. This is also consistent with researchers who have used 
pharmacological drugs to selectively determine their effects on false and veridical 
memory (e.g. Hurron et al. 2001). As conclusions derived from the statistical analyses are 
not dependent upon comparing the relative levels of false and veridical memory, 
including these two measures within a single ANaYA was not deemed essential4• 
Instead, insight into how alcohol may selectively affect false and veridical memory 
relative to a placebo control group is pursued, as assessed using implicit and explicit 
tests. In addition, insight into the way in which false and veridical memories are 
selectively modulated by repetition, and how this may differ as a function of drink, is also 
an aim, and these ends are not hampered by separate analyses in critical and veridical 
items. Within the cognitive memory literature, researchers have tended to perform 
separate analyses involving remember and know judgments due to the potential mutual 
dependency of these two variables (e.g. Gardiner et al. 1996). Analyses in the present 
study were performed on raw scores as opposed to percentages of remember and know 
judgements. Consequently, the variability induced by the memory capacity of individual 
participants meant that this dependency was not absolute. Thus measures of awareness 
(aware versus unaware), memory type (remember versus know) were incorporated within 
a single analysis5. This followed a president set by researchers within the 
4 This does not apply to the priming data, where a question of interest is the potential for a differential 
priming effect to be obtained in veridical and critical worlds. Consequently, analysis will include both 
veridical and critical words within a single ANOV A. 
5 This logic also applies to the mode of analysis adopted for source monitoring judgements (correct versus 
incorrect) applied in Experiments 8 and 9. 
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psychopharmacology literature for analyses involving both awareness measures (e.g. 
Duka et al. 2001) and memory type (e.g. Milani and Curran 2000). 
The data analysis will be divided into two sections. Firstly, cued recall data will be 
analysed (Experiment 1). Secondly, implicit data will be analysed (Experiment 2). At the 
start of each section the type of statistical analysis employed will be stated. As these are 
the first experiments, potentially interesting trends <.09 will be discussed as a means to 
highlight possible effects to explore in subsequent experiments. 
Researchers usmg the DRM paradigm sometimes correct their data for non-critical 
intrusion rates prior to analysis (e.g. Chan et al. 2005) - with intrusions being defined as 
words recalled or recognised which are not veridical words or critical words. Such 
corrections, however, are not habitually employed within the empirical literature. Indeed, 
at present, many researchers appear not to correct their data for intrusions (e.g. Seamon et 
al. 2003). Researchers who have used repetition as a within subjects variable have also 
tended not to correct their data as they do not belong to any repetition condition (Seamon 
et al. 2002). There is an incentive not to perform signal detection analyses if data 
incorporates a large amount of zeros and ones as the corrections employed reduce 
differences which may exist within the data. Nevertheless, if group differences exist in 
intrusion rates then clearly memory scores need to be adjusted to accommodate this. 
Within the present study, no corrections were administered to the data prior to analysis 
for intrusion rate. This was because non-critical intrusions were not found to differ 
between the alcohol and placebo groups, as determined using a number of different 
analyses. Firstly, between subjects t-tests were performed to see how the alcohol and 
placebo groups differed in terms of their intrusions (with an intrusion classified as a stem 
which was completed to form a word that was not a veridical item encountered in the 
encoding phase, nor its associated critical item). The first analysis determined whether 
the total number of intrusions recalled differed between the two groups. This was found 
to be non-significant [t(22) = -.535, p = .598]. In case levels of overall memory differed 
between the two groups in such a way that would render a difference in intrusions as 
significant, further analyses were conducted. Two new variables were devised which 
looked at the proportion of intrusions in terms of the total amount of veridical items 
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recalled or the total amount critical items recalled. Neither of these respective variables 
reached significance [t(22) - .832, p = .415; t(22) = .403, p = .691]. The amount of stems 
corresponding to either veridical or critical words from the two encoding phases which 
were completed to form an intrusion were calculated. In terms of the first encoding phase, 
neither the amount of intrusions written by alcohol verses placebo subjects on veridical 
stems [t(22) = .000, p = 1.000] nor critical stems [t(22) = -.364, p = .719] reached 
significance. Nor were the amount of intrusions completed on veridical stems [t(22) = _ 
1.113, p = .278] or critical stems [t(22) = .000, p = 1.000] corresponding to the second 
encoding phase found to significantly differ between the two groups. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Groups 
Units consumed per week, AUQ score, binge score and baseline memory scores (Lezak 
1995) were separately calculated for both the placebo and alcohol groups in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2 (see table 3.1.). 
Experiment 1: Mean (SEM) Experiment 2: Mean (SEM) 
Placebo Alcohol Placebo Alcohol 
Units per week 34.59 (5.14) 23.97 (5.57) 30.90 (5.70) 31.55 (4.81) 
AUQ score 65.62 (9.60) 44.81 (6.39) 55.96 (9.89) 59.15 (8.92) 
Binge score 31.05 (5.90) 20.85 (2.74) 25.15 (5.23) 27.63 (6.29) 
Lezak 17.64 (l.45) 18.08 (0.87) 17.63 (0.99) 16.6 (0.67) 
Table 3.1. Group qualities in the alcohol and placebo groups for Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2. 
Independent t-tests revealed that the alcohol and placebo groups, in both Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2, were matched in terms of units consumed per week [t(22) = 1.410. P = 
.173; t(30) = -.086, p = .932], AUQ score [t(22) = 1.84, p =.09; t(30) = -2.40, P = .812] 
and binge score [1(22) = 1.614, P = .121; t(30) = -.302, p = .764]. In addition, analyses of 
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baseline memory scores (Lezak 1995) revealed that the alcohol and placebo groups were 
matched in both Experiment 1 [t(22) = -.270, p = .790] and Experiment 2 [t(30) = .836, p 
= .410]. 
VAS scores: Time 1 (post drink) 
Experiment 1: Mean (SEM) Experiment 2: Mean (SEM) 
Placebo Alcohol Placebo Alcohol 
Relaxed 5.6 (.55) 6.13 (.057) 5.82 (5.81) 6.92 (.049) 
Content 5.45 (.51) 6.37 (0.37) 5.81 (.38) 6.55 (0.41) 
Lightheaded 3.44 (.74) 5.9 (.72) 2.59 (.52) 4.9 (.64) 
Table 3.2. VAS scores post consumption of drink. 
VAS scores: Time 2 (post test) 
Experiment 1: Mean (SEM) Experiment 2: Mean (SEM) 
Placebo Alcohol Placebo Alcohol 
Relaxed 4.97 (.31) 5.58 (.32) 5.9 (.36) 5.41 (047) 
Content 6.3 (.38) 5.96 (.54) 6.02 (.39) 5.92 (AI) 
Lightheaded 3.18(.30) 3.83 (.34) 2.88 (.34) 3.06 (.35) 
Table 3.3. VAS scores post test. 
V AS scores were taken in both the alcohol and placebo groups at two separate time 
points. The first time was post consumption of the drinks (see table 3.2.), and the second 
time was post test (see Table 3.2.). Analyses of VAS scores from time 1 revealed that in 
both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, there was no effect of alcohol on subjective ratings 
for how relaxed [t(22) = -.669, p = .511; t(30) -1.746, p = .091] and content [t(22) = -
1.462, P = .158; t(30) = -1.335, p = .192] participants felt. In contrast, participants in the 
alcohol and placebo groups differed in the their subjective ratings of lightheadedness in 
both Experiment 1 [t(22) = -2.377, P = .027] and Experiment 2 [t(30) = -2.806, p = .009] 
demonstrating a significant effect of alcohol on self-rated feelings of lightheadedness. 
Analyses of VAS scores in the second time point (Table 3.3.) revealed that groups were 
matched on all three measures in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 respectively: 
Relaxed [t(21) = -1.340, P = .195: t(30) = .822, p = .418]. content [t(21) = .506, p = .618; 
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t(30) = .176, p = .861] and lightheadedness [t(21) = -1.422, p = .170; t(30) = -.386, p = 
.702]. 
3.4. Main analysis: Cued recall [Experiment 1] 
3-way between subjects ANOV As were performed on the amount of stems completed 
under explicit instructions. Analyses were separated for the pre-drink and post-drink 
encoding phases. In addition, separate analyses were performed in veridical and critical 
items, thus making four separate analyses in total: pre-drink veridical items, pre-drink 
critical items, post-drink veridical items, post drink critical items. Within subjects 
variables were repetition (presented once vs. repeated three times) and memory type 
(remember vs. know). Drink (alcohol vs. placebo) was the only between subjects 
variable. The amount of stems completed served as the dependent variable. 
Phase one (pre-drink): Veridical items 
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Figure 3.1. The mean amount of stems completed by the placebo and alcohol 
groups to form veridical words viewed in the first encoding phase. These were . 
divided into words viewed once, and those repeated, and whether they were ascribed 
a know or a remember response. 
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No main effects or interactions reached significance. 
A marginal main effect of memory type reflected participants' increased tendency to 
ascribe remember responses to memories [F(l, 22) = 3.,446, p = .076]. 
No main effect of drink was found [F(l, 22) = l. 769, p = .197] , nor did a main effect of 
repetition reach significance [F(l, 22) = 1.769, p = .197]. Repetition was not found to 
interact with drink [F(l, 22) = .111, p = .743] or memory type [F(l, 22) = 1.425, p = 
.245], and memory type did not interact with drink [F(l, 22) = .000, p = 1.000]. The 3-
way repetition x drink x memory type interaction also did not reach significance [F(l , 22) 
= .089,p = .768]. 
Phase one (pre-drink): Critical items 
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Figure 3.2. The mean amount of stems completed by the placebo and alcohol 
groups to form critical words correspondi.ng to. the first encoding phase .. These were 
divided into critical items resulting from hsts viewed once, and those which were 
repeated, and whether they were ascribed a know or a remember response. 
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A main effect of memory type [F(l , 22) = 5.891 , p = .024] was found and indicated more 
false memories were ascribed remember than know responses. The differential effect of 
repetition on false memory levels dependent on drink consumed was displayed in a 
borderline significant repetition x drink interaction [F(l, 22) = 3.417, p = .078] (see 
Figure 3.3). 
No main effect of either repetition [F(l , 22) = .214, p = .649] or drink were obtained 
[F(l , 22) = 1.637, p = .214]. Memory type was not found to interact with drink [F(l, 22) 
= .828, p = .373] and repetition was not found to interact with memory type [F(l, 22) = 
.633 , p = .435]. 
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Figure 3.3. Figure depicting a borderline significant drink x repetition interaction 
for critical items from the pre-drink encoding phase. 
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Phase two (post-drink): Veridical items 
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Figure 3.4. The mean amount of stems completed by the placebo and alcohol 
groups to form veridical words viewed in the second encoding phase. These were 
divided into words viewed once, and those repeated, and whether they were ascribed 
a know or a remember response. 
The only significant effect was a main effect of repetition [F(l, 22) = 12.087, p = .002] 
signifying that repetition served to enhanced later recall. 
No other main effects or interactions reached significance: main effects of memory type 
[F(1, 22) = 1.365, p = .255] and drink [F(1, 22) = 1.733, p = .202] were not found to be 
significant. Repetition was not found to interact with drink [F(l, 22) = 1.046, p = .318] 
nor memory type [F(l , 22) = .793, p = .383] , and memory type did not interact with drink 
[F(1 , 22) = .028, p = .869]. The 3-way repetition x word type x memory type interaction 
[F( 1, 22) = .793, p = .383] was also not significant. 
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Phase two (post-drink): Critical items 
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Figure 3.5. The mean amount of stems completed by the placebo and alcohol 
groups to form critical words corresponding to the second encoding phase. These 
were divided into critical items resulting from lists viewed once, and those which 
were repeated, and whether they were ascribed a know or a remember response. 
Repetition significantly interacted with memory type [F(1, 22) = 4.770, p = .040], and 
further analysis revealed that repetition marginally increased the amount of critical items 
recalled and ascribed know responses [t(23) = -1.813, p = .083], whilst having no effect 
on remember responses [t(23) = .000, p = 1.000] (see Figure 3.6). 
Repetition marginally interacted with drink, [F(l, 22) = 3.767, p = .065], as depicted in 
Figure 3.7. 
Main effects were not obtained for repetition [F(1, 22) = 1.356, p = .257], memory type 
[F( 1, 22) = 2.434, p = .133 nor drink [F( 1, 22) = 1.356, p = .257] . The 3-way repetition x 
drink x memory type was also not significant [F(1, 22) = 1.435 p = .244]. 
70 
Memory type x Repetition 
0.75 
CJKnow 
c:::J Remember 
0.50 
0.25 
Single Repeat 
Figure 3.6. Figure depicting marginal significant memory type x repetition 
interaction for critical items from the post-drink encoding phase. 
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Figure 3. 7. Figure depicting a marginal significant drink x repetition interaction 
for critical items from the post-drink encoding phase. 
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3.5. Main analysis: Implicit Results [Experiment 2] 
The results for Experiment 2 - whereby memory was assessed using implicit instructions 
- will be addressed in three sections. Section 3.5.1 is concerned with whether a priming 
effect was obtained in both veridical and critical items, with priming being defined as 
increased stem completion to form a veridical word, or its critical associate, relative to 
baseline stem completion rates for those items. Section 3.5.2. deals with comparisons 
between aware items (those items subsequently circled and endorsed has having been 
previously presented) and unaware items (those items completed under implicit 
instructions but not endorsed as having been previously presented). Lastly, section 3.5.3. 
addresses phenomenological experience, as assessed using the remember / know 
procedure. Once again, and following an argument outlined in section 3.3., all analyses 
were carried out on raw data. This decision was taken following analyses which 
demonstrated that the alcohol and placebo groups did not differ in terms of non-critical 
intrusions. Similar to the analyses performed in the explicit data, analyses in the implicit 
data also demonstrated that the alcohol and placebo groups did not differ in terms of 
intrusions endorsed on either veridical stems from encoding phase one [t(30) = .556, p = 
.583] or critical stems from encoding phase one [t(30) = .315, p = .755]. Neither did the 
two groups differ in terms of intrusions either endorsed on stems of veridical words 
viewed in the second encoding phase [t(30) = -.327, p = -.327] or their semantic critical 
associates [t(30) = -1.065, p = .295]. 
3.5.1. Priming 
An initial analysis was performed to determine whether a pnmmg effect had been 
obtained for veridical and critical items. The amount of veridical and critical stems 
completed to correspond to studied words was compared to baseline stem completion 
rates. As baseline stem completion rates were not confined to a particular encoding 
episode (pre or post drink), the analysis assessed priming collapsed across encoding 
episodes. A 3-way mixed ANOY A was conducted with drink (placebo vs. alcohol) 
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serving as a between subjects factor, and status (baseline vs. studied) and word type 
(veridical vs. critical) as within subjects factors. The proportion of stems completed was 
the dependent variable. 
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Figure 3.B. Figure depicting the priming effect - as demonstrated by a significant 
main effect of studied status - for veridical and critical items. 
A main effect of status [F(1, 30) = 4.135, p = .051] indicated that a priming effect was 
obtained. Consequently, a stem was more likely to be completed to form a word 
corresponding to those encountered in the encoding phase (either veridical or critical) 
than baseline stem completion rates for those words. 
No main effect of word type was found [F(1, 30) = 1.146,p = .293], demonstrating that a 
stem had an equal probability of being completed to form either a veridical or a critical 
word. Status was not found to interact with word type [F(l, 30) = .308, p .583], thus the 
priming effect was not differentially found in veridical and critical item. No main effect 
of drink was found [F(1 , 30) = .381,p = .541], thus the probability of completing a stem 
to form a veridical or critical word did not differ as a function of drink consumed. Nor 
was there a status x drink interaction [F(1 , 30) = .064, p = .803] or a status x word type x 
drink interaction [F(1 30) = 1.244, p = .274) thus the priming effect was not found to 
differ a a function of drink in either eridical or critical items. 
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3.5.2. Comparison of aware and unaware items 
Separate 3-way ANOVAs were conducted in veridical and critical items, for words learnt 
in either encoding phase one or encoding phase two. Four separate ANOV As were thus 
conducted in total. They were performed on veridical items from phase one, critical items 
from phase one, veridical items from phase two and critical items from phase two. A 
mixed 2(drink: placebo versus alcohol)x2(awareness: unaware versus 
aware)x2(repetition: lists presented once verses lists repeated three times) ANOVA was 
performed separately on veridical and critical items. Drink was a between subjects 
variable, whilst awareness and repetition were within subjects variables. The amount of 
stems completed to form either veridical or critical words, from either the first or second 
encoding phase, served as the dependent variable. 
Phase one (pre-drink): Veridical items 
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Figure 3.9. The mean number of stems completed to form veridical words viewed 
in the first encoding phase which were subsequently endorsed (aware) or not 
endorsed (unaware) as having been previously presented. These mean values were 
calculated separately for veridical words from repeated and singularly presented 
Ii t . 
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A significant repetition x awareness interaction [F(l, 30) = 4.62, p =.040] was further 
explored to indicate that repetition significantly increased the amount of aware veridical 
stems completed [t(31) = -2.37, p = .024] whilst having no effect on the amount of 
unaware veridical stems [t(31) = .571, p = .572]. 
A marginal main effects of awareness [F(l, 30) = 3.10,p =.088] and repetition [F(l , 30) 
= 3.42, p =.074] were found. 
Concerning the non-significant effects, awareness status was not found to interact with 
drink [F(l, 30) = .000, p = 1.00], nor was drink found to interact with repetition [F(l , 30) 
= .000,p = 1.00]. There was also no main effect of drink [F(l, 30) = .429,p = .518], nor 
a significant repetition x drink x awareness interaction [P(l, 30) = .000, p = 1.00]. 
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Figure 3.10 The mean number of stems completed to form critical words 
corresponding to words viewed in the first encoding phase which were subsequently 
endorsed (aware) or not endorsed (unaware) as having been previously presented. 
These mean values were calculated separately for critical words corresponding to 
repeated and singularly presented lists. 
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In critical items, a main effect of awareness [F(1, 30) = 7.75, p = .009] demonstrated that 
participants were more aware than unaware of the critical stems they completed. 
All other main effects and interactions remained non-significant; drink was not found to 
affect the probability of stem completion [F(1, 30) = .328, p = .571], nor was repetition 
[F(1, 30) = .49I,p = .489]. Awareness status did not interact with either repetition [F(l , 
30) = .027, p = .871] or drink [F(1, 30) = .021, p = .885]. Inspection of Figure 3.10 
reveals that repetition had a tendency to increase false memories within the alcohol 
group, whi 1st decreasing them in the placebo group, and this effect appeared to be 
particularly pronounced for aware false memories. This effect failed to reach significance 
though, as defined by a non-significant repetition x drink interaction [F(1, 30) = 2.673, p 
= .113], and a non-significant 3-way drink x repetition x awareness interaction [F(1, 30) 
= .243,p = .625]. 
Phase two (post-drink): Veridical items 
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Figure 3.11. The mean number of stems completed to form veridical words viewed 
in the second encoding phase which were subsequently endorsed (aware) or not 
endorsed (unaware) as having been previously presented. These mean values were 
calculated separately for veridical words from repeated and singularly presented 
lists. 
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In veridical items, no interactions nor main effects reached significance. There was no 
main effect of awareness [F(l, 30) = 2.084, p = .159], repetition [F(l, 30) = l.950, p 
.173, nor drink [F(l, 30) = .931,p = .342]. Awareness was not found to interact with 
either repetition [F(l, 30) = .022, P = .882] or drink [F(l, 30) = .026, P = .874]. Nor was 
drink found to interact with repetition [F(l, 30) = l.180, p = .286]. The 3-way drink x 
repetition x awareness interaction also did not reach significance [F(l, 30) = .556, p = 
.462] . 
Phase two (post-drink): Critical items 
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Figure 3.12. The mean number of stems completed to form critical words 
corresponding to words viewed in the first encoding phase which were subsequently 
endorsed (aware) or not endorsed (unaware) as having been previously presented. 
These mean values were calculated separately for critical words corresponding to 
repeated and singularly presented lists. 
For critical items, a main effect of repetition was significant [F(l , 30) = 8.83, p = .006 
signifying that repetition served to reduce critical items, thus making memory more 
accurate. 
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A repetition x drink interaction [F(l, 30) = 6.32,p = .018] was further analysed with 
within subjects t-tests. No significant difference existed between alcohol and placebo 
groups in the amount of stems completed to form critical items from singularly presented 
lists [t(30) = 1.43, P = .163]. For repeatedly presented lists, the placebo group completed 
more critical stems, and this value was marginally significant [t(30) = 1.96, p = .059] 
(see Figure 3.14). 
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Figure 3.13. Graph depicting a trend drink by awareness interaction for critical 
items corresponding to the post drink encoding phase. 
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Encoding Phase 2: Critical 
Items - Drink x Repetition 
single repeat 
Repetition 
c:=J Placebo 
c:=J Alcohol 
Figure 3.14. Graph depicting a trend drink by repetition interaction for critical 
items corresponding to the post drink encoding phase. 
A marginal awareness x drink interaction [F(l, 30) = 3.01, p = .093] was obtained. See 
Figure 3.13. 
No main effect of drink [F(l, 30) = .042, p = .839] or awareness status was found [F(1 , 
30) = 1.219, P = .278] in phase two critical items. 
3.5.3. Remember / Know Analysis 
Two mixed 2( drink: placebo vs. alcohol)x2(repetition: presented once vs. repeated three 
times)x2(memory type: know vs. remember) ANOV As were performed separately for 
veridical and critical items. 
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Phase one (pre-drink): Veridical items 
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Figure 3.15. The mean number of stems completed by the alcohol and placebo 
groups to form veridical words viewed in the first encoding phase, divided into those 
allocated know and those allocated remember responses. 
For veridical items, a main effect of memory type was found [F(l , 30) = 8.13, p = .008], 
signifying more veridical words were ascribed remember responses than know responses. 
In addition, a main effect of repetition [Fe 1 , 30) = 5.42, p = .027] demonstrated that 
repetition served to increase the amount of veridical stems completed. 
No main effect of drink was found [F(l , 30) = .157, p = .695]. Drink was not found to 
interact with either memory type [F(l , 30) = .401,p = .531, or repetition [F(l, 30) = .000, 
p = 1.00]. Repetition did not interact with memory type [F(l , 30) = .478, p = .495] and 
the 3-way repetition x drink x memory type interaction did not reach significance [Fe 1 
30) = .120, p = .732]. 
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Phase one (pre-drink): Critical items 
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Figure 3.16. The mean number of stems completed by the alcohol and placebo 
groups to form critical words corresponding to items viewed in the first encoding 
phase, divided into those allocated know and those allocated remember responses. 
In critical items, a main effect of memory type [F(l, 30) = 9.05, p = .005] showed that 
more remember than know responses were made to completed critical stems. 
No main effect of repetition [F(I, 30) = .066, p = .799] nor drink [F(l, 30) = .038, p = 
.848] was found to be significant. Drink did not interact with either memory type [F(l, 
30) = .031, p = .861] or repetition [F(l , 30) = 1.652, p = .209], and repetition did not 
interact with memory type [F(l , 30) = 1.384, p = .249]. The 3-way repetition x memory 
type x drink interaction was also not significant [F(l, 30) = .254, p = .618]. 
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Phase two (post-drink): Veridical items 
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Figure 3.17. The mean number of stems completed by the alcohol and placebo 
groups to form veridical words viewed in the second encoding phase, divided into 
those allocated know and those allocated remember responses. 
In veridical items, no main effects or interactions reached significance: main effects of 
memory type [F(1 , 30) = 1.189,p = .284] repetition [F(l , 30) = .529, p = .473] and drink 
[F(} , 30) = .280, p = .600] were all non-significant. In addition, repetition was not found 
to interact with either drink [F(l, 30) = 1.189, p .284] or memory type [F(l , 30) = .135 , p 
= .716] , nor did memory type interact with drink [F(l , 30) = .529, p = .473]. The 2-way 
repetition x drink x memory type was also not significant [F(l , 30) = 2.152 , p = .153] . 
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Phase two (post-drink): Critical items 
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Figure 3.18. The mean number of stems completed by the alcohol and placebo 
groups to form critical words corresponding to items viewed in the second encoding 
phase, divided into those allocated know and those allocated remember responses. 
A memory type x drink interaction was approaching significance [F(l , 30) = 3.49, p = 
.078] (see Figure 3.19). 
In critical items, no main effects of memory type [F(l , 30) = .000, p = 1.00] , repetition 
[F(1 , 30) = 1.121 , p = .298] or drink [F(1 , 30) = 1.788, p = .191] were significant. In 
addition, repetition did not significantly interact with either drink [F(l , 30) = .280, p = 
.600] or memory type [F(1 , 30) = .736, p = .398]. The 3-way repetition x memory type x 
drink interaction was not significant [F(l , 30) = 1.656, p = .208] 
t/) 
E Q,) 
...... 
t/) 
't-"C o Q,) 
...... ~~ 
.co. 
E E 
::l 0 
c:: (.) 
c: 
co Q,) 
~ 
83 
Encoding Phase 2: Critical 
Items - Memory type x Drink 
Know Remember 
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Figure 3.19. A graph depicting a trend memory type by drink interaction for 
critical items corresponding to lists viewed in the second encoding phase. Alcohol 
participants were found to have significantly less remember false memories than 
placebo participants, whilst no significant difference existed between the two groups 
in terms of false memories allocated know responses. 
3.6. Discussion 
3.6.1. Summary of main findings 
Cued Recall [Experiment 1] 
The main findings can be summarised as follows: The pre-drink encoding phase did not 
demonstrate a significant retrograde facilitation effect in either veridical or critical items 
as a function of drink. A borderline significant repetition by drink interaction was found 
for critical items from the first enc09ing phase. In terms of the post-drink encoding phase 
no anterograde impairment of alcohol was found in veridical items or critical items. A 
repetition by drink interaction also approached significance. 
Implicit instructions [Experiment 2] 
Priming 
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A priming effect was found, indicating that if a word was viewed in the encoding phase 
(veridical items) or was semantically related to those viewed (critical items) the 
probability of completing a stem to form those words was significantly increased, relative 
to baseline stem completion rates. Whilst inspection of the data revealed a tendency for 
the magnitude of the priming effect to be larger for veridical items, this did not reach 
significance as indicated by a non-significant 2-way item type by studied status 
interaction. In addition, the priming effect was not found to interact with drink, thus the 
probability of completing a stem to form a veridical or critical word was not dependent 
upon drink consumed. 
Remember / know judgements 
After the awareness measures were taken for stems completed under implicit instructions, 
remember / know judgements were made as a means to assess phenomenological 
experience. Amongst these data, the only potential result of interest concerns a borderline 
line significant drink by memory type interaction for critical items from the second 
encoding phase indicating reduced remember memories under alcohol. 
3.6.2. Discussion and analysis 
Cued Recall 
Levels of false and veridical memory as assessed using cued recall were not found to 
differ as a function of drink. Thus, neither a retrograde facilitation effect for material 
encoding pre alcohol, nor an anterograde impairment for material encoded post alcohol, 
was obtained. Both of these effects are well established by previous empirical literature. 
Studies have shown that alcohol consumed prior to encoding at a dose comparable to the 
present study impairs recognition (e.g. Curran & Hildebrand 1999) and cued recall (e.g. 
Duka at al. 2001). In addition, the retrograde facilitation for material learnt pre-alcohol 
has also been widely replicated (e.g. Lamberty et al. 1990; Muller et al. 1983; Parker et 
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al. 1980). So how can a failure to find these two effects be accounted for? One can argue 
that a lack of sensitivity within the current study may have rendered these effects non-
significant and the reasons for this will be addressed in tum. 
Firstly, a limited number of studies have investigated the anterograde and facilitative 
effects of alcohol within a single experiment, a methodology chosen for its naturalistic 
design (Knowles & Duka 2004; Moulton et al. 2005). Previous studies, however, have 
tended to have a single encoding phase, and thus are confined to either the study of the 
retrograde facilitation effects (e.g. Muller et al. 1983; Parker et al. 1984), or the 
anterograde impairment effects of alcohol (e.g. Parker et al. 1974; Maylor et al. 1987). A 
simple design incorporating a single encoding phase has the methodological advantage of 
eliminating interference (proactive, retroactive and negative transfer) induced by the 
presence of the two encoding phases.6 Moreover, two encoding phases divides the total 
material learnt into two. As false memories are shown to be affected by the degree of 
material learnt (Dodson et al. 2000), the present studies used similar amounts of material 
to previous studies (e.g. Hicks & Stans 2005), but divided this material between the two 
encoding phases. Consequently, a single encoding phase incorporating twice the material 
could serve to decrease the variability and consequently increase the sensitivity. This 
would increase the probability that an effect would be detected. 
Secondly, whilst studies exist which incorporate two encoding phases within a single 
experiment and have found that both effects obtained (Knowles & Duka 2004; Moulton 
et al. 2005), these studies assessed memory using free recall as opposed to cued recall. 
The way in which cued recall was employed in Experiment 1 reduced the sensitivity of 
the experiment as it restricted the amount of material classified as valid for assessing an 
effect. For example, in terms of veridical items, whilst participants viewed different 30 
singularly presented veridical items in each encoding phase, only 3 stems were provided. 
Thus only ten percent of the items viewed contributed to the assessment of memory and 
this could have masked the presence of a genuine effect, resulting in a type II error. 
6 As interference is thought to be the mechanism which induces the facilitation effect (e.g. Mueller 1983) 
this would mean having to focus on the anterograde impairments of alcohol. 
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A failure to find an effect of alcohol on veridical memory - either in terms of retrograde 
facilitation or anterograde impairment - means one must be cautious in forming 
judgments about the effects of alcohol on false memory based upon the results of the 
current study. Nevertheless, within the cued recall data, two borderline significant 
interactions were found in critical items. Whilst they failed to reach significance, they 
require attention as a means to assess whether they should be further investigated in 
future studies. 
In the placebo group, an initial decrease in false memOrIes with repetition is in 
accordance with previous studies (e.g. Benjamin 2001). This can be accounted for if the 
benefits of increased exposure to veridical items in terms of forming detailed episodic 
traces outweighed the potential for increased activations of the critical item (Benjamin 
2001). Thus at test the phenomenological disparity between items presented and those not 
presented increased with increased learning. This could thus aid the monitoring of 
sources at test (e.g. Hicks & Marsh 1999), leading to a decline in false memories with 
repetition. Concerning the effect of repetition on false memories from the first encoding 
phase in the alcohol group, repetition had no significant effect. 
In the second encoding phase, repetition marginally increased false memOrIes in the 
placebo group. Under the principle of negative transfer7, the memory for the initial 
material may impede the extent to which material from the second encoding phase was 
learnt. Research has demonstrated that when encoding is impoverished, as demonstrated 
via speeded encoding, repetition results in a monotonic increase in false memories 
(Seamon et al. 2002). When a slower rate of veridical word presentation is provided, 
repetition has an inverse U-shaped relationship between false memory levels and 
repetitions. Seamon et al. (2002) equated repetition with the degree of encoding, and thus 
argued that when material is relatively poorly learnt, limited amounts of repetitions 
increases false memories. In contrast, when material is learnt well, as determined by an 
even greater number of repetitions, a subsequent decline in false memories is observed. 
7 when the learning of initial material can impede the learning of subsequent material 
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This principle can be extrapolated and applied to the current experiment - when the 
material was well learnt (as it was the material initial viewed) repetition decreased false 
memories, whereas when material was not encoded sufficiently due to the speculated 
effects of negative transfer, repetition increased false memories. 
In the alcohol group, repetition had no effect on false memories resulting from the second 
encoding phase. Whilst this finding is in contrast to the placebo group, one cannot 
conclude that this absence of an effect of repetition on false memories in intoxicated 
participants was a direct consequence of the alcohol. This is because the effect of the pro-
active interference resulting from the first encoding phase cannot be controlled and thus 
accounted for. Future studies need to determine whether this effect can be replicated 
using a single encoding phase. 
Implicit instructions 
Priming 
A main effect of studied status was achieved, thus viewing a word in the encoding phase 
increased the likelihood that stems would be completed to form that word (veridical 
items) or their semantic associates (critical items). Studied status was not found to 
significantly interact with word type (veridical versus critical). Consequently, the priming 
effect was not found to statistically differ between these items. This has important 
implications. As discussed in the introduction, other studies which obtained a priming 
effect for false memory words used a far shorter retention interval (e.g. McDermott 1997; 
McKone & Murphy 2000). It is also interesting from the perspective that stem 
completion tasks are traditionally viewed as perceptual tasks, whilst critical items were 
never physically presented, and thus are semantic by nature. Whilst the higher order 
ANOYA did not differentiate between the magnitude of the priming effect for veridical 
and critical items, inspection of Figure 3.8. indicates a numerically greater priming effect 
was obtained for veridical versus critical items. Indeed further analysis to investigate this 
potential differential priming effect reveals that a priming effect was significant only in 
veridical items [t(31) = -.2,485,p = .019] and not critical items [t(31) = -.955,p = .347]. 
88 
Further investigation is thus needed to establish the validity of this potential long term 
priming effect for false memory items. 
Final conclusions 
Whilst this study raised some interesting points, no conclusions regarding the effect of 
alcohol and repetition on false memories can be drawn. The presence of the two encoding 
phases may have complicated the study by virtue of the potential confound of 
interference effects. In addition, the presence of the two encoding phases served to reduce 
the sensitivity of the experiment. Consequently, a single encoding phase will be pursued 
and the anterograde impairments of alcohol will be focused on in subsequent studies. 
89 
Chapter 4. The effect of alcohol on implicit and explicit false and veridical 
memories 
4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 sought to manipulate encoding quality - through study list repetition and 
alcohol at encoding - to determine the subsequent effects on false memory levels. 
Observation of the way in which repetition and alcohol modulated false memory levels 
was used to gain insight into the mechanisms underlying false memories. 
As summarised in Chapter 1, and mentioned in Chapter 3, research on the effect of 
alcohol on false memories using the DRM paradigm has to date been limited, with 
equivocal results. A study by Milani and Curran (1999) found that alcohol (0.27 g/kg) 
had a tendency to increase false recognition relative to a placebo control group, whilst not 
affecting false recall. In addition, alcohol was found to affect the subjective 
phenomenological experience of false memory items by increasing false remember 
responses relative to the placebo control group. In contrast, Mintzer and Griffiths (2001), 
found no effect of a 0.27g/kg dose of alcohol on false recognition, though a larger dose 
(0.60g/kg) was found to reduce veridical recognition but leave levels of false memory 
comparable to the placebo group. In addition, and unlike the findings of Milani and 
Curran (1999), Mintzer and Griffiths (2001) did not find an effect of alcohol on 
phenomenological experience as assessed using the remember / know procedure. The 
proportions of remember and know responses made to false memory items were found to 
be equivalent in both the alcohol and placebo groups. 
Methodological differences, particularly regarding the type of tests administered, may 
account for some of the variability in phenomenological experience obtained within the 
two studies (see Chapter 1 for an explanation). From a theoretical perspective, however. 
and following an argument outlined in Chapter 1, it can be proposed that alcohol may 
have the potential to both increase and decrease false memories. Using the AMF (see also 
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Chapter 1), a theory which postulates opponent processes underlying false memories, it 
can be hypothesised that by reducing both processes, alcohol could give rise to increases 
and decreases in false memories relative to a placebo control group (see figure 4.1 ). 
Specifically, the AMP claims that false memories get elicited by activation of the critical 
items. Two distinct activation routes are proposed. Firstly, via the automatic spread of 
activation through semantic networks, and secondly, by means of conscious elaborative 
processing resulting in the direct thought of the critical item (Gallo & Roediger 2002). At 
test, monitoring processes are thought to determine the source of this activation. For 
critical items, activation may be misattributed to prior presentation of the items at 
encoding, as opposed to internal processes such as elaborative thought at encoding. This 
reality monitoring error means the critical items get endorsed at test, which translates into 
a false memory (Roediger et af. 2001). 
Semantic activation 
Automatic spread Conscious thought 
~/ 
Reduced by alcohol ~ Less activation 
~ Decrease in false memories 
Enriched 
encoding 
V 
IV 
/ 
Disrupted by alcohol ~ 
Impairment in monitoring 
~ Increase in false 
memories 
Source monitoring at retrieval 
Figure 4.1. Diagram to depict the theorised potential for alcohol to decrease false 
memories (via reduced activation at encoding), and increase false memories (via 
impairing encoding quality, leading to reduced ability to monitor at retrieval). 
Regarding activation, the speculation that alcohol will reduce false memories via reduced 
activation of critical items is based upon a number of findings. The potential for alcohol 
to disrupt attentional resources (Steele & Josephs 1988) and disrupt the production of 
semantic context required to encode the meaning from information being processed 
(Birnbaum et al. 1980) would indicate a decreased likelihood that the critical item \\till 
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be consciously thought of under an alcohol challenge at encoding. Concerning automatic 
activation, proposed shallower processing under alcohol (Craik 1977), would lessen the 
spread of activation relative to deeper semantic processing (Thapar & McDermott 2001). 
This is supported by the finding that alcohol disrupts mediated semantic priming) 
(Sayette et al. 2001), which can be taken as a behavioural manifestation that alcohol 
reduces the spread of activation within semantic networks. In addition, Weissenborn and 
Duka (2000) found that alcohol at encoding eliminated the benefit afforded by the 
presentation of high associations as a contextual cue for retrieval. This thus indicates that 
alcohol blocks the forming of associations at encoding and thus substantiates the 
perspective that alcohol may reduce false memories. 
The primary effect of alcohol on false memories is hypothesised to be a decrease in false 
memories due to decreased activation. In addition, one can argue that, under some 
circumstances, alcohol may lead to an increase in false memories relative to a placebo 
group. This hypothesis is founded upon the potential for alcohol at encoding to impair 
successful monitoring at retrieval. The potential for alcohol to affect false memories via 
monitoring mechanisms must be secondary to the effect of alcohol on activation 
processes. The ability to monitor - successfully or otherwise - can only take effect when 
a threshold of activation is surpassed. Otherwise, the ability to recollect the item in 
question, or the sense of familiarity felt for that item, would not be sufficiently high to 
enable their monitoring to occur in the first place. 
Whilst no literature currently exists to support the hypothesis that alcohol may impair 
monitoring, it can be inferred from existing empirical research. Specifically, Curran and 
Hildebrandt (1999) and Duka et al. (2001) both demonstrated the propensity for alcohol 
to selectively impair remember responses, whilst leaving know responses relatively 
intact. Monitoring is aided by the degree to which sources can be discriminated from 
each other (Hicks & Marsh 1999). Consequently, enriched recollective memory \vould 
thus aid reality monitoring, relative to memories based on a sense of familiarity. If at 
1 1\ lediated semantic priming is when target words are preceded by primes that are either unrelated or 
indirectly related to the target. 
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retrieval items encoded under alcohol are not sufficiently distinct to make successful 
reality monitoring decisions, a consequent increase in false memories can be predicted. 
Alcohol can thus be viewed as a tool to initially manipulate activation processes, with the 
potential to impair monitoring processes when learning is increased. One can thus predict 
that, due to impaired activation when intoxicated, participants in the alcohol group may 
have reduced false memories relative to the placebo group. One can also predict that false 
memories may increase with repetition in the alcohol group. Impaired monitoring 
processes could be a mechanism to account for this (Benjamin 2001). These hypotheses 
are in accordance with the principles of the AMP which denotes that decreased activation 
decreases false memories, whilst impaired monitoring can serve to increase false 
memories. Repetition is a study variable which can increase learning, thus allowing the 
potential detrimental effects of alcohol on monitoring to manifest. Repetition also has the 
potential to both increase and decrease false memories (e.g. Benjamin 2001). Unlike 
alcohol, repetition has been hypothesised to achieve this dual function through increasing 
activation and monitoring processes. Specifically, increased repetitions provide an 
opportunity for increased activations of the critical item, which could increase their 
endorsement. In addition, repeated exposures to the veridical items at encoding would 
heighten the potential that they will be distinctly recollected. Phenomenological disparity 
has been found to exist between false memory items and veridical items in terms of the 
degree of detail inherent within the memory and the feelings felt when 'encoding' the 
item (Neuschatz et al. 2001). Consequently, if participants are able to distinctly recollect 
veridical items, the disparity between true and false memories would be heightened 
resulting in the potential for enhanced monitoring at retrieval (Benjamin 2001; Jacoby et 
al. 1998). Thus both alcohol and repetition have the potential to increase and decrease 
false memories via differentially affecting the opponent processes thought to underlie 
false memories; alcohol through reduced activation and impaired monitoring, and 
repetition through increased activation and increased ability to source monitor. Repetition 
and alcohol thus provide two distinct ways to modulate encoding quality, using opposite 
mechanisms of action. One can predict that participants in the alcohol group should have 
decreased levels of false memories relative to the placebo group for singularly presented 
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lists due to decreased activation. In addition, one can predict that repetition should 
increase false memories in the alcohol group, due to a deficit in encoding quality which 
may mean the activation enhancing benefits of repetition prevail relative to the placebo 
group. 
4.2. Assessment of memory 
Memory will be assessed using implicit and explicit tasks, as alcohol has been shown to 
differentially affect these measures of memory. The anterograde impairments of alcohol 
as assessed by cued recall (e.g. Weissenborn & Duka 2000) and free recall (e.g. Parker et 
al. 1974) have not been found to extend to implicit memory, as assessed using stem 
completion (Duka et al. 2001). In the present experiment, priming measures will be taken 
for both veridical and critical items, and subsequent awareness measures will also be 
taken. Previous research has investigated implicit false memories using priming 
measures, whereby a priming effect was obtained for both veridical and critical items 
(Hicks & Starns 2005; McKone & Murphy 2000). These experiments used immediate 
stem completion tasks as a means to assess priming levels. This study will follow 
previous methodologies used in the alcohol memory literature (e.g. Duka et al. 2001; 
Weissenborn & Duka 2000) and next day testing will occur. This allows for the study of 
how alcohol effects the encoding of false memories, since no drinks will be administered 
on the second day. This is significant for two reasons, firstly, neither of the two previous 
studies involving alcohol and the DRM paradigm (Mintzer & Griffiths 2001; Curran & 
Hildebrandt 1999) fully separated the encoding and retrieval phases of the experiment in 
terms of alcohol intoxication. The aetiology of false memories is thought to occur 
primarily at encoding (e.g. consequently having an experimental design which isolates an 
experimental manipulation at encoding allows for conclusions pertaining to the effect of 
encoding). Secondly, it is of interest to determine whether long-term priming will be 
obtained for critical items, since no study using implicit measures has previously 
attempted a 24 hour retention interval. Finding ways in which veridical memory operates 
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in the same way and differs from critical memory provides insight into mechanisms 
underlying these two types of memory. 
4.3. Materials and methods 
Participants 
Thirty-two volunteers (16 males and 16 females) were recruited from the undergraduate 
and postgraduate population at the University of Sussex. They received either a cash or 
course credits as payment. All participants were native English speakers, not dyslexic and 
aged 18-34 years.All volunteers met the criteria for inclusion specified in Chapter 2. 
Alcohol administration 
Same as Experiment 3. 
Design 
The experiment was double-blind, and participants were randomly assigned to either the 
placebo (n=16) or the alcohol group (n=16). The experiment took place over two 
consecutive days. The drink was consumed on day one, and was followed by the learning 
phase. Participants returned the next day to undergo 2 memory tests: an implicit test and 
free recall. 
Memory task: Encoding 
Eleven II-word lists were taken from Stadler et al. (1999) when lists conformed to the 
specifications made by McEvoy et al. (1999) deemed necessary for stem completion tests 
(see Chapter 2). Nine lists were the newly created lists used in Experiments 1 and 2 (see 
Chapter 2). 
The II-word lists (including 2 non-presented critical items) were separated into two 
master lists consisting of 10 lists each (master list A and master list B). Each participant 
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viewed either master list A or master list B in the encoding phase. Each master list was 
also divided into two sections, forming set 1 and set 2 (resulting in 5 lists in each set). 
The sets determined which lists were repeated; half the subjects viewed set 1 lists once, 
whilst lists from set 2 were consecutively repeated three times. The remaining 
participants saw lists from set 1 three times, and lists from set 2 once, thus ensuring list 
repetition was counterbalanced. The presentation order of lists was fully randomised, 
with the constraint that repetitions were consecutive. Lists in each set were matched for 
word frequency, stem completion rate and whether the critical items were nouns or 
adverbs. 
Memory task: Test 
The implicit test consisted of 80 stems: 2 critical items and 2 veridical items from each 
list. 20 studied veridical and 20 non-studied critical items corresponded to lists viewed in 
encoding. 10 of these veridical items came from lists presented once, whilst the 
remammg 10 were from repeated lists. Similarly, 10 critical items were from repeated 
lists, whilst 10 were from singularly presented lists. The remaining 40 stems were from 
the master list not viewed in the encoding session, and served as baseline measures. 
These baseline stems comprised 20 veridical items not viewed in the encoding session, 
and their associated 20 critical items. 
Following the implicit test, a free recall test was introduced. Participants were given 
instructions to write down all the words they remembered from the previous days 
encoding phase. 
Subjective self-ratings 
Participants completed a series of 100mm V ASs (Duka et al. 1998; See Chapter 2). 
Alcohol Use Questionnaire and Nuffield Medical Questionnaire 
See Chapter 2. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. On entering the lab participants signed a consent 
form, and read a brief description about the experiment, which stated that the effect of 
alcohol on learning was to be tested. They were thus not informed that the experiment 
was concerned with false memory. 
Participants filled out a medical questionnaire to ensure they were medically fit to take 
part, and the AUQ to ensure they were moderate social drinkers (that they consumed 
between 5-50 units per week). 
All participants were breathalysed to ensure their baseline breath alcohol concentrations 
(BACs) were O. 
Participants height and weight was taken, they consumed their lunch (a small roll and a 
glass of water) and completed the AUQ (Alcohol Use Questionnaire) and a verbal 
memory task (Lezak), as a means to obtain baseline memory scores. They were then 
taken to a medical room in order to consume their drinks. Their BAC level was measured 
10 min after the final drink was provided (40 min after the initiation of drinking) and they 
completed a series of visual analogue scales. They were subsequently breathalysed at half 
hourly intervals thereafter. Participants were then taken to the testing rooms where they 
underwent the encoding phase. The encoding phase lasted for 15 minutes. 
Participants completed the V AS for a second time, and then retired to the waiting room. 
Once BACs had fallen to below 0.4 gil, participants gave consent that they would not 
drink, ride a bike or operate any kind of machinery for 4 h and were released from the 
laboratory. 
On day 2, participants completed the implicit test with implicit instructions, followed by 
free recall. They then returned to the words they had generated under implicit test 
instructions. They were instructed to circle all the words they were 'aware' of having 
viewed in the encoding phase. They then completed the V AS. 
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Statistical analyses 
In accordance with an argument outlined in Chapter 3, and following a mode of analysis 
employed by previous researchers using pharmacological manipulations in conjunction 
with the DRM paradigm (Hurron et al. 2001), all analyses were performed separately in 
veridical and critical items. This would allow an assessment of how repetition and 
alcohol selectively modulated false and veridical memory levels. In addition, and 
following a procedure employed in Chapter 3, all analyses were performed on raw data 
scores due to equivalent intrusion rates within the alcohol and placebo groups, as 
described in section 3.4.1. The main analysis is divided into three sections. Firstly, the 
free recall data is addressed. The data generated under implicit instructions is dealt with 
in regard to priming, followed by an analysis which is concerned with aware verses 
unaware items. Details of individual ANOV As preformed precede each analysis. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Groups 
Mean (SEM) 
Placebo Alcohol 
Units per week 37.11 (5.40) 26.96 (3.32) 
AUQ score 54.09 (5.85) 51.57 (7.92) 
Binge score 21.46 (2.91) 24.61 (5.65) 
Lezak 17.56 (1.08) 17. 19 (1. 09) 
Table 4.1. Group qualities in the alcohol and placebo groups for Experiment 3. 
Analyses of the alcohol and placebo groups revealed that participants were matched for 
units consumed per week [t(30) = 1.602, p = .120], AUQ score [t(30) = .257, p = .799], 
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binge drinking score [t(30) = -.459, p = .625] and baseline memory measures (t(30) = 
.293, p = .772) (see table 4.1.). 
VAS scores 
Day 1: Mean (SEM) Day 2: Mean (SEM) 
Placebo Alcohol Placebo Alcohol 
Relaxed 5.51 (.46) 6.1 (.47) 5.32 (.4l) 4.77 (.52) 
Content 5.65 (.39) 6.27 (.37) 5.65 (.39) 5.69 (.51) 
Lightheaded 1.83 (.56) 5.96 (.52) 0.53 (.09) 0.53 (.09) 
Table 4.2. VAS scores on day 1 and day 2. 
The alcohol and placebo groups did not differ on subjective ratings of relaxedness on 
either day 1 [t(30) = -.885, p = .383] nor day 2 [t(30) = -.833, p = .412]. Nor did they 
differ on ratings of contentedness on either day 1 [t(30) = -1.116, P = .261] nor day 2 
[t(30) = -.068, p = .946]. In contrast, on day 1 post consumption of the drink, the alcohol 
group rated themselves as significantly more lightheaded than the placebo group [t(30) = 
-5.392,p < .001]. On day 2 when no alcohol was administered, no significant difference 
existed in lightheadedness ratings between the two groups [t(30) = -.000, p = 1.000] (see 
table 4.2). 
To determine whether it was necessary to correct memory scores for the recall of 
intrusions2, between subjects t-tests were administered to determine the extent to which 
intrusion rates differed between the alcohol and placebo groups. The amount of non-
critical intrusions recalled between the two groups was approaching significance [t(30) = 
1.862, P = .072], however the mean value of non-critical intrusions recalled was higher in 
the placebo group (4.81) than the alcohol group (2.81). As placebo participants recalled 
more veridical and critical items than the alcohol group, two new variables were formed 
which looked at the ratio of non-critical intrusions to total veridical memory and total 
critical memory recalled. As placebo participants recalled more veridical and critical 
words than alcohol participants (see analyses below), these new variables resulted in non-
2 Defined as the recall of non-presented items which were not critical items 
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significant differences in intrusions as a function of total veridical memory recalled [t(30) 
= .037,p = .91] and total critical memory recalled [t(30) = .952,p = .349]. Consequently, 
no corrections were administered prior to analyses and thus results were analysed using 
raw data only. 
4.4.2. Free Recall 
Veridical items 
In order to explore the effect of alcohol on veridical items, a mixed 2( drink: alcohol vs. 
placebo)x2(repetition: lists presented once vs. lists presented three times) ANOYA was 
performed on the percentage of veridical words recalled, with drink serving as a between 
subjects variable, and repetition as a within subjects variable. 
A main effect of repetition was found [F (1, 30) = 67.143, p < .001] demonstrating that 
repetition of lists resulted in a greater probability of later recall. The repetition x drink 
interaction was not found to be significant [F(1, 30) = 1.190, p = .284], nor was a main 
effect of drink obtained [F(1, 30) = 1.775, P = .193]. Due to a homogeneity of variance 
problem, separate between subjects t-tests between alcohol and placebo groups were run 
in single and repeated conditions. It was found that participants in the alcohol group 
recalled significantly less than placebo participants for singularly presented lists [t(30) = 
2.953, p = .006]. No difference existed between the two groups for repeated lists [t(30) = 
.418,p = .679]. 
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Figure 4.2 The percentage of veridical items recalled in singularly presented and 
repeated lists in both the alcohol and placebo groups. 
Critical items 
In order to explore the effect of alcohol and repetition on critical items a mixed 2( drink: 
alcohol vs. placebo)x2(repetition: lists presented once vs. lists presented three times) 
ANOV A was performed on the percentage of critical words recalled, with repetition as a 
within subjects factor, and drink as a between subjects factor. 
A main effect of repetition [F(l, 30) = 3.93, p = .057] was bordering on significance, 
indicating a tendency for repetition to increase critical recall. Whilst there was no main 
effect of drink [F(l, 30) = l.381, p = .249], a repetition x drink interaction [F(l , 30) = 
3.93 p = .057] , was approaching significance. Further exploration revealed a non-
significant effect of repetition on the percentage of critical items recalled in placebo 
subjects [t(l , IS) = .00, p = 1.00]. In contrast, repetition was found to significantly 
increased the percentage of critical items recalled in participants who had consumed 
alcohol [1(15) = -2.79, p = .014] . 
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gure 4.3. The percentage of critical items recalled in singularly presented and 
repeated lists in both the alcohol and placebo groups. 
4.4.3. Implicit test of memory 
4.4.3.1 Priming 
Before performing analyses determining memory with and without awareness for words 
viewed in the encoding phase, an analysis was performed to determine whether a priming 
effect had occurred. A mixed 2(word type: veridical vs. critical)x2(status: studied vs. 
non-studied)x2( drink: placebo vs. alcohol) ANOY A was performed on the percentage of 
words completed. Drink served as the only between subjects variable, whist word type 
and status were within subjects factors. 
There was no overall priming effect as demonstrated by a non-significant main effect of 
status [F(1, 30) = 1.085, P = .306], and there was no status x drink interaction [F( 1, 30 = 
.036 p = .851] nor a significant 3-way status x drink x word type interaction [F(1 30) = 
1.800, p = .190]. The only significant effect was a status x word type interaction [F(1 30) 
= 15.14 P = .001] reflecting the finding that previously studying eridical \ ord 
incr a ed the likelihood of completing a stem to form that word [/(31) = -3 .13,p = .003] 
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but that previously viewing lists did not increase the probability that a stem would be 
completed to form corresponding critical items [t(31) = 1.37,p = .18], thus a significant 
effect of priming was only obtained for the veridical items. 
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Figure 4.4. The percentage of stems completed to form veridical or critical items 
corresponding to those viewed in the encoding phase (studied) versus the 
percentages of stems completed to form words not encountered in the encoding 
phase (baseline), for the alcohol and placebo groups. 
As a consequence of the non-significant priming effect in critical items, conclusions 
regarding implicit memory can only relate to veridical items, but the critical priming data 
can still be used to generate measures of aware and unaware items. 
4.4.3.2. Analysis incorporating awareness measures 
Analyses were performed to compare the relative rates of aware and unaware items, and 
how they differed as a function of alcohol and repetition 
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Veridical Items 
A mixed 2(drink: placebo vs. alcohol)x2(awareness: aware vs. unaware)x2(repetition: 
presented once versus repeated three times) ANOVA was perfonned on the amount of 
stems completed to correspond to veridical items encountered in the encoding phase. 
Drink served as a between subjects variable, whilst repetition and awareness were within 
subjects variables. 
A main effect of awareness was found, signifying more aware than unaware items [F(1, 
30) = 8.82, p = .006], thus once participants had completed a stem to correspond to an 
item viewed at encoding, they were more likely to endorse it as an item they were aware 
of, than fail to do so. A main effect of repetition was also found [F(1, 30) = 8.82, p = 
.006], demonstrating that repetition served to increase the probability that a stem would 
be completed to form veridical items viewed in the encoding phase. An awareness x 
repetition interaction [F(1, 30) = 14.26, p = .001], signified that repetition significantly 
increased the amount of aware items [t(3l) = -3.54, p = .001], but that repetition also 
decreased the amount of unaware items, though this effect did not reach significance 
[t(3l) = 1.22,p = .234]. An awareness x repetition x drink interaction [F(1, 30) = 4.71, P 
= .038], was further explored using two-way ANOVAs separately for the alcohol and 
placebo groups. In the placebo group, the repetition x awareness interaction was non-
significant [F(1, 15) = 1.238,p = .283]. In contrast, analysis in the alcohol group found a 
significant repetition x awareness interaction [F(1, 15) = 18.483, p = .001]. This 
interaction was further explored to reveal that repetition significantly decreased the 
amount of unaware veridical items [t(15) = 2.18, p = .046] but increased the amount of 
aware veridical items [t(15) = -3.39, p = .004] within the alcohol group. 
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Figure 4.5. A main effect of awareness in placebo participants, indicating that they 
were significantly more aware than unaware of veridical items, regardless of 
repetition condition. 
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Figure 4.6. A repetition x awareness interaction in the alcohol group indicated that 
participants were more unaware of single veridical items verses repeated veridical 
items, yet more aware of repeated veridical items relative to single veridical items. 
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Critical Items 
A mixed 2(drink: placebo vs. alcohol)x2(awareness: aware vs. unaware)x2(repetition: 
presented once vs. repeated three times) ANOVA was performed on the amount of stems 
completed to correspond to critical items semantically related to veridical items 
encountered in the encoding phase. Drink was a between subjects variable, whilst 
awareness and repetition were both within subjects variables. 
A main effect of awareness was found [F(1, 30) = 4.53, P = .042], reflecting the finding 
that participants were more aware than unaware of critical items. There was no 
significant main effect of repetition [F(1, 30) = .122, p = .729] and neither the awareness 
x repetition [F(1, 30) = .350, p = .558], nor drink x repetition [F(1, 30) = .66, p = .442] 
interactions were found to be significant. A significant awareness x repetition x drink 
interaction [F(1, 30) = 8.75, p = .006] was further explored using separate two-way 
ANOV As for the alcohol and placebo groups. In the placebo group, a significant 
repetition x awareness interaction F(1, 15) = 5.44, p = .034], was further explored to 
reveal that repetition increased the amount of unaware critical words [t( 15) = -2.24, p = 
.041], but did not affect critical aware words [t(30) = 1.31, p = .211]. As being unaware 
of critical items constitutes accurate memory, being unaware of them thus amounts to 
being able to correctly reject them, and this was enhanced in the placebo group as a 
function of repetition. In the alcohol group, a repetition x awareness interaction was 
approaching significance F(1, 15) = 4.24, p = .057]. This was further explored to reveal 
that repetition had a borderline significant tendency to decrease the amount of unaware 
critical items [t(15) = 2.09, p = .055]. In contrast, repetition did not affect the amount of 
aware items [t(15) = -1.37,p = .191]. As depicted in the figures 4.7. and 4.8., a double 
dissociation was obtained, as repetition was found to have opposite effects on levels of 
aware and unaware critical items, dependent on drink consumed. Repetition was thus 
found to increase the accuracy of memory for participants in the placebo group, and 
decrease memory accuracy for participants in the alcohol group. 
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Placebo: Awareness x 
Repetion in Critical Items 
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Figure 4.7. A repetition x awareness interaction in the placebo group demonstrated 
that repetition increased the amount of unaware critical words and decreased the 
amount of aware words, though this did not reach significance. 
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Figure 4.8. A repetition x awareness interaction in the alcohol group 
demonstrated that repetition decreased the amount of unaware critical items, and 
increased the amount of aware critical items. Both effects were approaching 
significance. 
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4.5. Discussion 
The important findings of the present study can be summarised as follows: Alcohol was 
found to impair free recall for single veridical lists relative to the placebo group, whilst 
repeated lists resulted in equivalent levels of veridical recall between the two groups. A 
main effect of repetition was found in the veridical items, indicating that repetition served 
to increase later recall in both the alcohol and the placebo groups. Concerning false 
memories, repetition had no effect on false recall in the placebo group, but increased false 
recall in the alcohol group. Analyses also demonstrated that alcohol decreased false recall 
for singularly presented lists, but had no effect on repeated lists relative to the placebo 
group. 
Implicit tests revealed a priming effect for veridical items, but not for critical items. 
Awareness measures demonstrated that placebo participants had a main effect of 
awareness, signifying that they were more aware than unaware of veridical items. For 
participants in the alcohol group, awareness was found to interact with repetition, such 
that they were more unaware of single veridical items verses repeated veridical items, yet 
more aware of repeated veridical items relative to single veridical items. An awareness by 
repetition interaction was also obtained in the false memory items, and differed as a 
function of drink. In the placebo group, participants were better able to not endorse (be 
aware of) false memory items from repeated lists, than from singularly presented lists. 
The reverse was found in alcohol participants, where repetition was found to increase the 
amount of false memory items endorsed. 
4.5.1. Explicit memory 
Explicit memory was assessed using free recall. The principle areas of interest were how 
alcohol and repetition modulated false and veridical memory levels, and whether these 
two distinct ways of manipulating encoding interacted. Repetition was found to 
effectively modulate the degree of encoding for both alcohol and placebo participants, as 
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a mam effect of repetition signified that viewing lists mUltiple times increased the 
probability of veridical recall. In addition, and in accordance with the established 
anterograde impairments of alcohol (e.g. Weissenborn & Duka 2000; Duka et al. 2001), 
participants in the alcohol group recalled significantly less singularly presented veridical 
items than placebo participants. This deleterious effect of alcohol was rendered non-
significant through increased learning, as recall levels for repeated veridical items did not 
differ as a function of drink. 
In contrast to veridical items, repetition selectively increased the probability of recall for 
false memory items for alcohol participants, but not placebo participants. In accordance 
with the AMP, if repetition is to lead to an increase in false memories, it must increase 
the activation of the critical item. Through increased knowledge of the study list, 
repetition can also result in increased monitoring ability which decreases false memories 
(Benjamin 2001). Consequently, the extent to which repetition increases the activation of 
critical items must exceed the extent to which monitoring ability is enhanced with 
repetition. Thus no effect of repetition on false memory levels can be interpreted as 
repetition increasing activation and monitoring processes to the same extent. In contrast, 
an increase in false memories with repetition can be taken as indicative of repetition 
increasing the activation of critical items to a greater extent than the enhanced potential 
for source monitoring at retrieval. Consequently, the finding that repetition lead to an 
increase in false memories in the alcohol group but not the placebo group can be 
attributed to: (1) repetition increasing activation processes to a greater extent in the 
alcohol group relative to the placebo group, or (2) repetition increasing monitoring ability 
to a greater extent in the placebo group than the alcohol group. Regarding activation 
processes, alcohol has been hypothesised to impair memory through superficial encoding 
(Craik 1977), leading to a decrease in activation of the critical items (Thapar & 
McDermott 2001). r f the activation levels of critical items were thus initially lower than 
the placebo group, yet three repetitions resulted in equivalent activation levels between 
the two groups (as indexed by equivalent levels of veridical memory), then the net 
increase in semantic activation as a function of repetition would be greater in the alcohol 
group than the placebo group. Alternatively, a deficit in recollective memory under 
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alcohol could account for the findings. Alcohol has been shown to selectively impair 
recollective memory (Duka et al. 2001). Consequently, the increase in false memories 
with repetition under alcohol is inline with previous research which has demonstrated that 
repetition selectively increases false memories in populations that have a deficit in 
recollective memory and hence a supposed deficit in monitoring ability. This has been 
demonstrated in the elderly (Benjamin 2001; Kensinger & Schacter 1999) and patients 
with Korsakoff amnesia (Schacter et al. 1998). 
4.5.2. Implicit memory 
The implicit instructions for the stem completion task ('complete the stems to form the 
first word to come to mind') resulted in a priming effect for veridical items, but not 
critical items. This priming by word type interaction did not differ as a function of drink. 
In regard to veridical items, this priming effect replicates 24 hour priming obtained by 
Duka et al. (2002), where, like the current experiment, priming was unaffected by drink 
consumed. It is also in accordance with empirical research that demonstrates the 
preservation of automatic components of memory under alcohol (e.g. Kirschner & 
Sayette, 2003; Tracy & Bates, 1999). In contrast, no priming effect was obtained in 
critical items. This appears contrary to researchers who demonstrated a significant effect 
of priming in critical items using stem completion (Hicks & Starns, 2005; McKone & 
Murphy 2000). These researchers, however, used immediate stem completion, as opposed 
to the 24 hour retention interval employed in the current experiment. This differential 
effect of priming for critical and veridical items over an extended retention interval thus 
provides an interesting insight into the relative durability of traces underlying true and 
false memory items. 
Participants were required to make awareness judgements for the words they had 
completed under implicit instructions, following a procedure used by Duka et al. (2001). 
By circling a word, participants were endorsing it as having been presented at encoding, 
thus proclaiming 'awareness' for its prior presentation. Awareness of veridical \\ords 
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thus constituted accurate memory. The reverse was true however for false memory 
" . 
items. For, as they were never presented, proclaiming 'awareness' of their presentation 
was thus incorrect. As a priming effect was only achieved in veridical items, conclusions 
regarding the automatic influences of memory as indicated by levels of unaware items is 
restricted to veridical items (Duka et al. 2001). Whilst aware and unaware measures can 
still be obtained for critical items, conclusions cannot be derived from these measures in 
terms of automatic and controlled memory processes. This is because stem completion 
for critical items was at chance and consequently one cannot infer that automatic memory 
processes aided their completion. 
For the veridical items, a main effect of repetition demonstrated that the priming effect 
became enhanced with repetition. This is not surprising as suprathreshold activation, 
leading to a priming effect, would be predicted with increased viewing (Grant & Logan 
1993). This result substantiates the use of repetition as a modulator of encoding and 
demonstrates that it can be obtained using implicit instructions. Interestingly, a three way 
repetition by awareness by drink interaction revealed for participants in the alcohol 
group, their awareness status for veridical words differed as a function of repetition. This 
was not true for placebo participants. Specifically, in the alcohol group, increased 
repetitions served to bring veridical items into conscious awareness. For words viewed 
just once, they were significantly more likely to be unaware of it relative to having 
viewed it repeated times. This finding would thus appear to support empirical research 
which documents the differential impairment of alcohol on automatic and controlled 
memory processes (Kirschner & Sayette 2003; Tracy & Bates 1999; Lister et al. 2001). 
As priming was not affected by drink, automatic memory influences, as quantified using 
degree of priming for veridical items, were not found to be affected by drink consumed. 
Explicit awareness of these words generated under implicit instructions, however, was 
found to be affected by drink. In addition, explicit awareness of these veridical items was 
mediated by repetition in the alcohol group only, such that it would appear they benefited 
from increased learning to bring these words into conscious awareness. The differential 
effect of alcohol on implicit and explicit memory is well documented in the current 
literature (e.g. Lister et al. 2001: Duka et al. 2001). 
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In critical items, whilst a main effect of awareness indicated that participants were more 
aware than unaware of stems completed to form critical items, this effect was qualified 
by a significant three way repetition by awareness by drink interaction. It was found that 
repetition had opposite effects in placebo and alcohol participants. Awareness, and thus 
endorsement, of critical items increased with repetition in alcohol participants, whilst no 
such effect was present in the placebo group. Thus, regarding memory accuracy as 
indexed by false memory endorsement, placebo participants' memory got more accurate 
with repetition, whilst accuracy for participants in the alcohol group declined. This 
finding mirrors the results obtained in the explicit data, and is accordance with the deficit 
in recollective encoding under alcohol (Kirschner & Sayette 2003). It can also be taken as 
a possible deficit of monitoring ensuing from alcohol intoxication at encoding. Whilst the 
literature has yet to document such an effect, it could be argued that it would be more 
likely to manifest using false memories. This argument is based on the high levels of 
global familiarity underlying false memory items (Fazendeiro et al. 2005) and the 
propensity of participants intoxicated at encoding to rely on familiarity for memory 
endorsement (Lister et al. 2001). 
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Chapter 5. In pursuit of the inverted U 
5.1. General introduction 
Investigation into the effect of repetition at encoding on subsequent false memory levels 
has resulted in equivocal findings. Studies have demonstrated that repetition at encoding 
has the potential to increase false memories (Benjamin 2001; Jacoby 1999; Seamon 
2002) decrease false memories (Benjamin 2001; Jacoby 1999), have no effect on false 
memories (Tussing & Greene 1997; Tussing & Greene 1999) or result in an inverted U-
shaped relationship, with repetitions initially serving to increase false memories, and later 
acting to decrease them (Seamon et al. 2002). 
McDermott (2001) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of 
learning - as manipulated by exposure duration of stimuli - and false memory levels. 
One can equate repetition with the degree of learning, hence accounting for the parabolic 
relationship between false memories and repetition obtained by Seamon et al. (2002). In 
addition, the way in which learning is affected by repetition is determined by the quality 
of encoding. For example, repetition when learning is impoverished has been shown to 
increase false memories, as shown by repetition under conditions of speeded encoding. 
Also repetition in the elderly, where recollection is impaired, has been shown to increase 
false memories relative to younger participants (Benjamin 2001). 
The potential for repetition to affect explicit false memones m different ways was 
reflected in the findings of the previous two chapters. Chapter 4 found no effect of 
repetition on explicit false memories in placebo participants. In contrast, Chapter 3 found 
a tendency for repetition to decrease false memories prior to a placebo drink, then 
increase false memories after consumption of a placebo drink. This chapter is concerned 
with gaining a greater understanding of the complex relationship between repetition and 
the false memory levels. By furthering our understanding of what factors determine the 
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way In which repetition will impact false memory levels, the prevIOUS seemingly 
contradictory findings can be reconciled. 
With regard to explicit data from placebo participants, one can interpret the results from 
the previous two chapters in terms of the parabolic relationship between repetition and 
false memories. In Chapter 4, the non-significant effect of repetition on false memories in 
placebo participants may indicate that the increase in learning between the two repetition 
points resulted in levels of false memory which were at the peak of the curve (see figure 
5.1). In the first encoding phase of Chapter 3, a tendency was found for repetition to 
decrease false memories. In contrast, results from the post-drink encoding phase resulted 
in a tendency for repetition to increase false memories. These two encoding phases could 
be viewed as approaching separate ends of the curve - with learning being impaired 
during the second learning phase as a result of proactive interference generated by the 
first encoding phase. This hypothesised reconciliation of the findings of the previous 
experiments in terms of the inverted U-shaped relationship between false memories and 
repetition is displayed in Figure 5.1. 
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The inverted V-shaped relationship between false memories and 
repetition: Previous experimental findings in Placebo participants. 
Chapter 3: Post-
drink encoding 
phase 
Chapter 4 
Degree of learning 
Chapter 3: Pre-drink 
encoding phase 
Figure 5.1. The explicit results from placebo participants in Chapters 3 and 4 are 
interpreted in terms of the inverted V-shaped relationship between the degree of 
learning and false memory levels (Seamon et al. 2002; McDermott 2001) 
This chapter is an exploration of the relationship between repetition and false memories, 
with a view to investigating the way in which different factors serve to affect the way in 
which repetition modulates false memories. As the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between false memories and repetition has, to date, only been demonstrated once 
(Seamon et al. 2002), determining whether it can be replicated, and establishing the 
conditions under which it manifests, can provide insight into the mechanisms underlying 
false memories. By having repetition both increase and decrease false memories within a 
single study, a paradigm is thus established which, when used in combination with 
alcohol, could provide greater insight into the way in which alcohol selectively modulates 
these two opposing effects. 
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5.2. Experiment 4 
5.2.1. Introduction 
In order to investigate the effect of repetition on false memones, and to determine 
whether an inverted u-shaped function could be obtained, three levels of repetition were 
introduced as a within subjects' factor. This was following the procedure used by Seamon 
et al. (2002). The parameters employed differed and were based upon those used by 
Benjamin (2001), as a means to make them comparable to the previous studies (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). The parameters specifically differed in terms of repetition number (1, 
3 and 9, compared to 1, 5, 10), stimulus duration (3 sec with a Isec interval between 
words, versus 2s for each word and no interval), and the type of test employed (next day 
free recall and recognition versus immediate recognition only). These parameters have 
been shown to affect false memory levels in differing directions. An increase in stimulus 
duration post 1000ms per word has resulted in a decrease in false memories (McDermott 
1996). An increase in retention interval has been shown in previous studies to have a 
differential effect on false and veridical memory, by decreasing veridical memories, but 
having either no effect on false memories (Payne et al. 1996; Seamon et al. 2002), or 
increasing false memories (McDermott 1996; Thapar and McDermott 2001). The 
adoption of different parameters provides an opportunity to investigate the potential 
robustness for three levels of repetition to vary false memory levels in the shape of an 
inverted U-shaped curve. 
5.2.2. Methods 
Participants 
Fifteen Sussex undergraduate students, between the ages 18-30, served as paid volunteers 
or gained course credit for participating in the experiment. None had taken part in 
previous false memory research. 
Materials 
Encoding 
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Twenty four DRM format lists were divided into two sets (set A and set B). Participants 
saw one set of 12 lists. Eleven lists were taken from the Stadler et al. (1999) norms, and 
13 were created for the purpose of the thesis (see chapter 2 and 3). Each list was 
composed of 12 veridical items. Set A and set B were each divided into 3 groups of 4 
lists to form 3 repetition categories: one set of 4 lists was shown once, one set of 4 lists 
was repeated three times, and one set of 4 lists was repeated nine times. Each participant 
saw either set A or set B at encoding, and the repetition category they were in determined 
which lists were repeated and which were not. In order to minimise item effects, the 
repetition category was counterbalanced for all the lists to ensure that anyone list had an 
equal probability of being presented once, three times or nine times. The lists contained 
in both sets and repetition categories were balanced, for both critical and veridical items, 
in terms of word frequency and probability of eliciting a false memory. 
Test 
The recognition test comprised 96 items: 3 veridical items from each list (serial positions 
1, 5, 10), amounting to 12 singularly presented veridical items, 12 veridical items that 
were presented three times and 12 veridical items that were presented nine times during 
encoding. There were also 4 critical items from each repetition category presented in the 
test. The 12 critical and 36 veridical items from the set not presented at encoding served 
as non-related distracter stimuli. The test order was fully randomised. 
Procedure 
Prior to encoding, subjects were given standard intentional learning instructions stating 
that they were going to view lists of words and that these lists would either be shown 
once, or repeated multiple times, and that they should try to learn these words as their 
memory for them would later be tested. Although 12 different lists were viewed in total, 
by viewing four of these lists once. four of them three times and four lists nine times, a 
total of 52 lists were shown. 
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Veridical words in each list were presented in decreasing associative strength from the 
critical items. List presentation was random with the constraint that repetitions were not 
consecutive. Words from each list were shown sequentially for 3 seconds, with a one 
second interval between each word. Prior to a new list being presented, a five second 
'NEW LIST' warning was displayed. 
The test took place 24 hours after the encoding phase. On arrival at the lab, participants' 
free recall was assessed by the instruction to write down all the words they could 
remember from the previous day's encoding phase. Once this was over, participants then 
underwent a recognition test. A word was presented in the middle of the screen, and 
remained there until a recognition decision had been made. Participants were required to 
press a key, one of which was marked 'OLD', which they were instructed to press if the 
word had been presented in the encoding phase, the other marked 'NEW', and was to be 
pressed if the word had not been presented in the encoding phase. After each old/new 
recognition judgment, participants were required to make rememberlknow judgments by 
pressing keys labelled either r or k. It specified that remember responses were to be made 
if they consciously remembered the word from the study lists, whilst know responses 
were to be made if they were sure the word was presented, but could not remember its 
specific occurrence. After the test was completed, subjects were debriefed, and were 
asked not to discuss the details of the experiment until the project was completed. 
5.2.3 Results 
5.2.3.1. Free Recall 
A 2(wordtype: veridical, critical)x3(repetition: presented once, three times, nine times) 
ANOV A was performed on the percentage of words recalled. A main effect of word type 
was obtained [F(I,14) = 5.01,p = .042] reflecting the finding that more veridical than 
critical words were recalled. A main effect of repetition was also found [F(228) = 17.30, 
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p < .001], demonstrating that increased repetitions increased free recall. In addition, word 
type was found to interact with repetition [F(2,28) = 17.60, p <.001]. To explore this 
interaction, within subjects t-tests were performed in the veridical and critical items. It 
was revealed that repetition served to increase veridical memory when lists were repeated 
three times compared to single presentations [t(14) = -4.84, p <.001] and that repetition 
increased veridical memory when lists were shown nine times versus three times [t(14) = 
-4.04, P <.001] (see Figure 5.2). In contrast, analyses of the critical items demonstrated 
that whilst there was a trend for false memory to increase between one and three 
repetitions, this effect did not reach significance [t(14) = -1.29, P =.217]. In addition, 
repetition had no significant effect for critical items from lists presented three and nine 
times [t(14) = .250,p =.806]. 
Experiment 1: Free Recall 
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Figure 5.2. The percentage of veridical and critical words recalled in each repetition 
category (once, three times and nine times). 
5.2.3.2. Recognition 
A 2(wordtype: veridical, critical)x3(repetition: presented once, three times, nIne 
times)x2(memory type: remember, know) within subjects ANOYA was performed on the 
percentage of words recognised. A main effect of repetition was found [F(2 28) = 5.29 
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p = .011], but the main effect of word type did not reach significance [F(l, 14) = 3.26, p 
= .093]. This demonstrated that repetition increased recognition, mirroring the pattern in 
free recall. Despite a slight tendency for more hits to be ascribed as remember responses, 
this was non-significant. 
A significant repetition x word type interaction was obtained [F(2,28) = 7.16, p = .003], 
as was a repetition x word type x memory type interaction [F(2,28) = 3.5,p = .044]. 
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Figure 5.3. The percentage of remember / know recognition judgments for veridical 
and critical items in each repetition category (once, three times and nine times). 
Further analysis of the repetition x word type interaction revealed that repetition 
increased memory for veridical items [F(2, 28) = 24.655, p <.001], and this reached 
significance between one and three repetitions [t(l4)=-6.5I , p <.001], and was 
approaching significance between three and nine repetitions [t(l4 = -1.85 , p = .083]. In 
contrast, repetition had no effect on memory for critical items [F(2 , 28) = .129, P = .879] ; 
neither between one and three repetitions [t(l4) = -.587, p = .567] , nor between three and 
nine repetitions [t(l4) = .168, p = .869] . 
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As a means to explore the three way word type x repetition x memory type interaction, 
separate 2(memory type: veridical, critical)x3(repetition: presented once, three time, nine 
times) within subjects ANOVAs were performed on the percentage of critical and 
veridical items recognised. It was revealed that the memory type x repetition interaction 
was significant for the veridical items [F(2, 28)= 16.54, p <.001], but not the critical 
items [F(2, 28)= .37,p = .69]. Further analysis of veridical items revealed that repetition 
significantly increased the amount of remember responses in between both repetition 
points [t(14) = -1.323, p = .207; t(14) = 1.936, p = .073 respectively], repetition had no 
significant effect on know responses and either repetition point [t(14) = -6.145, p < .001; 
t(14) = -3.336,p = .005 respectively] (see Figure 5.3). 
5.2.4 Discussion 
Whilst veridical memory, as assessed by free recall, was shown to monotonically increase 
with repetition, repetition was not found to affect false recall levels. Similarly, repetition 
was found to increase veridical recognition for words presented once compared to words 
presented three times, and veridical remember responses between either repetition points, 
whilst not affecting false recognition rates. 
This non-significant effect of repetition on false memory levels is in accordance with the 
findings of Tussing and Greene (1999) who, in four experiments out of five, 
demonstrated that repetition had no significant effect on false memory levels. These 
findings, however, appear contrary to those obtained by Seamon et al. (2002), as the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between recognition and false memories was not 
obtained. Confidence intervals for mean differences in the present study were from -
23.2.77 and 13.277 for critical items between one and three repetitions, and -19.574 and 
22.901 for critical items between three and five repetitions. These intervals incorporate 
the effect sizes obtained by Seamon et al. (2002), 11 and 19 for critical items at the 
respective repetition conditions. Consequently, the present experiment was not 
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sufficiently sensitive to render significant an effect size comparable to Seamon et al. 
(2002). 
Two key methodological parameters differed between the present study, and that of 
Seamon et al. (2002). The way in which an increased retention interval and increased 
exposure duration may have affected the results will be considered. 
Retention interval 
The retention interval used in the current experiment was 24 hours, compared to 
immediate recognition employed by Seamon et al. (2002). Retention interval has been 
shown to differentially affect false and veridical memory, specifically by reducing 
veridical memory, whilst leaving false memory intact (e.g. Payne et al. 1996; Seamon et 
al. 2002), or by increasing false memory, whilst decreasing veridical memory. 
McDermott (1996) found an increase in false memories over a 24 hour period. Whilst this 
effect was originally thought to have possibly been elicited through repeated testing 
(Roediger et al. 1996), a similar result was obtained by Thapar and McDermott (2001). 
They found that absolute levels of false recognition increased with retention interval. To 
date, no studies have investigated the potential for retention interval to interact with 
repetition in false memories. Thapar and McDermott also found that level of processing 
interacted with retention interval, with deeper processing leading to a greater decline in 
memory than superficial processing over a 24 hour retention interval for both veridical 
and critical memory. Whilst one needs to be careful in equating number of repetitions 
with level of processing manipulations, they are comparable in the sense that they affect 
the degree to which material is learnt. It can thus be speculated that if false memory 
levels increased with repetition, memory in the higher repetition conditions may also 
have been subjected to a disproportionate decline with the retention interval. It is thus 
possible that these two opposing effects may have converged and consequently rendered 
the net differences non-significant. 
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Stimulus duration 
In the present experiment, the stimuli were presented for almost twice as long, compared 
to the duration used by Seamon et al. (2002). As increasing stimulus duration over 
lOOmis per word has been shown to decrease false memories (McDermott & Watson 
2001; Seamon et al. 2002), this could have served to cause a decrease in false memories 
in the present study relative to the levels obtained by Seamon et al .. Indeed, false memory 
rates within this study remained at approximately 25 percent, substantially less than was 
obtained by Seamon et al. (54, 65 and 46 percent in the one, five and ten repetition 
conditions respectively). One can speculate that the decreased levels of false memory 
may have required a greater amount of repetitions in order for an effect to manifest itself. 
Indeed, in the series of experiments performed by Tussing and Greene (1999), a 
monotonic decrease in false memories with repetition only manifested itself when false 
memory levels were initially at 30%, a value almost double that of the four previous 
studies. 
As a number of methodological parameters differed between the present study and that 
performed by Seamon et al. (2002), one can only speculate the potential ways in which 
they might have contributed to a difference in results and experimental sensitivity. A 
systematic variation in the aforementioned parameters could provide clarification on this 
matter. Before such systematic modulation however, a direct replication of the 
experiment performed by Seamon et al. (2002) needs to be undertaken to ensure the 
presence of the curve can be obtained using their exact methodology and stimuli. 
5.3. Experiment 5: Direct replication of Seamon et al. (2002) 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The findings of Seamon et al (2002) are depicted in the graph below (Figure 5.4), where 
the inverted U-shaped curve was obtained in false memory items as a function of 
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repetition. As this present experiment was designed to exactly replicate the materials and 
procedure used by Seamon et af. (2002) it was hoped that the results obtained would be 
in accordance with theirs. 
Seamon et al. (2002) 
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Figure 5.4. Graph depicting the findings of Seamon et al. (2002), where repetition 
was found to monotonically increase veridical recognition, but interact with false 
recognition to form an inverted V-shaped function. 
5.3.2. Method 
The experiment used contains many similarities with the previous experiment, but will be 
written in full as subsequent experiments will refer back to this exact methodology. 
Participants 
22 Sussex undergraduate students, between the ages 18-30, served as paid volunteers or 
gained course credit for participating in the experiment. None had taken part in previous 
false memory research. 
Materials 
18 DRM word lists which elicited the highest rates of false recognition were used as 
demonstrated by the recognition norms provided by Stadler et af. (1999) . Each list was 
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composed of 15 veridical items, all of which were converging associates of a critical non-
presented item. The veridical items were arranged in hierarchical order of associative 
strength to the critical items, with the strongest associates occurring at the beginning of 
each list. Hence the order of presentation of the veridical words in each list was always 
constant. The 18 lists were divided into two sets of 9 lists, labelled set A and set B. Each 
participant viewed just either set A or set B in the encoding phase. Each set of 9 lists was 
divided into 3 groups of 3 lists. Participants saw one group of 3 lists once, one group of 3 
lists five times, and once group of 3 lists 10 times, thus making 48 list presentations in 
total for each subject. The order of the lists was random, with the constraint that no list 
could appear twice in a row. Within each list, all words were blocked and the order of 
words was constant. The test was composed of 72 words; 3 veridical items from each of 
the 18 lists (serial positions 1, 8 and 10), and the 18 critical non-presented items from 
each lists. As each subject viewed one set (either set A or B) of nine lists composed of 3 
repetition conditions, the test contained 9 veridical words from lists shown once, 9 
veridical words from lists repeated five time and 9 veridical words form lists repeated ten 
times. In addition, they viewed 3 critical items corresponding to each of these three 
repetition conditions (xl, x5 and xl0). The veridical and critical words from the set not 
viewed in the encoding phase but presented at test served as baseline measures for the 
veridical and critical words. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and were gIven standard intentional learning 
instructions stating that they should attempt to learn all words presented as they would 
later undergo a recognition test. They were also informed that some lists were to be 
presented once, whilst other lists would be repeated. All list words were presented 
sequentially in the centre of the screen for 2 seconds with no gap between words. A one 
second warning stating 'NEW LIST' was presented in capitals between list presentations. 
The list order was random with the constraint that the same list would not appear 
sequentially. 
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After the encoding phase, participants were given a recognition test. This consisted of 72 
words; 3 veridical items from each study list (serial positions 1, 8 and 10) and each non-
presented critical item associated with each list. All words were presented in a random 
order. Each word remained on the screen until participants had made a recognition 
judgment. They were required to press the key labelled 'OLD' for any word presented in 
the encoding phase, and 'NEW' for any word not previously shown in the learning phase. 
If subjects pressed 'OLD' a prompt asking them to make a remember I know judgment 
was made by requiring them to press keys labelled 'R' (if they consciously remembered 
the word from the encoding phase) or 'K' (if they were sure that the word was presented, 
but they could not remember its specific occurrence. If subjects presented 'NEW' the 
remember I know judgment was not applicable and subjects were required by a prompt to 
press the key labelled 'NI A'. All words in the test were presented in a fully random order. 
After the test was completed the subjects were debriefed and requested not to discuss the 
nature of the experiment with anyone until the project was completed. 
5.3.3. Results 
A 2(wordtype: veridical vs. critical)x3(repetition: presented once vs. three times vs. nine 
times)x2(memory type: remember vs. know) ANOVA was performed on the percentage 
of words recognised. A main effect of repetition was found to be significant [F(2,46) = 
5.50, P = .007], indicating that repetition served to increase memory when collapsed over 
word type and memory type. A main effect of word type was also significant [F( 1 ,23) = 
6.71, P = .016], demonstrating that more veridical words than critical words were 
recognised. A significant repetition x word type interaction [F(2,46) = 23.08, P <.001], 
was also obtained, as was a repetition x word type x memory type interaction [F(2,46) = 
6.27, p = .004]. 
Further exploration of the word type x repetition interaction revealed that repetition 
increased veridical memory [F(2, 46) = 39.973, p < .001], and this reached significance 
between one and five repetitions [/(23) = -6.452, P < .001] and between five and ten 
126 
repetitions [t(23) = -2.460, p = .022]. In contrast, repetition did not have a significant 
effect on false memory levels [F(2, 46) = 2.241,p = .118] (see Figure 5.5.). 
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Figure 5.5. The percentages of veridical and critical words recalled in each 
repetition condition (once, five and ten times). 
In addition, a breakdown of the significant repetition x word type x memory type 
interaction revealed that the repetition x memory type interaction was not significant for 
memory for critical items [F(2, 46) = 1.286, p = .286]. In contrast, a significant repetition 
x memory type interaction was found to be significant in veridical memory [F(2, 46) = 
32.503, p < .001]. Exploration of the interaction revealed that repetition served to 
increase veridical remember responses [F(2, 46) = 43.658, P < .001] and this reached 
significance between one and five repetitions [t(21) = -5.81, p <.001] and between five 
and ten repetitions [t(21) = -2.14, P =.045]. In contrast, repetition decreased veridical 
know responses [F(2, 46) = 13.816, P < .001] and this reached significance between one 
and five repetitions [t(23) = 3.773,p =.001] though not between five and ten repetitions 
(/(23) = 1.096 P = .285] , possibly due to a floor effect (see Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6. The percentages of remember and know recognition judgements for 
veridical and critical items in each repetition condition (presented once, five and ten 
times). 
5.3.4. Discussion 
Despite following the exact methodology and materials used by Seamon et al. (2002) the 
inverted U-shaped curve was not obtained in false memory items as a function of 
repetition. 
As the methodology and stimuli were exactly the same as those used by Seamon et al. 
(2002), the difference in results cannot be attributed to methodological parameters, as 
previously speculated. Through an examination of the effect size obtained by Seamon et 
al. (2002), and the confidence interval within the present study, one can conclude that 
had effect size comparable to that obtained by Seamon et al. (2002) been achieved the 
present experiment would not actually have been sufficiently sensitive to render an 
increa e in false memories as significant. Specifically, Seamon et al. (2002) obtained a 
dif~ rence in percentage of 11 critical items recognised between one and five repetitions. 
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Within the present experiment, the confidence interval for the difference one and five 
repetitions was -11. 74 and 11.74. This confidence interval incorporates, albeit only just, 
the effect size obtained by Seamon et al. (2002). 
The present experiments failed to elicit the inverted U-shaped curve for false memory as 
a function of repetition. A failure to obtain this effect may be attributable to a lack of 
sensitivity in the present study. Reducing variability may result in a significant increase 
in false memories between one and five repetitions. It can be argued that manipulating 
repetition at encoding is somewhat analogous to manipulating the degree of rehearsal 
during learning, as repeated presentations of stimuli increase the potential for rehearsal. 
This is important as the effect of rehearsal on memory type is thought to be influenced by 
the type of rehearsal undertaken. Research has demonstrated that when elaborative and 
conceptual rehearsal is performed, a subsequent increase in remember responses is 
observed, whilst when perceptual processing and maintenance rehearsal are performed, 
an increase in know responses commonly ensues (Gardiner et al. 1996). It should be 
noted, however, that this distinction is not absolute (Rajaram, 1996; Conway et at., 
1996). Consequently, using repetition to manipulate the degree of encoding could be 
viewed as problematic if the type of rehearsal employed has a resultant impact upon the 
nature of their subsequent memories. In the absence of controlling the way in which 
information is rehearsed, it is thus left to the discretion of the participant to adopt a 
particular encoding strategy, which in turn can influence the nature of their memories. 
This could be viewed as particularly pertinent when dealing with repetition and false 
memories, as opposed to repetition and veridical memories, as the processes which give 
rise to remember and know memories can be viewed as working together to endorse 
veridical items, but have the potential to work in opposition to each other for the 
endorsement of false memory items. This supposition is based upon the work done by a 
number of researchers who theorise that strong recollective traces for veridical items can 
counteract the familiarity felt for critical items to prevent their erroneous endorsement 
(e.g. Hicks & Marsh, 1999). Thus a person who engages in elaborative rehearsal has the 
potential to strongly recollect veridical items, which could thus aid monitoring at retrieval 
(Hicks & Marsh, 1999). Elaborative rehearsal could reduce false memories unlike rote 
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rehearsal which could merely increase familiarity for veridical items. The large standard 
error bars in the current experiment support the supposition that a high level of individual 
variability existed in the amount of false memory items endorsed. 
In the absence of any methodological differences between the direct replication of 
Seamon et al. 's experiment and the actual methodology employed by Seamon et al. 
(2002), it thus remains a possibility that the discrepancy in results could be attributed to 
different encoding strategies employed by the participants. Providing instructions at 
encoding could serve as a way in which to limit the degree of individual variability 
through the use of directed encoding. 
Further inspection of Seamon et al. 's (2002) data (see Figure 5.7.) reveals that the 
inverted U-shaped curve was actually confined to remember responses only, but that 
these effects were sufficiently large when analyses were collapsed over memory type, 
and thus included know responses to render the inverted U-shaped curve as still 
applicable. Consequently, a manipulation which directly affects recollective processes 
may elicit the curve more readily than other types of manipulations. In addition, both the 
previous experiments (see this section and Experiment 4), resulted in a trend increase in 
remember responses for critical items between one and five repetitions, but no decrease 
between five and ten repetitions. Thus, subsequent manipulations will be designed to 
maximise the potential for recollective processes as a means to elicit the U-shaped curve. 
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Figure 5.7. Results from Seamon et al. (2002): The percentages of remember and 
know recognition judgements for veridical and critical items in each repetition 
condition (presented once, five and ten times). 
5.4. Experiment 6: Warning 
5.4.1 Introduction 
An introduction of a warning prior to encoding has dual functions. Firstly, research has 
indicated that warning participants about the nature of the DRM paradigm is to elicit false 
memories, and instructing them to avoid such errors, serves to affect encoding style. The 
now established finding that warnings reduce false memories when given prior to 
encoding (McCabe & Smith 2002), whilst having no little or no effect when issued post 
encoding but prior to test (Neuschatz et al. 2001; McCabe & Smith 2002) implies that the 
\ arning induced decline must be an encoding based phenomenon. Gallo et al. (2001) 
131 
argued that issuing warnings before the learning phase enables participants to determine 
what the critical item is by virtue of its absence, and then strategically avoid endorsing it 
at test (Gallo & Roediger 2002). This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the 
likelihood that the critical item can be identified during exposure to the study lists 
correlates with the effectiveness of warnings (Neuschatz et al. 2003). It can be argued 
that subjects' ability to identify the critical item would be enhanced by repetition, as 
multiple list presentations would allow subjects to confirm the absence of the critical item 
during encoding once they had identified it. In addition, McCabe and Smith (2002) 
conducted a warning experiment whereby presentation rate of veridical words was 
manipulated. Words were presented with a short stimulus duration (2 seconds) or a slow 
duration (4 seconds). It was found that participants were better able to utilise the 
warnings and discriminate between studied and non-studied words for slower presented 
lists. Repetition could be considered similar to the manipulation of presentation rates, 
thus supporting the prediction that the beneficial effect of warnings could be influenced 
by repetition. 
Secondly, the mechanisms through which warnings have been hypothesised to mediate a 
reduction in false memories implicate a recollective emphasis, by maximising such traces 
at encoding, and requiring them for endorsement at retrieval. Watson et al. (2004) argue 
that issuing a warning may result in a shift in encoding focus from semantic to 
perceptual, as this would enable them to better discriminate between what items had been 
presented and those which were merely semantically related. Warnings could also reduce 
false memories by making the recognition criterion more stringent, forcing subjects to 
reject familiarity alone for an item as being diagnostic of prior presentation. Thus, in 
accordance with the AMF, one could hypothesise that warnings could lead to a greater 
emphasis being placed on monitoring the source of familiarity during recognition, to 
ensure that a sense of familiarity does not stem from a non-presented semantic associate. 
Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) demonstrated that artificially enhanced familiarity of a to-
be-recognised word increased false recognition of that word only if the source of that 
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familiarity (immediate pnor exposure through masked priming) is not appreciated 1. 
Providing a warning could help subjects appreciate the origin of their sense of familiarity. 
allowing them to correctly attribute it to semantic relatedness to presented words, and 
thus rejecting them during recognition. 
5.4.2. Methods 
The methods were identical to those used for the direct replication of Seamon et al. 's 
study (Experiment 5), with the exception of the following variations: 
Materials 
- Previous research had demonstrated that the probability that participants could identify 
the critical item at test served as a predictor of later false memory, and that this 
probability varied between lists (Neuschatz et al. 2003). Consequently, list sets (A and B) 
and repetition conditions within these sets were balanced for identifiability according to 
the probability norms outlined by Neuschatz et al. (2003), whilst ensuring that word 
frequency and probability of eliciting a false memory remained balanced. 
A warning was issued prior to encoding. The wording of the warning was based on that 
used by McDermott and Roediger, (1996) and was exactly the same as the warning used 
by Heit et al. (2004) in terms of font and wording with the exception of an additional 
sentence regarding repetition: 
I I Though see Higham and Vokey (2000) Experiment 1, where results obtained were the reverse of Jacoby 
and Whitehouse (1989). Possible methodolgocial reasons are provided to account for this discrepancy (pg. 
578-579). In addition, the identification heuristic is proposed as an additional heuristic that can guide 
recognition decisions. 
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Hint to improve accuracy scores 
In the study phase you will see nine lists of related words. 3 of these lists will be presented 
once,3 lists well be repeated five times and 3 lists will be repeated 10 times. All the words in 
each list are associated to one common word, but this word is not actually presented during 
study. For example, you might see the following words during study: 
Queen, England, crown, palace, throne, chess, subject, monarch, royal. 
In this case, king, the word that links all the above words is not presented during study. In the 
test phase you are asked to decide whether the word king is 'old' (previously seen in the study 
phase) or 'new' (not seen in the study phase). In this case, the correct response to the word 
king is new, because it was not presented during study. However, previous research has shown 
that sometimes people mistakenly respond 'old' to these words (such as king) that link groups 
of words together even though they have not seen the word during study. It is important that 
you try not to make these kind of errors. 
THANK YOU 
Figure 5.8. Instructions issued prior to encoding to warn participants about the 
nature of the experiment, and instructing them to avoid making false memory 
errors. 
5.4.3. Results 
A 2(wordtype: veridical, critical)x3(repetition: presented once vs. five times vs. ten 
times)x2(memory type: remember vs. know) within subjects ANOVA was performed on 
the percentage of words recognised. A main effect of word type was found, reflecting a 
greater proportion of veridical items recognised relative to critical items [F(1, 21) = 
37.12, p <.001]. In addition, a main effect of memory type was obtained [F(1, 21) = 
61.89, p <.001], reflecting a larger proportion of remember recognition responses than 
know responses. No main effect of repetition was found [F(2, 42) = .967, p =.39]. A 
word type x repetition interaction was significant2 [F(1.5, 30.6) = 8.21, P =.003] (see 
2 Mauchly's test of sphericity is significant (Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted) 
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Figure 5.9), as was a word type x repetition x memory type interaction [F(2, 42) = 14.71 , 
p <.001] (see Figure 5.10). 
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Figure 5.9. The percentage of veridical and critical items recognised in each 
repetition category (one, five and ten). 
Breakdown of the repetition by word type interaction revealed that repetition served to 
increase veridical memories [F(2, 42) = 15.375, p <.001], and paired t-tests revealed this 
reached significance between both one and five repetitions [t(21) = -3.26. p = .004] and 
five and ten repetition, [t(21) = -2.25, p = .036]. In contrast, repetition had no effect on 
false memory items [F(2, 42) = .650, p = .527]. 
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Figure 5.10. The percentage of remember and know responses made to veridical and 
critical words in each of the three repetition categories (once, five and ten times). 
As a means to further explore the three way interaction, separate 2(memory type: 
remember vs. know) by 3(repetition: presented once vs. five vs. ten times) ANOY As 
were performed in veridical items and in critical items. A memory type by repetition 
interaction was found to be significant in veridical items [F(1.4 , 29) = 24.199, p <.001], 
but not in critical items [F(2, 42) = .262, p = .771]. Analysis revealed an effect of 
repetition in remember responses for veridical items [F (l.4, 42) = 37.443]. Repetition 
increased false remember responses between both repetition points, [t(21) = -5.8 , p 
<.001; t(21) = -2.14, p = .045 respectively]. Repetition affected veridical know responses 
[F(1.55) = 5.498, p = .018]. Further analysis revealed repetition decreased know 
responses between one and five repetitions [t(21) = 2.540,p = .0 19], but had no effect on 
know responses between five and ten repetitions [t(21) = -.196, p = .847] (see Figure 
5.1] . 
5.4.4. Discussion 
I suing a warning about the nature of the experiment served to reduce false memories 
relative to not warning participants (determined via an analysis comparing the current 
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experiment with Experiment 2, where false memory items in the warning experiment 
averaged at 39.90, whilst averaging 68.98 in experiment 2, and these values differed 
significantly, [t(44) = 3.495, p = .001] ). This reduction in false memory items did not 
vary as a function of repetition. 
The overall reduction in false memory levels is in accordance with the findings of 
previous research which have shown that issuing warnings prior to the encoding phase of 
the DRM paradigm can reduce false memory levels. Gallo et al. (1997) found the 
probability of eliciting a false memory was reduced from .81 to .46 after a warning was 
issued prior to encoding. This value is comparable to that obtained in the single repetition 
condition of the present experiment, where the probability of a false memory was found 
to be .45. This thus supports previous findings which suggest warnings do not eliminate 
the false memory effect, but serve to reduce them. 
5.5. Experiment 7: Warning and extended repetitions 
5.5.1. Introduction 
In the previous experiment, false memories monotonically decreased with repetition, but 
these effects were not found to be significant. It is possible that the presence of a warning 
could have resulted in a decrease in false memories with repetition, but this effect could 
have been rendered non-significant by the overall reduction in false memories due to the 
warning, thus resulting in a floor effect. This is unlikely, and the alternative possibility is 
that ten repetitions did not provide an adequate encoding opportunity to significantly 
reduce false memories. This would render the experiment as insufficiently sensitive to 
detect a linear trend decrease in false memories with repetition. Consequently, increasing 
the amount of repetitions at encoding may result in an increased likelihood that an effect 
will be detected. To investigate whether providing more encoding opportunities would 
lead to a significant decrease in false memories, an increase in repetitions was introduced. 
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5.5.2 Method 
The methods were identical to the previous warning experiment, with the exception that 
lists were repeated on a between subjects basis either 1, 5, or 15 times. 
5.5.3. Results 
A 2(wordtype: veridical, critical)x3(repetition: presented once vs. three vs. rune 
times)x2(memory type: remember vs. know) within subjects ANOY A was performed on 
the percentage of words recognised. A main effect of word type was found [F(l , 23) = 
46.89, p < .001], demonstrating that more veridical than critical items were recognised. A 
main effect of memory type [F(1 , 23) = 39.16, p < .001] indicated that more words were 
ascribed remember than know responses. No main effect of repetition was obtained 
[F(1.3 , 30) = 1.58, P = .22]. A significant word type x repetition interaction [F(1.38 , 
31.78) = 16.46, p <.001], and a word type x repetition x memory type interaction was 
also significant [F(2, 46) = 4.21,p =.021]. 
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Figure 5.11. The percentage of veridical and critical items recognised in each of the 
three repetition categories (one, five and fifteen). 
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Further analysis of the word type x repetition interaction revealed that repetition served to 
increase memories for veridical items [F(2, 46) = 30.239, p < .001], and this reached 
significance between one and five repetitions [t(23)= -5.19,p <.001] and between five 
and fifteen repetitions [t(23)= -2.10, p =.046] but no effect of repetition on false 
memories [F(2, 46) = 1.703,p = .118] (see Figure 5.11). 
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Figure 5.12. The percentage of remember and know responses for veridical and 
critical items, in each of the three repetition categories (one, five and fifteen). 
Exploration of the significant repetition x memory type x word type interaction (see 
Figure 5.12), revealed that the repetition by memory type interaction was significant in 
the veridical items [F(2, 46) = 26.80, p < .001], and in addition, was marginal in the 
critical items [F(2, 46) = 2.53, p = .091]. Repetition increased veridical remember 
responses [F(2, 46) = 4l.261, p < .001] and paired t-tests demonstrated that repetition 
served to increase veridical remember responses between one and five repetitions [t(23) = 
-5.63, p <.001], and between five and fifteen repetitions [t(23) = -3.45, p = .002]. In 
contrast repetition decreased veridical know responses [F (2, 46) = 6.798 p < .001] 
though this decrease was non-significant between one and five repetitions [t(23) = 1.66, p 
=. 1 10] , but significant between five and fifteen repetitions [t(23) = 2.53 p = .019]. 
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Exploration of the borderline significant repetition by memory type interaction in the 
critical items revealed that repetition decreased know responses [F(2, 46) = 4.463, p = 
.017], and this was approaching significance between one and five repetitions [t(23) = 
1.86, p = .076] though was non-significant between five and fifteen repetitions [t(23) = 
1.45, p = .162], possibly due to a floor effect. In contrast, repetition had no effect on 
remember responses made to false memory items [F(2, 46) = .442, p = .646]. 
5.5.4. Discussion 
The introduction of a warmng pnor to encoding, in combination with increased 
repetitions, resulted in a highly significant word type by repetition interaction. In 
addition, a borderline repetition by memory type interaction in critical items was due to a 
monotonic decline in false memories in know responses only, whilst the remember 
responses did not systematically vary. Inspection of the graph, however, indicates a non-
significant tendency for an inverted U-shaped function with repetition. 
It is necessary to address the issue of why the decrease in false memories was displayed 
in know responses only. It could be argued that, after experiencing a warning, 
participants were reluctant to endorse an item as previously presented if their memory 
was based upon feelings of familiarity in the absence of recollection. By alerting 
participants to the memory illusion, the warning could have resulted in participants 
altering their diagnostic criteria which they deemed sufficient for the endorsement of 
items. This hypothesis is supported by recent research which has demonstrated that an 
attribution manipulation which served to make feelings of familiarity non-diagnostic for 
memory judgements served to eliminate false memory (Fazendeiro et al. 2005). Thus, 
with increased repetitions, the metacognitive expectation to recollect, in combination 
with the increased recollection of veridical items, would mean that this is an effect that 
could have been potentiated as a function of repetition. Such a supposition could account 
for a decrease in know responses with repetition. as well as being in accordance with 
theorists who account for the false memory effect in terms of a criterion shift adopted 
during retrieval (Miller & Wolford 1999). It is also supported by empirical research 
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which has indicated that false recognition can result from the misattribution of familiarity 
(Jacoby and Whitehouse 1989). Instructions could have thus have helped participants to 
correctly attribute familiarity of critical items as deriving from semantic relatedness to 
presented stimuli, and not as indicative of prior presentation. 
This explanation, however, should be taken with caution for three principle reasons. 
Firstly, in the initial warning experiment (see Experiment 6), the non-significant decrease 
in false memories with repetition was not selectively displayed in the know responses. 
Secondly, the significant decline in false memories obtained in Experiment 5 between 
five and ten repetitions also took place in the know responses and no warning was issued 
in that experiment. Thirdly, previous studies have demonstrated that warnings presented 
post encoding but prior to the test had little or no impact, relative to warnings presented 
prior to encoding (McCabe & Smith 2002). If warnings lowered false memories through 
a criterion shift at retrieval, then warnings provided post encoding and pre-test should be 
just as effective. Instead, the advantage of warnings offered pre-encoding would suggest 
that warnings may result in a different encoding emphasis. Similarly, Watson et al. 
(2004) argued that issuing a warning may encourage participants to direct their attention 
to nonsemantic and perceptual dimensions of the studied associates, such orthography 
and phonology, to aid source monitoring. If activation within semantic networks of 
critical associates gives rise to a subjective sense of familiarity which serves as the basis 
for know recognition judgements, then a shift to forms of encoding which lessen this 
activation should result in a drop in false memories ascribed know responses. 
A tendency for an inverted U-shaped relationship between repetition and false memories 
was obtained in false remember items, but this did not reach significance. The use of 
warnings appeared to modulate false know memories. Warnings were abandoned as a 
means to elicit the curve, and an alternative manipulation was pursued which was 
hypothesised to affect remember false memories as a function of repetition. 
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5.6. Experiment 8: Distinctiveness 
5.6.1. Introduction 
The preVIOUS 4 experiments demonstrated that any significant modulations in false 
memones as a function of repetition were obtained in know responses. This, as 
previously pointed out, was in direct contrast to Seamon et al. (2002) where the inverted 
U-shaped curve was manifested in remember responses only. Consequently, a 
manipulation was sought that would make this curve more pronounced. 
Previous research 
A number of different studies have demonstrated that presented DRM lists in 'distinctive' 
format serves to reduce false memory levels. Schacter et al. (1999) modified the DRM 
lists by adding the presence of pictorial stimuli in conjunction with the DRM words at 
encoding. In this distinctiveness condition, each word was presented orally and was 
accompanied by a visual picture of that word, compared to a control group where words 
were presented in the absence of a picture (in both oral and visual modalities). It was 
found that when pictures accompanied words, a dramatic reduction in false memory 
levels was obtained. A number of other studies have also demonstrated that the addition 
of distinctive infonnation acts to reduce false memories in adults (e.g. Israel & Schacter 
1997; Read 1996; Smith & Hunt 1998; Dodson & Schacter 2002), the elderly (Dodson & 
Schacter 2002) and children (Ghetti et al. 2002), indicating the robustness of the 
phenomenon. 
Mechanisms 
Whilst the effect of distinctive infonnation on false memory levels is well established, a 
contentious point surrounds the mechanism through which distinctiveness induces this 
reduction. Hege and Dodson (2004) argue that explanations can be divided into encoding 
and retrieval based theories. 
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Distinctiveness heuristic 
The distinctiveness heuristic can be classified as a retrieval based mechanism due to its , 
concern with the nature of decision processes which take place at retrieval. It is a 
proposed metacognitive strategy, hypothesised to be employed by participants at retrieval 
when they are assessing whether memories contain perceptual detail sufficient to render it 
above a self determined threshold (Schacter et al. 1999; Dodson & Schacter 2001). For 
example, an encoding phase which presents words in conjunction with pictures, allows 
for the possibility for participants to utilise the presence or absence of retrieved pictorial 
information as means to aid recognition endorsement or rejection. That is to say, during a 
recognition test, a word may appear familiar, but if participants are not able to retrieve 
associated pictorial information participants may reject it, and assume the familiarity it 
elicits may derive from a source other than prior presentation (e.g. semantic relatedness 
to previously presented words). Consequently, presenting stimuli with associated 
information that can serve to enrich memories at encoding, has the potential to aid the 
correct rejection of non-presented items at retrieval, as the greater the opportunity for 
multiple memory dimensions can result in a greater potential disparity in 
phenomenological experience between 'memories' of presented and non-presented items. 
A study by Dodson and Schacter (2002) investigated the degree of metacognitive control 
participants were able to exert over the use of the distinctiveness heuristic. Participants' 
expectations about the usefulness of the pictorial information for the test was varied. 
When told memory for the words and not the pictures would be assessed in the test, the 
presence of pictorial information at encoding did not serve to reduce false memories. In 
contrast, when participants were (erroneously) informed that pictorial information would 
also be assessed, then the presence of pictures at encoding served to reduce false 
memories. Dodson and Schacter (2002) thus argue that 'the distinctiveness heuristic is 
under metacognitive control such that it can be turned on or off depending on 
participants' expectations about its usefulness for reducing memory errors' (pg. 782). 
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Impoverished-relational encoding 
Encoding based theories propose that the beneficial effects of distinctive information at 
reducing subsequent false memories occur at the time of encoding. Whilst there are a 
number of encoding based theories, Hege and Dodson (2004) argue that they share the 
common feature in that encoding sessions which provide distinctive information serve to 
direct learning to item specific aspects, and decrease memory for relational information. 
They therefore collectively term them impoverished relational-encoding accounts. 
Hege and Dodson (2004) designed a study to compare encoding based theories concerned 
with impoverished relational-encoding with retrieval distinctiveness theories as a means 
to investigate which effect dominates. It was found that participants who studied pictures 
and words reported critical lures less often than participants who studied only pictures. 
This was true even when participants were given inclusion instructions to report related 
items a well as studied items. This finding is in accordance with encoding based theories 
as it suggests that distinctiveness results in a type of processing which is not conducive 
for the generation of relational items. 
Distinctiveness and the Activation Monitoring Framework 
I t can be argued that the mechanisms through which distinctiveness reduces false 
memories can be accounted for using the Activation Monitoring Framework, and that 
retrieval based mechanisms implicate the role of monitoring, whilst encoding based 
theories rely on reduced activation. Concerning activation, if the presence of distinctive 
information results in a type of processing that limits the amount of relational processing, 
then the probability that the critical items will be activated is reduced. The AMF states 
that the critical item can become activated in one of two ways. Firstly, conscious thought 
of the item during encoding is thought to result in its representation within semantic 
networks being directly activated. Thus, focusing on the distinctive information may 
inhibit conscious elaboration, resulting in a decrease in the probability that the critical 
item will come to mind during encoding. Alternatively, the automatic spread of activation 
within semantic networks to associated words is also hypothesised under the AMF as a 
means to activate the critical item, and this can occur in the absence of conscious thought 
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of the critical item which has been deemed unnecessary for its later endorsement 
(Seamon, et al. 2002). One can hypothesise that focusing on distinctive information 
would result in a shift from semantic to item specific and perceptual processing. False 
recall levels have been shown to increase with semantic processing, as revealed by level 
of processing manipulations (Thapar & McDermott 2001). Reduced false memories can 
be predicted if a shift from semantic to perceptual processing occurs. This line of 
reasoning is in accordance with the impoverished relational encoding account. Regarding 
monitoring, the potential for participants to engage in source monitoring would increase 
with the distinctiveness of veridical items, as this would increase the phenomenological 
disparity between veridical items and critical non-presented items. At test, participants 
will assess the quality of their memories, and if a memory is not sufficiently distinct, then 
in accordance with their metacognitive expectation that memories for words should be 
enriched with a source, this could lead to a rejection of the item in question. 
5.6.2 Rational 
The presentation of pictorial information at encoding is now an established way to reduce 
false memories (e.g. Israel & Schacter 1997; Read 1996; Smith & Hunt 1998; Dodson & 
Schacter 2002; Ghetti et al. 2002). In these experiments, however, distinctiveness was 
manipulated by the presentation of a word in conjunction with a picture of that word. 
Such stimuli could be considered to provide highly enriched detailed memories, by virtue 
of the detail inherent in the pictorial information. The resultant contrast between words 
presented with pictures, and non-presented critical words in terms of phenomenological 
appearance could be high3. It could be argued that the ability of subjects to use the 
distinctiveness information to reduce false memories could be dependent upon the ease 
with which it can be employed. That is to say, it could be viewed as dependent upon the 
nature and 'quality' of the distinctive information provided, with pictures of the \\ords 
being more 'useful' than an arbitrary picture presented with the \Yord. The latter 
J Though it should be acknowledged that there is a potential. for pictorial infonnation to be recreated by 
critical items, though processes such as phantom recall (Bramerd et at. 2003). 
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manipulation, however, could be considered interesting as the resultant effects on false 
memory levels has not yet been firmly explored. 
A final manipulation draws upon work done in relation to distinctiveness and source 
monitoring. When DRM lists have been previously presented in distinctive format, a 
modified version has been used (e.g. Schacter et al. 1999). In order to keep the stimuli the 
same across successive experiments (thus allowing for the possibility of a legitimate 
meta-analysis) the distinctiveness manipulation drew upon source monitoring procedures. 
Hicks and Marsh (1999) varied the sources of DRM lists. It was found that only when 
sources were sufficiently discriminable (e.g. external vs. internal) was a subsequent drop 
in false memories obtained. When two external sources (male vs female voice), or two 
internal sources (frequency judgments vs. pleasantness ratings) were used, no subsequent 
reduction in false memory levels ensued relative to a single source control. The present 
experiment sought the manipulation of distinctiveness by presenting DRM words in 
conjunction with one of two visual images. This manipulation was thus analogous to the 
external-external condition employed by Hicks and Marsh, with the exception that rather 
than two auditory sources, the presentation of two arbitrary pictures served to vary the 
visual encoding context. The use of repetition in the present study may demonstrate that 
increased opportunities for learning may result in the two external sources being 
sufficiently discriminable as to reduce false memories. One could therefore hypothesise 
that the effectiveness of distinctive information is likely to be enhanced with repetition, 
as that would provide increased opportunities for learning, especially when such 
information is more challenging to employ. Using sources which are not easily 
discriminable increases the probability that a reduction in false memories may only occur 
between five and ten repetitions - as in accordance with the inverted U-shaped curve. 
5.6.3 Method 
The method used was identical to that of experiment 2 (direct replication of Seamon el al. 
2002), with the exception of the following changes: 
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- Additional instructions were issued after the standard intentional learning instructions. 
stating that: "Each word will be shown with an associated picture. If a word is shown 
multiple times, the picture will remain the same, i.e. the same word is always shown with 
the same picture. When you are learning the words, try to use the picture as a visual aid to 
remember the word." 
- Each veridical word was presented with a picture - either a yellow flower or a blue fish , 
(see figure 5.13). The picture presented with each word remained the same throughout 
repeated presentations of that word. 
- The word was presented in the same colour as the picture (either yellow or blue as 
shown in figure 5.14). 
- Each picture was presented equally often in each repetition condition and in each list. 
All items were counterbalanced to ensure associated words, list presentations and 
repetition categories were presented equally often in every combination. 
- In the recognition test, instead of making 'old ' or 'new' judgements for a specific word, 
participants were simultaneously presented with 3 squares titled A, B, or C. One of the 
squares had the word written in yellow with a flower, one had the word written in blue 
with a fish, and one square contained the words 'not presented' in green (see figure 5.13). 
- At test, subjects were required to press the key which corresponded to their memory 
decision. The presentation of words on the test was fully random, and the order of the 
images displayed in squares A, Band C was fully counterbalanced. 
Figure 5.13. Stimuli presented at encoding. 
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Figure 5.14. Stimuli presented at test. 
5.6.4. Results 
An initial analysis was performed to investigate participants ' aptitude at source 
identification; to determine how this ability varied with repetitions and whether correct 
attributions had a tendency to be selectively ascribed know or remember response. A 3-
way ANOV A was thus performed on veridical items only, as critical items were never 
presented and thus no correct source existed, with repetition (presented once vs. repeated 
five times vs. repeated ten times), memory type (remember vs. know) and attribution 
(correct vs. incorrect) as within subjects factors , and the percentage of veridical items 
recognised as the dependent variable. 
A main effect of memory type [F(l, 21) = 4.603 , p = .044] was indicative of a greater 
number of memories being ascribed remember responses compared to know responses. A 
main effect of repetition [F(2 , 42) = 19.585, p <.001] demonstrated that repetition served 
to increase the number of words recognised. Memory type was found to interact with 
both repetition [F(2 , 42) = 18 .112, p < .001] and source attribution [F(2, 42) = 5.799 p = 
.006]. In addition repetition was found to interact with source attribution [F(2 42) = 
5.799, p = .006]. Breakdown of these interactions will not be perfo rmed a the are 
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qualified by a significant repetition by word type by source attribution interaction [F(2 
42) = 10.6l9,p < .001]. 
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Figure 5.15. Graph to depict how the amount of remember / know recognition 
judgements for veridical items change for correct and incorrect source attributions 
as a function of how many times the word was viewed at encoding (once, five, or ten 
times). 
The three-way interaction was further investigated by performing separate 2-way 
ANOV As in the correct source attributions, and the incorrect source attributions using 
repetition and memory type as within subjects factors. This revealed that the repetition by 
memory type interaction was non-significant for incorrect source attributions F(2, 42) = 
2.587, P = .087] but significant in the correct source attributions [F(2, 42) = 21.204, p < 
.00 1]. Additional analyses revealed that the interaction was due to repetition having a 
greater affect on remember responses for correct source attributions [F(2, 42) = 23.86, p 
< .001] than on know correct source attributions [F(2, 42) = 4.48, p = .016] (see Figure 
5.15). FUliher break down of these two effects revealed that the effect of repetition did 
not reach significance at either of the respective repetition points in know correct source 
attributions [t(21) = 1.834, p = .079; t(2l) = 1.238, p = .228]. In contrast repetition 
significantly increased correct remember attributions and this reached significance 
between one and five repetitions [t(2l) = -4.781, p < .001] but was non-significant 
b tween five and ten repetitions [t(2I) = -1.329 p = .198]. 
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In order to explore how memory changed with repetitions, a 3-way ANOY A, with word 
type (veridical vs. critical) and repetition (presented once vs. three times vs. ten times) 
and memory type (remember vs. know) as within subjects factors, was performed on the 
percentage of words recognised, regardless of source attribution. A significant repetition 
by word type interaction was found [F(2,42) = 15.24, p <.001], and a significant 
repetition by word type by memory type interaction was also obtained [F(2,42) = 5.50, p 
=.008]. 
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Figure 5.16. The percentage of remember and know judgements for veridical and 
critical items in each repetition condition (one, five and ten). 
In order to explore the three way word type x repetition x memory type interaction 
separate 2(memory type: remember, know)x3(repetition: presented once, three times, ten 
times) ANOY As were performed in both the veridical and critical items. 
In the veridical items, a significant memory type by repetition interaction [F(2, 42) = 
18.112,p < .001] was investigated to reveal that repetition increased remember responses 
[F(2, 42) = 32.550, p < .001] and this reached significance between both one and five 
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repetitions [t(21) = -4.95,p < .001] and five and ten repetitions [t(21) = -2.175,p = .041]. 
In contrast, repetition had no effect on veridical responses [F (2,42) = 3.015,p = .60]. 
In the critical items, a memory type by repetition interaction was also found to be 
significant [F(2, 42) = 9.78, p <.001]. Repetition served to significantly affect know 
responses for critical words [F(2, 42) = 6.780, p = .003] by significantly decreasing them 
between one and five repetitions [t(21) = 3.552, p = .002] but having no effect on them 
between five and ten repetitions [t(21) = -.646, p = .525]. Repetition was also found to 
significantly affect false remember responses [F(2, 42) = 5.370, p = .008]. Further 
analyses revealed, as demonstrated in Figure 5.16, that repetition significantly increased 
remember responses for critical words corresponding to lists presented once versus lists 
presented five times [t(21) = -2.53,p = .019]. In addition, repetition served to decrease 
remember responses for critical items corresponding to lists presented ten times versus 
critical items from lists presented five times [t(21) = 2.01, p = .057]. 
5.6.5. Discussion 
When distinctive pictorial information was provided at encoding in the form of one of 
two arbitrary pictures, an inverted u-shaped relationship was found between repetition 
and false memory levels for remember responses. The effect was eliminated when 
collapsed over memory type. The number of veridical items endorsed and attributed to 
the correct source increased with repetition. This effect was found to be significant for 
remember responses only, though it is possible that no increase was found in know 
responses due to a floor effect. The key questions which need to be addressed are: what 
was it about the presentation of the pictures which resulted in this inverted u-shaped 
relationship between false memory levels and repetition, and why was it confined to 
remember responses only? 
The decrease in false remember items between five and ten repetitions, obtained as a 
consequence of the distinctive stimuli, is compatible with the distinctiveness heuristic (as 
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outlined in the introduction, Section 5.6.1.). In addition, the finding that this reduction in 
false memory endorsement was found solely in the remember responses can also be 
accounted for under the distinctiveness heuristic. By definition, remember memories 
require not just familiarity with the subject, but explicit memory of the context, which in 
this case would be the pictorial tag. Consequently, it could be argued that any recollective 
fuelled decline in false memories would predominantly reside in remember responses. In 
addition, the distinctiveness heuristic can accommodate the selective decline in false 
remember memories between five and ten repetitions. Metacognitive expectations about 
the necessity of a 'pictorial' tag to accompany memories would be at their greatest 
between five and ten repetitions. 
This explanation regarding the distinctiveness heuristic capitalises upon source 
monitoring principles. It is thus in accordance with the source monitoring framework, 
highlighting the parallels between these two theories. It has been proposed that the 
distinctiveness heuristic is a distinct mechanism because of its potential to be influenced 
by subjective expectations regarding the quality of memories, thus making it under 
metacognitve control (Dodson & Schacter 2002). It can be argued, however, that its 
successful execution is also dependent upon source monitoring ability. Indeed, recent 
research done in different clinical populations supports this conclusion. Budson et al. 
(2005) demonstrated that patients with frontal lobe lesions were unable to use the 
distinctiveness heuristic as a means to reduce false memories, leading the authors to 
conclude that the distinctiveness heuristic is a metacognitive strategy dependent upon 
frontal lobe function. In a separate study in Alzheimer's patients, Budson et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that Alzheimer's patients were able to use the distinctiveness heuristic, but 
that their episodic failings rendered it as non selective, resulting in monitoring errors 
which lead to a reduction in both veridical and false memory. In the absence of any direct 
manipulation regarding metacognitive expectations to differentiate the source monitoring 
account from the distinctiveness heuristic, no conclusions concerning the relative role of 
these two explanations can be offered. 
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The impoverished relational encoding account, as previously stated, has been suggested 
as an alternative mechanism by which distinctive pictorial information serves to reduce 
false memories, by virtue of a shift from relational encoding to the encoding of 
perceptual features of stimuli (Hege & Dodson 2004). It is less clear how this theory 
would lead to a selective decrease in false memories between five and ten repetitions 
unless the additional assumption is made that perceptual information encoded is used at 
test to aid source monitoring. 
Increase in false memory levels (remember responses). 
As previous research surrounding the use of distinctive information and source 
monitoring has used them as manipulations to reduce false memories, the initial rise in 
false remember responses is not easily incorporated under the theories previously 
discussed. It can be argued that, initially at least, the presence of the pictures increased 
the memory load at encoding, which resulted in a significant reduction in remember 
responses in both veridical and critical items for singularly presented lists. Such an 
interpretation is indeed compatible with previous research as well as being reflected in 
the findings of the current series of experiments. Previous studies have shown that the 
addition of distinctive information has the potential to lead to a reduction in veridical 
recall, relative to a single source control group. Hicks and Marsh (1999) found veridical 
memory to be highest for DRM lists when a single source was used, an intermediate 
amount of veridical memory was obtained when two sources were used, and the lowest 
levels of veridical memory when participants were warned that retrieval would require 
the specification of source. This indicates that by increasing the memory load by 
requiring source learning, memory for the source could potentially be at the expense of 
memory for the word itself. With regard to the current experiment, this decreased 
learning could be considered more detrimental for singularly presented lists, as they 
would be viewed only once. Post-hoc inspection of the data demonstrates that veridical 
memory for singularly presented lists was lowest in the distinctiveness group (see graph 
5.17). In addition, the distribution of remember / know responses in the singularly 
presented veridical items was also markedly different in the distinctiveness experiment 
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from the previous ones (see graph 5.18). Remember responses were found to exceed 
know responses for all other experiments, whereas in the distinctiveness experiment the 
know responses exceeded the remember responses. Crucially, this was true only for the 
singularly presented lists; in all other repetition conditions in the distinctiveness 
experiment as well as all other repetition conditions in the other experiments, veridical 
remember memory always exceeded veridical know memory. 
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Figure 5.17. The percentage of veridical items recognised for singularly presented 
lists across the latter four experiments (distinctiveness, direct replication of Seamon 
et 01. 2002, warning, and extended repetitions and warning). 
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Figure 5.18. The percentage of words recognised and classified as remember or 
know for veridical items from singularly presented lists, across the latter four 
experiments (distinctiveness, direct replication of Seamon et al. 2002), warning and 
increased repetitions and warning. 
As it has now been established that veridical memory was reduced in the lists presented 
once relative to the previous studies, and that remember / know distributions also 
differed, the implications this has for false memories must be addressed. Whilst it has 
been shown that false memories can exist in the absence of memory for the veridical 
words which elicited the false memories (Seamon et at. 2002), it has also been 
established that false memory levels are influenced by levels of veridical memory. The 
more is less effect, initially advocated by Tolgia (1999) and subsequently supported by 
Rhodes and Anastasi (2000) and Thapar and McDermott (2001) suggests that factors 
which serve to increase veridical memories can also serve to increase false memories. 
Conversely, factors which decrease veridical memory can also decrease false memory. 
Tolgia (1999) performed a series of experiments which demonstrated the parallel levels 
of false and veridical memory by manipulating factors at encoding. For example, 
manipulating level of processing, by shifting encoding from semantic to phonological 
processing, served to decrease both false and veridical memories (Tolgia 1999; Rhodes & 
Anastasi 2000; Thapar & McDermott 2001). Reduced veridical learning for lists 
155 
presented once, with a resultant corresponding low level of false memories, could lead to 
a rise in false memories due to a greater increase in veridical learning. This can not be the 
sole answer, however, as reduced levels of false memories were particularly confined to 
remember responses and thus an explanation needs to incorporate this finding. Research 
by Perez-Mata et al. (2002) used an attention manipulation (divided vs. full) at encoding 
for DRM and then assessed phenomenological experience of veridical and critical items 
using the remember / know procedure during a recognition test. They found that 
'variations in attention had similar phenomenological consequences for list items and 
critical non-presented words' (pg. 168). If one extrapolates this principle and applies it to 
the current data, the inclusion of distinctive information could have reduced memory for 
items for singularly presented lists, and this could have been particularly manifested in 
reduced remember responses. This could have translated into low levels of critical 
remember responses for singularly presented lists, due to the proclivity of the 
phenomenological experience of veridical items to mirror that of critical items. With 
increased repetitions, increased learning of veridical items caused remember responses to 
be greater than know responses, and this was mirrored in response type for critical items. 
With yet further repetitions (five to ten) lists were sufficiently learnt (as demonstrated by 
a non-significant further increase in veridical memory) for the benefits afforded by the 
distinctive information to manifest in a dissociation between phenomenological 
experience between veridical and critical items. For, as previously argued, participants' 
ability to recollect veridical items in conjunction with the pictorial tag was sufficiently 
proficient for them to utilise this knowledge as a means to 'edit out' critical intrusions. In 
particular, as in accordance with the distinctiveness heuristic, participants' metacognitive 
expectations that memories of words should be accompanied by a pictorial tag, and the 
lack of such a tag for critical items, meant that after ten repetitions participants 
endorsement of critical items with remember responses was vastly reduced. To conclude, 
the inverted u-shaped relationship between false memory levels and repetition may be a 
consequence of what could be termed 'polarisation of learning' (see figure 5.19). The 
presence of distinctiveness information at encoding may have resulted in reduced levels 
of learning at first, but ultimately allowed for heightened recollective knowledge of the 
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study list. The presence of these extreme memory states may have consequently given 
rise to an inverted U-shaped memory state function of repetition 
Polarisation of learning 
Learning comparable to previous experiments 
_. _ . _ . - . _ . _. _ . _ . - . _. _ . ----. -~ 
Reduced learning: due to 
additional information at encoding 
Encoding 
Increased learning: Greater disparity 
between the phenomenological 
experience of veridical and false 
memories -+ increased potential for 
monitoring 
Figure 5.19. Idealised graph to depict the theorised relationship between encoding 
quality and false memory levels, providing encoding is hampered at first, and that 
recollective encoding of veridical items is potentiated to increase encoding quality. 
5.7. General discussion 
This chapter manipulated different factors as means to elicit the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between repetition and false memory levels. Determining which factors 
resulted in its inception provided insight into its underlying mechanisms. Moreover, a 
paradigm incorporating both an increase and decrease in false memories with repetition 
allows a future study to replicate it in conjunction with alcohol. 
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The only experiment to obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship between repetition and 
false memory responses was Experiment 8. This experiment found that the curve was 
confined to remember responses only. The inclusion of the distinctive pictorial stimuli 
was hypothesised to have induced this effect. The addition of extra information at 
encoding was argued to have initially reduced remember memories relative to the other 
experiments. If this reduction in remember responses translated into a net increase in the 
activation of critical items between one and five repetitions, the resultant increase in false 
memories can be accounted for. No other experiments found significant a rise in false 
memory responses. As no other experiment included a variable which increased the 
memory load at encoding, this finding is in accordance with the above argument. 
Regarding significant decreases in false memories, only Experiment 8 found a significant 
decrease in false remember responses. As pictorial stimuli were presented at encoding, it 
was argued that participants were better able to utilise recollective processes in their 
memory judgements. Indeed, source monitoring ability increased with repetitions and 
was confined to remember responses only. Consequently, as no pictorial stimuli were 
presented with critical items, a subsequent decline in false remember responses was 
observed when stimuli were sufficiently wellieamt. Interestingly, this effect suggests that 
to increase the likelihood that differences in false memory levels will manifest in 
remember responses, visual manipulations are required. 
One other experiments obtained significant decreases in false memories. Experiment 7 -
which issued a warning prior to encoding and increased the amount of repetitions - found 
that repetition monotonically decreased false memories. This decrease was also confined 
to the know responses. Interestingly, the decrease in false know responses with repetition 
is contrary to what one would predict based upon the AMF. One way repetition is thought 
to increase the activation of critical items is via the increase in opportunities for their 
activation within semantic networks (Benjamin 2001). One would expect this to translate 
into increases in know responses. In contrast, the potential to recollect veridical items 
increases with repetition. False and veridical memories have been found to differ 
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phenomenologically, specifically in regard to the detail inherent in them, and the thoughts 
and feeling experienced when 'encountering' them at encoding (Neuschatz et al. 2001). 
With increased learning of veridical items, their increased recollection should translate 
into greater phenomenological disparity between veridical and critical items. One would 
hypothesise that this would lead to a decrease in false remember responses with 
repetition. Whilst theories have been proposed which can account for the phantom 
recollection of false memory items, such as through the binding of context with the 
critical items (Brainerd et al. 2001), such theories cannot readily account for why 
decreases in false memories with repetitions were found in know responses only. Further 
research is thus needed to determine why repetition modulated know responses in the 
present experiment, yet Seamon et al. (2002) found that effects were confined to 
remember responses. Using a single scale to determine whether memories are classified 
as know or remember results in their mutual exclusivity. Further research into the effect 
of the phenomenology of false memories could use a procedure which assesses them 
separately, such as the independent scales methodology devised by Higham and Vokey 
(2004). This procedure would be particularly advisable in the context of the present 
findings since, when the inverted U-shaped curve was obtained in false remember 
responses, a non-significant tendency for a U-shaped relationship between false know 
responses and repetition was found. 
The paradigm used in Experiment 8 serves as a means to selectively increase and 
decrease false remember responses. Alcohol has been shown to differentially affect 
recollective, as opposed to familiarity based processes (Duka et al. 2001). As the effects 
were manifested in remember responses, the potential for drink to differentially effect 
false memories as function of repetition is increased. 
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Chapter 6. Activation and monitoring: Does alcohol shift the parabolic function 
between false remember memories and repetition? 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the mechanisms through which study-list repetition and 
alcohol may serve to affect false memory levels. Building on work done in Chapter 5, 
three levels of repetition will be used as this provides an opportunity to assess differences 
in initial levels of false memory between the alcohol and placebo groups. In addition, the 
relative potential for alcohol and placebo to selectively modulate a rise in false memories 
and a subsequent decline in false memories can also be assessed. The experiment to be 
replicated in conjunction with alcohol is the distinctiveness design employed in 
Experiment 8. It was chosen for two principle reasons. Firstly it was the only design 
which obtained a significant inverted u-shaped relationship between repetition and false 
remember responses. Secondly, as words were presented in conjunction with arbitrary 
pictures, a source monitoring procedure administered at test can assess the propensity for 
alcohol to disrupt contextual memory. 
6.1.1. Repetition 
This thesis has previously outlined the argument that repetition has the propensity to both 
increase false memories - via repeated activations of the critical items - and decrease 
false memories - via the increased potential to learn veridical words and better 
differentiate between items presented and items not presented (Benjamin 2001). 
Consequently, whether repetition serves to decrease false memories or increase false 
memories can provide an insight into whether activation or monitoring processes are 
prevailing in memory judgements. Any differences induced by alcohol concerning the 
way in which repetition modulates false memory levels could hence provide an insight 
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into the way in which alcohol affects memory processes underlying false memory 
endorsements. 
6.1.2. Alcohol 
In regard to alcohol, it is hypothesised that three distinct mechanisms could mediate 
alcohol's affect on false memory levels: impairment of activation, impairment of 
monitoring and metacognitive expectations of memories, as defined by the 
distinctiveness heuristic. These will be assessed in tum. 
Activation 
Throughout this thesis it has been strongly argued that alcohol could reduce the activation 
of critical semantic associates. As defined by the AMF, activation of critical items can 
occur through two processes. Firstly, via the automatic spread of activation within 
semantic networks, and secondly, by conscious elaborative processing at encoding. It has 
been hypothesised that alcohol has the potential to reduce activation via both 
mechanisms. Firstly, superficial processing at encoding under alcohol (Craik 1977) could 
reduce the automatic spread of activation in semantic networks. In addition, the 
disruption of cognitive resources when intoxicated could reduce conscious elaborative 
processing at study (Steele & Josephs 1988). Consequently, two distinct predictions can 
be made. Firstly, it can be hypothesised that alcohol may result in initially reduced false 
memory levels, as demonstrated by a reduction in false memories from singularly 
presented lists relative to the placebo control group. Secondly, activation levels of critical 
items should reach their maximum in placebo subjects before the activation levels of 
critical items peak in alcohol subjects. Consequently, extended repetitions have the 
potential to increase activation levels to a greater extent in alcohol subjects than placebo 
subjects if activation levels have reached their maximum level in the placebo group. 
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Monitoring 
In addition, alcohol may affect the ability for participants to differentiate between false 
and veridical words. Consequently, an impairment in source monitoring ability in the 
alcohol group could serve to elevate false memories relative to the placebo group. In the 
previous chapter, it was found that the inverted U-shaped curve was obtained in 
remember responses only when words at encoding were presented in conjunction with 
pictures. It was thus argued that increasing the potential contextual disparity between 
presented and non-presented words could have aided reality monitoring decisions at test, 
resulting in a decline in false remember memories when sources were learnt sufficiently 
well (Hicks & Marsh 1999). As alcohol has been found to particularly impair recollective 
processes (Duka et af. 2001; Kirschner & Sayette 2003), and the richness of episodic 
traces (Curran & Hildebrandt 1999), such monitoring ability may suffer. This could 
consequently lead to a reduced decline in false memories with successive repetitions in 
the alcohol group relative to the placebo group. Whilst no effect of alcohol on source 
monitoring has yet been established, this tentative prediction is founded upon a number 
of empirical findings. In particular, Curran and Hildebrandt (1999) argued that the 
differential impairment of alcohol on know and remember responses was indicative of 
alcohol either affecting the ability to encode contextual information at study, or to 
associate the encoding context with studied items. Curran and Hildebrandt (1999) argue 
that this finding is compatible with 'alcohol myopia' (Steele & Josephs 1990) where 
alcohol's limitation of attentional resources (Steele & Josephs 1988) is thought to lead to 
only the most salient of cues being attended to. They argue that the salient stimulus could 
be the word itself in the absence of the context. Following this line of reasoning, it could 
be argued that the alcohol group may encode the word well but the pictorial tag only 
poorly. Administering a test which looks at participants' ability to monitor the context -
and whether this ability differs as a function of alcohol - could serve to investigate the 
validity of this speculation. 
Distinctiveness Heuristic 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the distinctiveness heuristic states that pictorial information at 
encodin ll can reduce false memories if, at retrieval, participants have a metacognitive 
b 
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expectation that the presence of a pictorial tag is diagnostic of prior presentation 
(Schacter et al. 1999). Alcohol could serve to alter this metacognitive expectation, as 
participants may attribute the lack of distinctive memories to alcohol induced impairment 
of encoding, as opposed to it being indicative of whether the item was presented or not. 
This speculation is in accordance with an experiment where the mere suggestion that 
participants had consumed alcohol resulted in an increase in false memories (Assefi & 
Garry 2003). Two predictions can be made utilising the principles advocated by the 
distinctiveness heuristic regarding the effect of alcohol on false memory levels. Firstly, 
perceived level of drunkenness may increase the amount of false memories endorsed. 
Secondly, extended repetitions may not reduce false memory levels if participants believe 
they are drunk, since participants may be less inclined to override the familiarity felt for 
critical items from repeatedly presented lists. Whilst perceived levels of drunkenness 
were not experimentally manipulated within this study, subjective reports of 
lightheadedness were taken post consumption of the drink and prior to encoding. These 
provide levels of perceived subjective drunkenness which are distinct from 
pharmacological levels of drunkenness, as assessed by BAC levels. Consequently, under 
principles of the distinctiveness heuristic, levels of self-reported lightheadedness should 
positively correlate with false memory endorsement to a degree with is not accounted for 
by BAC levels. 
6.2. Method 
Participants 
Forty-nine volunteers were recruited from the undergraduate and postgraduate population 
at the University of Sussex. They received either cash or course credits as payment. All 
participants were native English speakers, not dyslexic and aged 18-34 years. 
Volunteers were screened prior to participating on the basis of their medical history, and 
exclusion criteria were the same as those employed in Chapter 3. Participants \\ere 
instructed to abstain from the use of illicit recreational drinks for at least 1 \\eek prior to 
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the experiment, from the use of sleeping tablets or hayfever medication for at least 48 
hours, and from the use of alcohol for at least 12 hours prior to the experiment. 
Alcohol administration 
See Chapter 3. 
Design 
The experiment was double-blind. Participants were randomly allocated to either the 
placebo group (N = 26, 12 males and 14 females), or alcohol group (N = 23, 11 males 
and 12 females). 
Procedure 
The experiment took place over two consecutive days. On arrival at the lab, participants 
completed the AUQ whilst the drink was prepared. Consumption of the drink (over a half 
an hour period, see Chapter 3 for details), was followed by a ten minute break in order to 
ensure encoding coincided with peak BAC. Participants then completed the V AS and 
were breathalysed. 
Participants then underwent an encoding session and recognition test identical to those in 
Experiment 8. 
On completion of the test, participants did the VAS for a second time, and then were 
breathalysed. Participants were only allowed to leave the lab when their breath alcohol 
concentration (BAC) had fallen to 0.02%. 
Participants returned on the following day, 24 hours after the duration of their initial 
encoding session. They were breathalysed to ensure no alcohol was in their system and 
then completed the V AS for a third time. They then took a free recall test, where they 
were instructed to 'Please write down all the words you can recall from the learning 
session yesterday'. There was no time limit; participants \vere given as long as they 
required to complete this task. 
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6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Group analysis 
Group VAS ratings at the three time points 
Experiment 9: Mean (SEM) 
Placebo Alcohol 
1 st 2nd 3rd 1 st 2nd 3rd 
Content 5.78 (.29) 5.55 (.32) 5.80 (.39) 6.46 (.33) 5.76 (.31) 5.64 (.43) 
Relaxed 5.70 (.36) 5.55 (.36) 5.07 (.37) 6.55(.41) 5.47 (.39) 4.91 (.43) 
Lightheaded 1. 75 (.40) 1.73 (.38) 0.47 (.07) 6.24 (.42) 5.71 (.58) 0.49 (.08) 
Table 6.1. VAS scores in the alcohol and placebo groups for time 1 (post drink 
consumption) time 2 (post recognition test) and time 3 (post recall test). 
Independent t-tests of V AS scores revealed that the alcohol and placebo groups did not 
differ in terms of self ratings of contentedness, at time point 1 (post drink consumption) 
[t(47) = -1.528,p = .133] time point 2 (post recognition test) [t(47) = - .469,p = .641] nor 
time point 3 (next day: post recall test) [t( 47) = .278, p = .782]. Similarly, self ratings of 
relaxedness also did not differ between the two groups at the three respective time points 
[t(47) = - 1.538,p = .131; t(47) = - .154,p = .878; t(47) = - .267,p = .790]. In contrast, 
alcohol was shown to have a significant effect on ratings of lightheadedness, and this was 
true for time point 1 [t(47) = -7.778,p < .001] and time point 2 [t(47) = -5.863,p < .001], 
though, as would be expected, no significant difference existed the next day, at time point 
3 [t(47) = -.154,p = .879]. 
6.3.2. Recognition: Immediate testing 
An initial analysis was performed to investigate how alcohol at encoding affected 
veridical recognition levels, in combination with participants' aptitude at source 
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identification for the veridical items in question. Of interest were whether differences 
might exist between the alcohol and placebo groups, in regard to how this ability varied 
with repetition and whether correct attributions had a tendency to be ascribed know or 
remember response in the two groups. A 4-way mixed ANOV A was thus performed on 
veridical items only, as critical items were never presented and thus no correct source 
existed. Repetition (presented once vs. repeated five times vs. repeated ten times), 
memory type (remember vs. know) and context (correct vs. incorrect) were within 
subjects factors, and drink (alcohol vs. placebo) was a between subjects factor. The 
number of veridical items recognised was the dependent variable. 
Main effects were found in all within and between subjects' variables: a main effect of 
memory type demonstrated more remember than know responses were made [F(!. 47) = 
10.932, P = .002], a main effect of context indicated that more correct than incorrect 
contexts were remembered [F(1, 47) = 97.216,p < .001], a main effect of repetition [F(2, 
94) = 91.380] indicated that recognition of veridical items increased with repetition, and 
this reached significance for one compared to five repetitions [t( 48) = -10.271, p < .001], 
and approached significance for five compared to ten repetitions [t( 48) = -1.639, p = 
.108]. Lastly, a main effect of alcohol [F(1, 47) = 10.315, p = .002] demonstrated a 
greater number of veridical words were recognised by the placebo group versus the 
alcohol group. Further analysis ofa memory type x context interaction [F(1, 47 = 31.587, 
p < .001] indicated that more remember responses were ascribed to correct contexts than 
know responses [t( 48) = 4.897, P <.001], whereas no difference existed between the 
amount of remember and know responses for incorrect contexts [t( 48) = -.772. p = .474. 
A context x repetition interaction [F(2, 94) = 16.012, P < .001] was further explored to 
reveal that there was no effect of repetition on the amount of incorrect contexts [F(2, 96) 
= 1.804, P = .170], but a significant effect of repetition on the amount of correct contexts 
[F(2 96) = 55.248, p < .001]. These were found to significantly increase between both 
one and five repetitions [t( 48) = -8.525, p < .001] and five and ten repetitions [t( 48) = -
2.131,p = .038]. Memory type was not found to interact with drink [F(1, 47) = .576,p = 
.452]. nor was participants ability to correctly remember context dependent on drink 
consumed, as displayed by a non-significant drink x context interaction [F( 1. 47) = .620, 
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p = .435]. In addition, the memory type x context x drink interaction [F(l, 47) = .955 p = 
.333], memory type x repetition x drink [F(2 , 94) = .522, p .595] and memory type x 
context x repetition x drink [F(2, 94) = .291 , p = .748] interactions were all found to be 
non-significant. 
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Figure 6.1. The amount of know and remember responses made for veridical 
contexts (correct vs. incorrect) in placebo participants. 
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Figure 6.2. The amount of know and remember responses made for veridical 
contexts (correct vs. incorrect) in alcohol participants. 
As a means to determine the way in which alcohol and placebo affected false and 
veridical memory levels, a 4-way ANOV A was performed. Repetition (presented once 
vs. repeated five times vs. repeated ten times), memory type (remember vs. know) and 
word type (veridical vs. critical) were within subjects' variables, whilst drink (placebo vs. 
alcohol) was a between subjects' factor. The number of items recognised served as the 
dependent variable. 
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The percentage of veridical and critical items allocated remember and know 
attributions as a function of repetition (presented once, five times or ten times) in 
the placebo group (Figure 6.3.) and the alcohol group (Figure 6.4.). 
A borderline significant mam effect of memory type [F(l 47) = 3.103 , P = .085] 
indicated a tendency for memories to be ascribed remember responses relati e to knO\ 
r sponses. A main effect of repetition [F(2 , 94) = 23.124 P < .001] demonstrated that 
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repetition increased recognition, and a main effect of word type [F(1 , 47) = 17.150, < 
.001] revealed that veridical items were more likely to be recognised than critical items. 
Whilst there was no main effect of drink [F(1, 47) = 2.204,p = .144] a word type x drink 
interaction approached significance [F(1, 47) = 3.193, p = .080] and demonstrated that 
alcohol reduced veridical memory [F(l, 47) = 10.315, P .002], but had no effect on false 
memory [F(l, 47) = .032, p = .859]. Exploration of a repetition x drink interaction [F(2 
94) = 4.890, P = .010] revealed that participants in the alcohol group recognised 
significantly less items from singularly presented lists relative to the placebo group [t(47) 
= 2.562, P = .014], but that no difference existed between the two groups for lists 
repeated five times [t(47) = 1.178,p = .254] or ten times [t(47) = -.854,p = .398]. Drink, 
however, was not found to interact with memory type [F(} , 47) = .001, P = .918], and a 
memory type x repetition x drink interaction also did not reach significance [F(2 94) = 
.073, P = .930, nor did a word type x memory type x drink interaction [F(l, 47) = 2.639, 
P = .111]. A repetition x word type x drink interaction was also not found to be 
significant [F(2, 94) = .108, P = .898], nor was a repetition x word type x memory type x 
drink interaction [F(2, 94) = 1.395,p = .263]. 
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Figure 6.5. A word type x drink interaction demonstrated that, when collapsed. 
across the three repetition conditions, participants in the placebo gr?up recogm. ed 
significantly more veridical items than the alcohol group. No such difference eXisted 
between the two groups for critical items. 
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Figure 6.6. A drink x repetition interaction demonstrated that, when collapsed 
across word type (veridical and critical items), participants in the placebo group 
recognised significantly more items from singularly presented list than those 
recognised in the alcohol group. No such different existed between the two groups 
for items corresponding to lists presented five times or ten times. 
A repetition x word type interaction [F(2, 94) = 22.155,p < .001] was further explored to 
reveal that repetition monotonically increased veridical memory [F(2, 94) = 82.205, p < 
.001] and this reached significance between one and five repetitions [t( 48) = -10.271 , P < 
.001], though was non-significant between five and ten repetitions [t(48) = -1.639, P = 
.108]. In contrast, repetition had a marginal effect on false memories [F(2, 94) = 2.831, P 
= .064], and paired t-tests revealed that repetition served to increase false memory items 
between one and five repetitions [t( 48) = -2.013 , P = .050], but significantly decrease 
false memories between five and ten repetitions [t(48) = 2.588,p = .013]. 
A memory type x repetition x word type interaction [F(2, 94) = 3.557, p = .032] was 
further explored with separate 2-way ANOVAs in remember and know memories \: ith 
repetition (presented once vs. repeated five times vs. repeated times) and word t pe 
( ridical vs. critical) as within subjects factors and the amount of words recogni ed a 
the independent variable. No repetition x word type interaction as found for kn \\ 
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responses [F(2, 96) = .855, p = .429], whilst a significant repetition x word type 
interaction was found in the remember memories [F(2, 96) = 15.386, p < .001]. 
Additional analyses revealed that repetition affected veridical remember responses [F(2 
96) = 92.385, p < .001], increasing them between both one and five repetitions [t( 48) = _ 
10.644 < .001] and five and ten repetitions [t( 48) = -1.906, p = .063]. In contrast 
breakdown on the effect of repetition on false memory items [F(2, 96) = 9.963, p = .000], 
revealed that repetition increased the amount of remember responses made to false 
memory items between one and five repetitions [t(48) = -4.335, p < .001], and between 
five and ten repetitions [t( 48) = 2.354, p = .023]. 
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Figure 6.7. A significant word type x repetition interaction in remember responses 
only signified that repetition monotonically increased veridical remember responses, 
but served to initially increase false remember responses, and then subsequently 
decrease them. 
A memory type x repetition interaction [F(2, 94) = 36.195,p < .001] was broken down to 
reveal that repetition did not significantly increase memory in know responses [F(2, 94) = 
2.168, p = .120], but did significantly increase remember responses [F(2 94) = 93.285 p 
< .001] and this reached significance between one and five repetitions [t( 48) = -10.644, P 
< .001] and was approaching significance between five and ten repetitions [t(48) = -
1.906,p = .063). 
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Planned comparisons in regard to how alcohol may shift the curve in false remember 
responses revealed that, in the placebo group, repetition increased false remember 
responses between one and five repetitions [t(25) = -2.287, p = .031] and significantly 
decreased false memories between five and ten repetitions [t(25) = 2.3917, p = .025]. For 
participants in the alcohol group, repetition increased false remember responses between 
one and five repetitions [t(22) = -3.892, p = .001]. False remember responses failed to 
decline within the alcohol group between five and ten repetitions [t(22) = 1.064, p = 
.299]. Regarding how false memory levels differed between the two groups, participants 
in the alcohol group had significantly less false remember memories than the placebo 
group for critical items from singularly presented lists [t( 47) = 2.932) p = .005], though 
no difference existed between the two groups for lists presented ten times [t(47) = -.465, 
p = .644] 
6.3.3. Free Recall: Delayed testing 
A mixed 2(Drink: alcohol vs. placebo )x3(Repetition: lists presented once vs. five vs. ten 
times)x2(Word type: veridical vs. critical) ANOVA was performed on the percentage of 
words recalled. Repetition and word type were within subjects variables, whilst drink was 
a between subjects variable. 
A mam effect of repetition [F(2, 94) = 26.303, p<.OOI] was found, indicating that 
repetition affected recall, increasing it between both one and five repetitions [t( 48) = -
4.391, p< .001] and five and ten repetitions [t(48) = -3.376 = ]. A main effect of word 
type [F(l,4 7) = 9.561, p = .003] signified that more critical than veridi cal words were 
recalled. There was also a main effect of drink [F(l, 47) = 7.307, p = .010]. 
demonstrating significantly reduced recall in the alcohol group. No significant word type 
x drink interaction was found [F(l, 47) = .318, p = .576] nor was repetition found to 
interact with word type [F(2, 94) = .666,p = .516]. There \vas, ho\\ever. a borderline 
significant repetition x drink interaction [F(2, 94) = 2.674, p = .074). 
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Figure 6.8. A significant repetition x drink interaction in free recall data mirrored 
the recognition data, and indicated that a significant difference existed between the 
alcohol and placebo groups for the amount of words recalled corresponding to 
singularly presented lists (collapsed across word type), but that not such difference 
existed for repeated lists. 
Further analysis revealed that the amount of words recalled in the five and ten repetition 
conditions did not differ between the alcohol and placebo groups [t(47) = .106, P = .916 
and t(47) = 1.313,p = .196 respectively], but that the placebo group recalled significantly 
more words corresponding to singularly presented lists [t(47) = 3.834,p < .001]. 
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Figure 6.9. The percentage of veridical and critical words recalled for the groups 
who consumed alcohol or a placebo prior to encoding. 
A borderline significant repetition x word type x drug interaction [F(2, 94) = 2.641, p 
=.077] was further investigated using separate 2-way ANOV As in the veridical and 
critical items. Repetition (presented once vs. five times vs. ten times) was the only within 
subjects variable, and drink (placebo vs. alcohol) served as the only between subjects 
variable. The percentage of words recalled was the dependent variable. No repetition x 
drink interaction was found within veridical items [F(2, 94) = .095, p = .910]. Analysis of 
the critical items revealed a significant repetition x drink interaction [F(2, 94) = 3.067, p 
= .051] which was broken down to reveal that whilst repetition did not have a significant 
effect on false memory items in the placebo group [F(2, 50) = 2.141,p = .128], repetition 
affected false memories in the alcohol group [F(2 , 44) = 6.148 ,p = .004], increasing false 
memories between one and five repetitions [t( 48) = 3.425, p = .002], though not between 
five and ten repetitions [t(48) = -.l96, p = .847]. 
175 
6.4. Conclusions 
6.4.1. Recognition: Immediate testing 
The principle findings from the present experiment can be summarised as follo\\"5: The 
results of Experiment 8 were replicated in the current study - specifically, repetition was 
shown to affect false memories by initially increasing them, then subsequently decreasing 
them. This inverted U-shaped function was manifested in remember responses only. In 
terms of the effects of alcohol; a repetition by drink interaction demonstrated that the 
general deleterious effect of alcohol was confined to veridical memory, whilst alcohol 
had no overall effect on false memory levels. In regard to the inverted U-shaped function 
in false remember responses, and in line with the predictions outlined in the introduction, 
alcohol had dual effects. Firstly, it was shown through an initial reduction in false 
remember memories relative to the placebo group. Secondly, false remember memories 
significantly declined between five and ten repetitions in the placebo group, but this 
decline was not significant in the alcohol group. Contrary to speculations, alcohol was 
not shown to affect contextual source monitoring ability, as no differences were found 
between the alcohol and placebo groups in terms of ability to remember the context of 
veridical words. The main issues which thus need to be addressed are the propensity for 
alcohol to differentially affect veridical and critical items, and the mechanisms which 
may underlie this. In addition, an account needs to be provided regarding the shifted 
inverted U-shaped function in false memory levels, and the mechanisms which may 
underlie these opposing effects. The non-significant decrease in false remember 
responses between five and ten repetitions in the alcohol group needs to be accounted for 
particularly in regard to alcohol's non-significant effect on source monitoring levels 
within veridical items. In addition, differing effects of repetition on false memory 
endorsement was also obtained for same and next day testing. When memory was 
assessed the next day, repetition was no longer found to affect false memory levels in an 
invelied U-shaped function. Instead, a main effect of repetition for critical items 
demonstrated a propensity for repetition to enhance false memories. 
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The first major finding was a word type by repetition interaction which demonstrated 
that, when memory was collapsed across all repetition conditions, the deleterious effect 
of alcohol was more pronounced for veridical items than for critical items. Why does 
alcohol appear to differentially affect veridical and false memory levels? An argument 
can be made that certain properties of false memories are compatible with the processes 
which get selectively preserved under alcohol, namely, automatic processing (Tracy & 
Bates 1999) and familiarity based processing (Duka et al. 2001). Firstly, research has 
shown that the false memory effect can be founded purely upon feelings of familiarity 
(Fazendeiro et al. 2005). Secondly, research has revealed that, when encoding is severely 
impaired, memory for false memory items can exceed memory for veridical items. 
Seamon et al. (1998) manipulated encoding with rapid rates of stimulus presentation (20 
ms per word), which, it was argued, would minimise conscious processing of study items. 
At test, it was found that memory discrimination for list items were poor (13 %), and 
significantly less than memory discrimination for critical items (23 %). Whilst a debate 
currently exists about the extent to which this finding, and other similar ones, can be 
taken as evidence for false memories resulting from nonconscious processing (Gallo & 
Seamon 2004; Zeelenberg et al. 2003; Raaijmakers & Zeelenberg, 2004), it can still be 
argued that this effect is indicative of the potential automaticity of the false memory 
effect. Other research has demonstrated that factors which impair encoding can 
selectively impair false memories. For example, divided attention at encoding, caused a 
resultant impairment in veridical memory whilst leaving levels of false memory intact 
relative to a full attention control condition (Seamon et al. 2003). Despite finding that 
alcohol differentially affects veridical and false memory when memory levels were 
collapsed over all three repetition conditions, this assertion needs to be qualified for the 
effect of alcohol on false memory levels is actually more complex. 
Initial reduction in false remember responses under alcohol 
As outlined in the introduction, and in accordance with arguments posed in chapters 3 
and 4 initial decreases in false memories in the alcohol group can be accounted for by , 
reduced activation of critical items. Not only is this argument compatible with the AMF. 
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it is also in accordance with the established effects of alcohol. Specifically, the AMF 
hypothesises that activation of the critical item can occur through two routes - an 
automatic route, via the spread of activation within semantic networks, and a conscious 
route, via elaborative semantic encoding. Alcohol has the potential to reduce activation 
via both routes, which could account for the initial decrease in false memories under 
alcohol. Firstly, it has been theorised that reduced levels of processing serves as the 
mechanism through which veridical memory is impaired under alcohol (Craik, 1977). 
The reduced levels of processing could reduce the degree of activation within semantic 
networks, leading to reduced false memories under the AMF (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000; 
Thapar & McDermott, 2001). Secondly, the impairment of attentional resources under 
alcohol (Steele & Josephs 1988) could also reduce the degree of elaborative processing 
under alcohol, which may reduce the probability of the critical item being thought of at 
encoding. This process could reduce the quality of the representation of the critical item 
(Gallo & Roediger 2002). In an experiment where participants were required to verbalise 
semantic elaborations at encoding, a path analyses demonstrated that verbalising the 
critical item at encoding predicted subsequent levels of false recall (Goodwin et al. 
2001). Thus decreased levels of semantic activation under alcohol as a consequence of 
shallow encoding and reduced semantic elaborations at encoding could account for the 
reduced levels of false memory relative to the placebo group. 
Non-significant decline in remember false memories under alcohol 
The role of activation 
Planned comparisons revealed that in the placebo group, a significant decline in false 
remember memories were found between five and ten repetitions. In contrast, the 
difference in false remember memories between five and ten repetitions was not found to 
be significant in the alcohol group. Conclusions derived in chapter 5 (Experiment 8) 
centred upon the pictures aiding source monitoring, which in turn better abled 
participants to differentiate between items presented and items not presented - leading to 
a decrease in false memories. Crucially, however, monitoring ability was not found to be 
impaired in the alcohol group, as assessed using a contextual monitoring procedure on 
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veridical items. Yet if alcohol was not found to affect monitoring judgments, how can the 
failure for extended repetitions to reduced remember false memories in the alcohol group 
be accounted for? Under the AMP, it can be argued that a lack of a decline in false 
memories with repetition must occur through a dominance of activation based processes 
over monitoring ones being enhanced by successive repetitions. This could occur through 
an impairment of monitoring or a strengthening of activation with repetition. In light of 
the non-significant effect of alcohol on contextual monitoring, it is thus possible to 
account for the finding in terms of differential activation levels in the placebo and alcohol 
groups. 
Figure 6.10 depicts the hypothesised relationship between activation and repetition for 
the alcohol and placebo groups. It has been strongly argued that alcohol serves to initially 
'block' activation, resulting in decreased levels of false memory for singularly presented 
lists. If the alcohol group is thus operating from reduced baseline levels of activation, and 
if the additional assumption is made that with the activation enhancing effects of 
repetition (Benjamin 2001) the alcohol and placebo groups can be brought up to equal 
levels of activation with ten repetitions, a relationship such as that displayed in Figure 
6.10. could exist. This clearly indicates that as baseline differences in activation exist, a 
smaller number of repetitions are needed for the asymptote to be reached for activation 
peak levels in the placebo group. Consequently, differential gradients exist between the 
alcohol and placebo groups between five and ten repetitions. As the gradient represents 
increase in activation, a greater increase occurs within the alcohol group between these 
two repetition points. Thus, even if monitoring ability were the same between the 
placebo and alcohol groups, a greater increase in familiarity for false memory items 
within the alcohol group would result in smaller decline in false memory levels relative to 
the placebo group. 
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Figure 6.10. Red line demonstrating the activation levels of the alcohol group, 
black levels representing the activation levels of the placebo group and how they 
change with repetition. The arrows indicated the magnitude of increased activation 
between five and ten repetitions, with a greater increase hypothesised to be present 
in the alcohol group (red arrow) verses the placebo group (black arrow). 
The role of monitoring 
The simplest explanation for the effect of alcohol on false memories is reduced activation 
under alcohol - as this can account for both the initial reduced and the subsequent 
delayed decline. There are, however, reasons to be cautious in disregarding an 
impairment in monitoring under alcohol. Firstly, it is too simplistic to equate correct 
veridical contextual monitoring with the monitoring of false versus veridical items. 
Correct contextual monitoring of veridical items is not in fact synon mous with the 
reality monitoring decisions needed to differentiate between veridical and critical items. 
In the current study, source monitoring was assessed by recognition, and, a argued by 
Yonelinas (1999) familiarity can be the basis of correct contextual ource judgement. 
Yonelinas (1999) challenges the traditional assumption that source monitoring deci Ion 
rely exclusively on recollection; they may be based on perceptual fluenc (Kelle) tal. 
1989). Fluency is enhanced when the study and te t match each other in modalit) 
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(Westennan et al. 2002), as they did in the present experiment. The sense of familiarity 
arising from the increase in perceptual fluency from the specific word and picture 
combination encountered at encoding could have thus guided correct veridical contextual 
source judgments. Further recent empirical research has shown that alcohol can keep 
recognition of pictorial stimuli intact, whilst impairing other measures of memory. such 
as associative cued recall (Soderlund et al. 2005). Consequently, assessing veridical 
context in a way which was reliant upon perceptual familiarity may have potentially 
masked alcohol-induced impairment in monitoring ability. In addition, recollective 
memories may integrate information from a number of different sources. Perceptual 
features are just one aspect of a recollective memory. In addition, other processes such as 
infonnation arising from reflective processes at the time of encoding can also be 
retrieved. These include thoughts, evaluations, inferences, intentions and imagination 
(Henkel, Franklin & Johnson 2000). The present experiment only used a perceptual 
measure of monitoring and thus one can not conclude that monitoring ability in its 
entirety is equivalent in the alcohol and placebo groups. For example, the two groups 
may differ in terms of the monitoring of reflective processes. Indeed, such monitoring on 
internal versus external sources is especially important for reality monitoring. In future, a 
variety of source monitoring procedures could be administered. For example, participants 
could be asked to recall rather than recognise the word and the picture. In addition, using 
a monitoring procedure that directly targeted reality monitoring would mean one was not 
implicitly equating contextual monitoring of veridical items with monitoring veridical 
versus critical items. 
The role of the distinctiveness heuristic 
As discussed in the introduction, the distinctiveness heuristic could influence levels of 
false memories. As argued by Schacter and colleagues, the use of distinctive information 
to reject false memories is mediated by a metacognitive expectation that the presence of 
distinctive information is diagnostic of prior presentation. Alcohol may affect the 
metacognitive expectation that memories require a 'pictorial' tag to indicate their reality. 
Smith ct al. (2001) argue that 'although the presence of appropriate source kno\\ ledge 
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during recollection may be diagnostic of an item's list membership ... the lack of 
appropriate source information may not prove that an items did not belong to a 
memorised list' (pg. 364). Due to encoding impairments under alcohol, participants in the 
alcohol group may have had a reduced expectation that they would have effectively 
encoded pictures and thus may have been reluctant to reject the familiarity elicited for 
false memory words with a lack of an accompanying pictorial tag. If the distinctiveness 
heuristic was mediating false memory levels, one would expect to find a correlation 
between subjective levels of perceived drunkenness and levels of false memory. This 
correlation should still hold regardless of whether participants had consumed alcohol or 
placebo. Pearson's correlation analyses demonstrated that subjective ratings of 
lightheadedness 1 were found to significantly correlate with the mean amount of false 
remember responses in the alcohol group [r = .584, p = .004], but not in the placebo 
group [r = -.242, P = .254]. Interestingly, no other types of memories (false know, 
veridical remember and veridical know) memories were found to correlate with 
lightheadedness in either the alcohol or placebo groups. 
As lightheadedness was not found to correlate with false remember responses in the 
placebo group, it would appear that subjective feelings of drunkenness were not sufficient 
to increase the likelihood of having a false memory. This possibly suggests that in fact it 
was the pharmacological effects of alcohol, as indicated by lightheadedness, that was 
predictive of false memory levels. There are two reasons to suppose this is not the case. 
Firstly, variance in lightheadedness ratings was 1.61 in the placebo group, and 4.00 in the 
alcohol group. Indeed, with the exception of one outlier (5.90), all placebo participants 
had a Iightheadedness rating between 0 and 3.2, with a mean value of 1.44. In contrast, 
the alcohol group had a range of .90 to 8.90 with a mean rating of 6.35. This lack of 
spread in lightheadedness ratings in the placebo group could account for why the 
correlation was rendered significant in the alcohol group and not the placebo group. 
Secondly, a pharmacological index of drunkenness, as indexed by BAC levels, were not 
correlated with false remember responses in the alcohol group [r = -.086, p = .704]. BAC 
I Lightheadedness ratings were used from time point 1, though the same pattern of results was obtained 
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levels, were, however, found to be significantly related to lightheadedness [r = .584~ p = 
.004]. A dissociation thus exists between participant's pharmacological index of 
drunkenness and their subjective index of drunkenness in their ability to predict false 
memories. This is compatible with the hypothesis that lightheadedness affects false 
memory levels via expectations, as per the distinctiveness heuristic. 
As discussed, ratings of lightheadedness appear to influence the overall amount of false 
remember memories in the alcohol group. What is of principle interest though is the 
mechanism mediating the significant decline in false remember memories between five 
and ten repetitions in the placebo group, but not in the alcohol group. Is it possible that a 
lack of a significant decline in the alcohol group was also mediated by lightheadedness? 
In line with the principles of the distinctiveness heuristic, people with lower levels of 
lightheadedness may have an increased expectancy that repeatedly viewing lists should 
give rise to more detailed memories. Consequently, low levels of lightheadedness should 
be correlated with a decrease in false memories between five and ten repetitions. 
Conversely, people with higher levels of lightheadedness may not have the same 
expectancy that increased repetitions should give rise to detailed memories. Thus. people 
with higher levels of lightheadedness could have a more liberal endorsement criterion and 
consequently be less likely to reject a highly familiar critical item from repeated lists. To 
specifically investigate whether SUbjective feelings of lightheadedness within the alcohol 
group was responsible for the decline in false remember responses being non-significant, 
a new variable was created. This new variable was the difference between the amount of 
false remember responses from lists repeated five versus ten times. This variable did not 
correlate with lightheadedness in either the placebo group [r = .066, p = .764] or the 
alcohol group [r = .130, p = .555]. In sum, perceived levels of drunkenness, as measured 
by subjective ratings of lightheadedness, influenced overall levels of false remember 
memories in the alcohol group. In contrast, lightheadedness was not related to \\hether a 
decrease in remember false memories was obtained between five and ten repetitions. 
Whilst the distinctiveness heuristic - as mediated by perceived levels of drunkenness -
with lightheadedness ratings from time point 2. 
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can influence false remember memory levels, it does not appear to be the mechani m 
responsible for the decrease in false remember responses with extended repetitions In 
intoxicated participants. 
Shifted Curve 
As discussed, participants in the alcohol group recalled significantly less false remember 
memories from singularly presented lists relative to placebo participants. In addition, a 
significant decline in false remember memories was obtained between five and ten 
repetitions in the placebo group but not the alcohol group. Despite a repetition by drink 
interaction failing to reach significance in false remember memories, can one infer that 
alcohol may have 'shifted' the inverted U-shaped curve, as depicted in Figure 6.11. 
Alcohol and the shifted inverted V-shaped curve 
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Figure 6.11. The speculated 'shifted curve' in false remember responses under 
alcohol, with R marking the peak of the curve. 
To investigate whether the curve was indeed 'shifted' under alcohol an anal si wa 
conducted to investigate whether the point at which the curve peaked was different in the 
alcohol and placebo groups. This would reveal whether the mean amount of repetiti n 
needed to induce a peak level of false memories differed as a function of drink. 
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The value of false memories at any given point, where R is the amount of repetitions is: 
False remember memories = a + bIR + b2 R2 
Differentiating the equation to determine when the gradient equals zero: 
dfm/dR = bI + 2b2 R = 0 
Rearranging the equation to determine R, when R is the value of repetitions at the point 
were the gradient of the curve equals zero 
bl and b2 values were calculated by running separate multiple regression analyses for 
each individual. The amount of false remember responses served as the dependent 
variable, whilst the independent variables were the amount of repetitions (1, 5 and 10) 
which corresponded to b], and the amount of repetitions squared (l, 25, 100) which 
corresponded to b2. Nine participants (5 participants from the alcohol group and 4 from 
the placebo group) were excluded on the basis that they had the same amount of false 
remember responses in all three repetition categories. Consequently, b l and b2 values 
could not be calculated for these participants on the basis of their data. 
Prior to calculating mean values for b I and b2, box plots were made as a means to exclude 
all outliers. When calculating b I, three outliers were removed from the placebo group, and 
five placebo participants were removed when calculating b2. Their removal did not 
change the absolute patterns in the data. The value of R did not significantly differ 
between the two groups [t(34) = .284,p = .778]. The mean values for b2 were comparable 
between the two groups, yet the mean b l value in the alcohol group was approximately 
double that of the placebo group. Any differences in R resulting from drink would stem 
from b l values only. In an attempt to heighten the sensitivity of the analysis, a \\ithin 
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subjects t-test was run on b i values only to determine whether they differed as a function 
of drink. A one-tailed test revealed a marginally significant [t(26.2)-1.631, p = .0574] 
difference. The borderline significant difference in b i values between the alcohol and 
placebo groups could indicate that the inverted U-shaped curve may have shifted. Future 
studies are needed as a means to investigate whether indeed the inverted U-shaped curve 
is shifted under alcohol. 
6.4.2. Free Recall: Delayed testing 
Regarding the free recall data, a main effect of repetition was obtained, indicating that 
repetition monotonically increased both false and veridical memory. Unlike the 
recognition data, no repetition by word type interaction was found. Thus, immediate 
recognition showed that increased repetitions decreased false memories, whilst delayed 
recall showed a tendency to increase false memories with extended repetitions. As 
immediate testing employed a source monitoring procedure to assess false and veridical 
recognition, whilst delayed testing employed free recall only, it is thus possible that 
different testing procedures could account for these contrasting findings. Alternatively, it 
can be argued that these opposite effects of repetition can be accounted for in terms of the 
extended retention interval and by using the AMF. It could be argued that as retention 
interval increases, the phenomenological disparity between veridical and false memories 
is reduced. As recollection becomes less defined with time, participants would hence be 
less able to distinguish between which items were presented and which were not. Because 
critical items from repeated lists could give rise to a greater sense of familiarity due to the 
potential for multiple activations, a shift to familiarity based endorsement criterion could 
account for the increase in false memories with repetition. 
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6.2.1. Summary of conclusions 
Repetition was found to affect false remember responses in an inverted u-shaped 
function; by initially increasing false memory levels, then by subsequently decreasing 
them. This replicated the finding from Experiment 8. Alcohol initially decreased levels of 
false remember memories relative to the placebo group, and rendered their decline 
between five and ten repetitions as non-significant. The potential for alcohol to have 
'shifted' this curve is thus raised as a possibility. 
It has been argued that alcohol affects false memOrIes through an impairment of 
activation within semantic networks. As the degree of semantic activation has been found 
to correlate with false memory levels (e.g. Thapar & McDermott 2001), this could 
account for why initial levels of false remember memories were lower in the alcohol 
group than in the placebo group. In addition, an argument has been proposed to account 
for how reduced levels of semantic activation in intoxicated participants could account 
for the propensity for extended repetitions to significantly decrease false memories in the 
placebo group but not in the alcohol group. A consequence of lower initial activation in 
the alcohol group relative to the placebo group may have meant the increase in activation 
between five and ten repetitions was higher in the alcohol group if activation levels had 
reached their maximum in the placebo group. 
A failure to find a correlation between the degree to which extended repetitions decreased 
false memories and subjective ratings of lightheadedness indicated that it is unlikely that 
the distinctiveness heuristic mediated the non-significant decline in false memories with 
repetition. Specifically, perceived levels of drunkenness did not interact with repetition to 
influence participants' expectations about the quality of their memories. In contrast, 
lightheadedness, but not BAC levels, were significantly and positively correlated to 
overall levels of false remember responses in the alcohol group. This indicated that the 
more drunk participants perceived themselves to be, the more likely they were to endorse 
a critical item and ascribe it a remember response. This is in accordance with the 
distinctiveness heuristic as it indicates that participants could have been more liberal \\ith 
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their response criterion if they perceived themselves as drunk as they may have had a 
reduced expectation about the detail needed in a memory in order for it to be ascribed a 
remember response. 
In regard to source monitoring, alcohol was not found to affect the monitoring of 
veridical items, as memory for veridical context was found to be equivalent between the 
two groups. In previous empirical research, an inability for repetition to decrease false 
memory levels has been attributed to a deficit in monitoring ability (e.g. Benj amin 2001). 
The finding that alcohol did not impair the monitoring of veridical context would appear 
to indicate that monitoring ability was equivalent between the two groups, and thus 
differential monitoring ability cannot be the mechanism through which increased 
repetitions failed to significantly decrease false remember responses in the alcohol group. 
It was also acknowledged that contextual monitoring was assessed by recognition and not 
recall and this would have increased the likelihood that no group differences would have 
been found in monitoring ability. Because the ability to remember veridical context could 
be aided by perceptual fluency (Kelley et al. 1989), and as familiarity and perceptual 
processing are thought to be selectively preserved under alcohol at encoding (Kirchner & 
Sayette 2003), this mode of assessment could have potentially masked any differences 
that may have existed between the two groups in terms of monitoring ability. In addition, 
it was argued that contextual veridical memory is not equivalent to reality monitoring, 
and thus future studies need to administer a reality monitoring procedure as a means to 
directly assess whether reality monitoring ability is affected by alcohol. 
Lastly, the free recall test performed 24 hours after encoding demonstrated that extended 
repetitions no longer decreased false memories, instead a marginal increase was 
observed. Lists which were repeated would have repeatedly activated the critical item, 
and thus have made them more familiar. Because of the decline in recollection over an 
extended retention interval, it is argued that participants were less able to differentiate 
bet\\een which items were presented and \vhich were not. Consequently, the increased 
familiarity felt for critical items from repeated lists could have resulted in an increased 
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tendency that they would be recalled relative to false memory items corresponding to lists 
viewed only once. 
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Chapter 7. General discussion 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis investigated the way in which alcohol affected false memory levels. The 
AMP was chosen as the principle framework, as predictions about the effect of 
alcohol on false memories could be made using the opponent processes it 
incorporates. It was hypothesised that alcohol would reduce false memories via 
reduced activation within semantic networks. A secondary speculation was that 
alcohol may impair monitoring processes and that this could give rise to an increase in 
false memories when intoxicated. Repetition was chosen as an additional 
manipulation to explore whether these opposite effects of alcohol on false memory 
levels could be elicited. Study list repetition has been shown to increase both 
activation and monitoring processes (Benjamin 2001). According to the AMF, any 
variable which increases false memories can be interpreted as having a net increase on 
activation based processes relative to monitoring based processes. It was hypothesised 
that repetition could increase false memories in intoxicated participants through two 
routes. Firstly, initially decreased activation levels in critical items for intoxicated 
participants may result in a greater net increase in semantic activation with repetition. 
In addition, if monitoring processes were impaired under alcohol, this could lead to an 
increase in false memories with repetition when intoxicated. In contrast, placebo 
participants may be better able to counteract the increased activations of critical items 
that occur with repetition with an intact ability to source monitor. Thus, impaired 
activation when intoxicated would be manifested in initially reduced levels of false 
memories relative to the placebo group. Differential effects of repetition on false 
memory levels in the alcohol and placebo group would allow any potential increases 
in false memories in the alcohol group relative to the placebo group to manifest. 
Conclusions regarding the affect of alcohol on false memories, and an account of the 
mechanisI11s underlying these effects, were initially hampered by the complex 
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relationship between repetition and false memories. The results of Experiment 1. 2 & 
3 did not find a consistent effect of repetition on false memories in the placebo group. 
Repetition displayed a tendency to increase false memories (Experiment 1. encoding 
phase 2), decrease false memories (Experiment 1 encoding phase 1, Experiment 2 
encoding phase 1) have no effect on false memories (Experiment 3 explicit data) and 
reduce false memories (Experiment 3 implicit data). To reconcile these seemingly 
equivocal results, Chapter 5 sought to obtain the inverted V-shaped relationship 
between false memories and repetition within a signal paradigm. The provision of a 
stable paradigm displaying both an increase and decrease in false memories, when 
combined with alcohol, would offer the best insight into how alcohol affects false 
memories as a function of repetition. The inverted V-shaped curve was only reliably 
obtained when the potential for recollective monitoring - through the use of pictorial 
stimuli - was facilitated. It was found that this parabolic relationship was confined to 
false remember responses only. This paradigm was then used in conjunction with 
alcohol where results were consistent with alcohol 'shifting' the curve. 
The way in which alcohol affects false memories will be discussed in section 7.2. 
Section 7.3. accounts for the findings from all experiments in terms of an U-
relationship between the nature of learning and subsequent false memory levels. 
Finally, section 7.4. accounts for this inverted V-shaped relationship between learning 
and false memory levels in terms of underlying activation and monitoring processes. 
7.2. The effect of alcohol on false memories 
Conclusions regarding the effect of alcohol on false memories could not be definitely 
derived from Experiments 1 and 2 because of the confounding interference effects. 
Experiments 3 and 9 investigated the anterograde effect of alcohol on false memories. 
In Experiment 3, it was found that, for material viewed once in the encoding phase, 
participants recalled significantly fewer false memory items than the placebo group. 
This result was consistent \vith Experiment 9, where, relatiye to the placebo group, 
alcohol reduced false recognition for false remember items corresponding to material 
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viewed once in the encoding phase. Under the AMF, this can be accounted for bv 
decreased activation of critical items. Craik (1977) hypothesised that the mechanism 
through which alcohol impairs veridical memories is a reduction in encoding depth. 
Superficial encoding is known to reduce false memories (e.g. Thapar & McDermott 
2001). Experiments 3 and 9 support this hypothesis, and their findings in line with 
research which has demonstrated that alcohol impairs associative veridical memory 
(e.g. Duka et al. 2001), and extends this impairment to semantic false memories. 
Experiment 3 found that alcohol increased false recall with repetition. In contrast, 
repetition was not found to effect false memory levels in the placebo group. 
Experiment 3 also explored implicit memories and took awareness measures. Results 
obtained support the free recall data. Repetition increased the 'awareness' of critical 
items, thus also demonstrating an increase in false memories with repetition. The 
increase in false memories under alcohol could also be accounted for by a greater net 
increase in activation of critical items relative to the placebo group. Chapter 6 
explores the possibility that, via initially reduced activation levels when intoxicated, 
repetition could induce greater net increases in activation of critical items. Thus, even 
if monitoring processes were not impaired under alcohol, such an effect could lead to 
a rise in false memories with repetition. Indeed, Experiment 9 would suggest that 
reduced monitoring ability was not the mechanism responsible for the increase in 
false memories with repetition. This finding is interesting as, in the DRM literature, 
increases in false memories with repetition have been found in populations with 
impaired recollective ability (Benjamin 2001; Jacoby 1999). Consequently, alcohol's 
propensity to increase false memories is compatible with an impairment of monitoring 
induced by alcohol's selective detrimental effect on recollective memory (Duka et al. 
2001; Curran & Hildebrandt 1999). Although this was the initial hypothesis. this 
mechanism was not substantiated by empirical findings within this thesis. Experiment 
9 demonstrated that alcohol did not affect contextual monitoring in veridical items, 
leading to the conclusion that monitoring ability remains intact when intoxicated. 
Chapter 6, however, discusses the reasons for caution in arriving at this conclusion. 
Specifically, one cannot equate veridical contextual monitoring, as assessed using 
recognition, with reality monitoring decisions. In addition, it should also be noted that 
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the degree to which alcohol impairs recollective processes is affected by state 
dependency. It has been demonstrated that recollective processes are most affected 
when encoding and retrieval take place in different states (Duka et al. 2001). 
Consequently, the design of Experiment 9, where contextual monitoring was assessed 
when participants were in the same drug state, would have minimised the potential for 
demonstrating an alcohol induced impairment. Future research could use a full state 
dependent design - splitting up encoding and retrieval and administering a drink 
before each. This would result in four separate conditions (alcohol-alcohol, placebo-
placebo, alcohol-placebo, placebo-alcohol). This would have the benefit of 
maximising the detrimental effect of alcohol on recollective processing, thus 
increasing the potential for alcohol at encoding to increase false memories due to an 
impairment in lTIonitoring. In addition, alcohol could be used as a tool to selectively 
investigate how mechanisms at encoding and retrieval selectively contribute to false 
memory levels. Such a design requires a minimum 24 hour retention interval to ensure 
that participants sober up in time. A state dependent design was not employed in the 
present experiments because of the way in which repetition also interacts with 
retention interval. Chapter 6 demonstrated that false memories Increase with 
repetition when next day testing occurs. 
7.3. Summary of main findings: How they accord with the inverted U 
The directional effect of repetition on false memories has been shown to be affected 
by the nature of learning. In all experiments, repetition enhanced veridical learning, 
whilst alcohol impaired learning!. The nature of learning was also affected by a 
number of other factors, and consequently, these manipulations also affected false 
memory levels. These included interference effects [Experiments 1 & 2]. instructions 
warning about the false memory effect [Experiments 6 & 7], the retention inkrval 
[indicated in Experiment 3 and verified in Experiment 9] and the addition of 
distinctive pictorial information [Experiment 8]. All experiments were compatible 
I As assessed using explicit tests of memory, with the exception of Experiment 1 which assessed the 
impairing and facilitative effects of alcohol. 
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with the parabolic relationship between the nature of learning and false memory 
levels. To demonstrate this, the experiments will be summarised and interpreted in 
terms of this inverted U-shaped curve. 
In the placebo group from Experiment 1, repetition had a tendency to decrease false 
memories for material learnt in the initial encoding phase, and a tendency to increase 
false memories for material in the second encoding phase. This marginal effect was 
accounted for using the principle of interference and negative transfer. It was agued 
that information from the initial encoding phase was learnt well, as demonstrated by 
repetition decreasing false memories. This information was hypothesised to have 
impeded learning of material from the second encoding phase, leading repetition to 
marginally increase false memories. Consequently, results from the two encoding 
phases can be conceived as extreme ends of the curve - with results from encoding 
phase 1 corresponding to the descending limb. Impaired learning in the second 
encoding phase suggest that the results from encoding phase 2 represent the ascending 
limb (see Figure 7.1). Within these two experiments, accounting for how alcohol 
affected false memories in terms of the inverted U-shaped curve was problematic. It 
was argued that the complex design of the study meant that definitive conclusions 
were hard to derive due to the confound of interference effects. Henceforth additional 
studies concentrated on the anterograde impairments of alcohol. Further research 
could investigate the way in which interference impedes learning, and the way in 
which this interacts with repetition and alcohol as additional modulators of learning. 
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The hypothesised relationship between interference, 
repetition and false memory levels 
Results from 
encoding 
phase 2 
Interference 
Degree of learning 
Results from 
encoding 
phase 1 
reduces leaning ....... f------------------
Repetition 
• increases learning 
Figure 7.1. The hypothesised relationship between interference, repetition 
and false memory levels inferred from Chapter 1 (Experiment 1), based 
on the placebo group only. 
In Chapter 4, no effect of repetition was found on explicit false memory levels in the 
placebo group. In contrast, repetition increased false memories in the alcohol group. 
These findings can also be accounted for in terms of the curve - with learning 
between the two repetition points in the placebo group representing the top of the 
curve. The impeded learning under alcohol would have resulted in a left shift, thus 
accounting for the rise in false memories with repetition when intoxicated. In 
addition, one can speculate that the result in the placebo group is also compatible with 
Experiment 1. The increased retention interval (24 hours versus 4 hours) would have 
decreased the accuracy of memory (McDermott 1996; Thapar 2001) and thus a left 
shift in the curve would be expected relative to the first encoding phase of Experiment 
1. 
195 
The results from experiments in Chapter 5 can also be interpreted in terms of the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between false memories and repetition. Whilst 1\\'0 
experiments decreased false memories between five and ten repetitions (Experiment ~ 
and Experiment 4), only Experiment 5 found an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between false memories and repetition. This experiment presented words with 
arbitrary pictures as a means to employ a contextual source monitoring paradigm. It 
was argued that the presence of this additional visual information initially impeded 
learning, which would cause a shift in the curve. This could account for why false 
memories increased between one and five repetitions. In addition, it was argued that, 
with increased learning, participants were between able to 'edit' out false memories. 
This was reflected in a significant decrease in false remember memories between fi n~ 
and ten repetitions. 
Lastly, Experiment 9 investigated the propensity for alcohol to shift the curve. 
Results obtained did not prove that alcohol shifts the curve, though they were 
compatible with this perspective. Firstly, participants in the alcohol group had 
significantly less false remember memories than the placebo group for critical items 
from singularly presented lists. In addition, the placebo group were able to 
significantly decrease their amount of false remember responses between five and ten 
repetitions; this decrease did not reach significance in the alcohol group. Lastly, an 
analysis which was designed to compare the number of repetitions required to bring 
about a peak in false remember responses indicated a tendency for this value to be 
greater in the alcohol group than the placebo group. 
7.4. The mechanisms underlying the effect of alcohol and repetition on false 
memories. 
The AMF has been used as the principle theoretical framework to make predictions 
and account for results. It can be argued that the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between false memories and the nature of learning is actually a manifestation of how 
the learning employed influences activation and monitoring processes. Benjamin 
(200 I) argued that the effects of repetition on memory processes \\~re t\\"l)fold. 
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Firstly, repetition provides an opportunity for increased activations of the critical 
items, leading to their enhanced familiarity. In addition, repetition can increase 
recollection for items presented, and thus familiarity felt for critical items could be 
counteracted with an absence of their comparable recollection2• The parabolic 
relationship between false memories and repetition suggests, however, that these two 
processes do not operate simultaneously. The curve would instead suggest that 
activation processes initially prevail as a consequence of repetition, followed by a 
domination of monitoring processes. Thus, an argument has been made that only 
when a threshold of activation has been attained can monitoring processes operate. 
This could account for how repetition initially serves to increase false memories: the 
repeated activations of critical items increase their endorsement as this is not 
counteracted by an increased ability to source monitoring. Once a threshold of 
activation has been ascertained, participants are able to use the increased exposure to 
'edit' out false memories through an increased phenomenological disparity between 
false and veridical 'memories'. The role of monitoring in affecting false memory 
levels was demonstrated in a number of experiments. Firstly, presentation of a 
warning prior to encoding served to decrease false memory levels (Experiments 6 & 
7). A decrease in false remember responses in Experiments 8 and 9 between five and 
ten repetitions was found when pictorial stimuli were presented. This would indicate 
that participants were able to use the increased phenomenological disparity between 
the 'memories' of veridical and critical items to better monitor at test. Lastly, 
Experiment 6 found a monotonic increase in false memories with repetition when 
memory was assessed 24 hours after encoding. This was in contrast to the inverted U-
shaped relationship obtained with immediate testing. This would indicate that 
monitoring was impaired with an increase in retention interval, due to a reduction in 
phenomenological disparity between true and false memories with time. 
Future research could also use a different way of assessing recollective and familiarity 
based memories. The present studies employed the remember / know procedure which 
is currently the method most frequently employed in the DRM literature. The general 
2 As previously stated, although not acknowledged by Benjamin (2001), mechanisms have been . 
proposed to account for the erroneous recollection of false memory items (e.g. p~antom recollection. 
Brainerd 2003). Many connectionist models would also naturally produce occasIOnal erroneous 
recollections, as such models are essentially reconstructive. 
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discussion in Chapter 5 addressed the failings of such an approach. Specifically, the 
mutual exclusivity of this mode of assessment instils an arithmetic dependency 
between the two. Higham and Vokey (2004) propose the use of independent scales to 
separately assess levels of familiarity and recollection for items. As argued by 
Higham and Vokey (2004), the separate assessment of recollection and familiarity 
would provide insight into the way in which repetition selectively affects activation 
and monitoring processes for critical items. 
Future research could assess the confidence associated with memory decisions. 
Research has shown that the confidence ascribed to false memories tends to be lo\yer 
than for veridical memories (Jou et al. 2004). The mere suggestion that people have 
consumed alcohol - in the absence of drinking - has been shown to increase the 
confidence of erroneous events (Assefi & Garry 2003). Determining whether the 
consumption of alcohol increases the confidence of false memories thus warrants 
investigation. Investigating the conditions which elicit a false memory. and the 
confidence associated with that memory, has important implications for the legal 
system, especially in regard to eyewitness testimony. It should also be noted that the 
false memories investigated within this thesis were based upon semantic relatedness 
to veridical material. Consequently, one cannot generalise the findings to all types of 
false memories. Research on how alcohol may distort memories of events is highly 
limited (e.g. Read et al. 1992) and this area warrant further investigation. 
Manipulating factors which selectively affect different memory processes furthers our 
understanding of which mechanisms underlie our true and false memories. 
Knowledge of the factors which elicit erroneous memories thus provides insight into 
the workings of our memory system. Increasing our knowledge of the conditions 
which elicit false memories allows for a more accurate assessment of when our 
memories are a faithful representation of the past. 
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Appendix 1 
Old Lists (Stadler et al. 1999) 
Black Fruit Smoke Spider Music Shirt 
white apple cigarette web note blouse 
dark vegetable puff insect sound trousers 
cat orange billows bug piano tie 
night kiwi pollution fright Sing button 
funeral citrus ashes fly radio shorts 
colour ripe cigar arachnid band iron 
grief pear fire crawl melody polo 
blue cocktail tobacco tarantula horn cotton 
death bowl pipe poison rhythm vest 
gray basket lungs creepy concert waistcoat 
Sweet Rough Mountain Thief Chair Bread 
sour bumpy hill steal table butter 
sugar road valley robber sit food 
bitter tough climb crook legs eat 
good sandpaper summit burglar seat sandwich 
taste jagged top cop couch rye 
tooth coarse peak bad desk jam 
nice uneven plain rob sofa milk 
honey gravel glacier jail wood dough 
chocolate ground goat villain bench crust 
heart sand bike crime rocking slice 
New Lists 
Clown Venus Monkey Dance Weather Child 
circus love ape jive rain adult 
funny planet baboon ball forcast baby 
nose Mars primate steps bad young 
fool goddess animal move wet small 
coco beauty nuts band hot infant 
jester statue business twist fine kid 
hat Saturn puzzle disco meteorology play 
around star banana clap report parent 
joke sun rhesus hall climate toy 
tumble woman climb centre innocent 
Magic Dream Bright Flower Nurse Train 
wand sleep light rose doctor engine 
spell nightmare dull pot patient station 
trick day sun garden uniform railway 
circle night dark petal kind fast 
roundabout ideal early plant matron journey 
conjurer Freud star power sister steam 
lantern bed day pretty ward 
carriage 
wizard rest sparkle bloom aid 
coach 
carpet erotic dim daffodil help 
bus 
enchantment wish golden stem clinic 
wheels 
Appendix 2. 
Subject Information 
The effect of alcohol on learning 
Conducted in the laboratory of Experimental Psychol U', '. f . 
ogy, DJ\ erSI" 0 SU\\l'\, 
by Sarah Garfinkel and Theodora Duka . 
The aims of the study 
This study seeks to investigate the effects of alcohol on an individual's ability to lcarn 
infonnation. -
'-----------------------------~----
Outline of the experiment 
You will be asked to attend the laboratories in the Faculty of Experimental 
Psychology on two separate occasions on consecutive days. The first session will last 
for a maximum of 4 hours. The second session will last for a maximum of an hour. 
On the initial day of the experiment you should be prepared to be breathalysed on one 
or more occasions. You will be given a drink, alcohol or placebo, and will be required 
to complete a number of different questionnaires about your drinking and mood. You 
will be shown lists of words on a computer screen, each list will either be presented 
once, or more than once. On the second day no alcohol will be administered. You \\ ill 
be required to complete a series of word paradigms and questionnaires on your mood 
state. Your memory for the material you learnt the previous day will be tested. 
,-------------------------------------
The amounts of alcohol you may be asked to drink 
When you decide to participate in this experiment you should be prepared to conSUIllL' 
an amount of alcohol that is equivalent to 5 units (i.e. about 2 pints of typicallagcr or 
bitter at 4.5% ABV). You will be given the drink in small portions oycr a pcriod of 3() I 
minutes. You will not be able to participate in the test phase of the experimcnt until 
your breath alcohol concentration (BAC) has fallen to a quarter of the legal driying 
limit, this should take approximately 3 hours (0.020/0). 
Since you may still have alcohol in your system when you lca\c .thc lahoratory: \\ L' 
also require that you agree not to drive a car or ride a motorbike. or push-h.lk.l'.or 
operate any machinery for at least four hours after the completion of the 100tiai 
test session. 
What is required to participate in the study? 
In order to participate in the study, you will need to meet the following criteria: 
- You need to be between 18-35 years of age 
- You need to complete a medical questionnaire 
- You need to supply an estimate of your average weekly alcohol consumption 
You should not be a heavy smoker (under 15 cigarettes per day): you should he ahle 
to abstain from smoking throughout the two experimental sessions. 
- You should not be taking any medication that may interfere \\-ith the aims of the 
study 
What you must avoid doing before the first test session? 
If you decide to participate you must avoid the following: 
- Eating a high-fat breakfast or lunch before the first test session 
- Drinking alcohol for at least 12 hours before the first experimental session 
- Drinking alcohol in between the two experimental sessions 
- Taking sleeping tablets or hay fever medication for at least 48 hours before either 
experimental session 
- Drinking caffeine for at least 2 hours before each experimental sessions 
Payment 
On completion of the study you will be paid £20 
Informed consent 
University procedures require that you sign the conse~t form o\crleaf stating that the 
purposes and procedures of the study have been explam~d to you. Please understand 
that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. 
If you would like to participate in the study, please complete the ~orm ()\t.'rlt.'af. 
VOLUNTEER INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
I have read and had explained to me the attached infonnation sheet of which I retain a 
copy. The nature and purpose of the testing of the effects of alcohol on the way we 
remember information has been explained to me by one of the investigators. I ·am 
aware that I have the right to withdraw from the experiment at any time. 
I undertake to: 
a) refrain form drinking alcohol for at least 12 hours before the first experimental 
seSSIon; 
b) refrain form drinking alcohol in between the two experimental sessions: 
c) refrain form eating a high-fat breakfast or lunch before the first test sl'ssion: 
d) refrain form taking sleeping tablets or hay fever medication for at least ~x hours 
before either experimental session; 
e) refrain form drinking caffeine for at least 2 hours before each experimental 
seSSIOns; 
t) refrain from using illicit drugs for at least one week before the test session: 
g) not to drive a car, ride a motorbike or push-bike, or operate any machinl'ry for 
at least four hours after the completion of the initial test session: and. 
h) not to discuss the nature and detailed content of the experiment with other 
potential volunteers. 
NAME: __________________________________________ _ 
DATE OF 
BIRTH: ________________________________________ ___ 
ADDRESS: ___________________ _ 
---------------~~~--~-~ 
E-MAIL 
ADDRESS: _________________ _ 
PHONE 
NUMBER:· __________ _ 
SIGNED: _________ _ 
DATED: ____ ---------------
WITNESSED: __________ ~ 
Nuffield Hospitals Medical History Questionnaire 
Confidential 
Please complete all sections of this 
form unless otherwise indicated. 
Medical History Questionnaire 
Name (Full) ............................................................ . 
Date of Birth ................. .. Sex ......... . Height. .................. . 
Sub no ............... . 
Weight. .................. . 
Please underline the appropriate answer where a 'Yes' or 'No' is required. If your answer is 'Yes' brief details should be 
given. 
1. Have you suffered from any of the following? 
Diabetes Mellitus 
Epilepsy 
Frequent chest, throat or nose 
infectionsl diseases 
Back injurylbackache 
Joint injury 
Ear infection 
Rheumatism or Rheumatic fever 
Urinary problems or kidney disease 
Infectious diseases (Mumps, Measles, 
German Measles, Tuberculosis etc.) 
Hepatitis 
Heart disease 
High blood pressure, chest pain, 
shortage of breath 
Anxiety or Depression requiring treatment 
Nervous breakdown or debility arising 
from overwork 
Menstrual problems 
Haemorrhoids 
Dyspepsia or Peptic Ulcer 
Hernia 
Dysentry/TyphoidIF ood poisoning 
Any other stomach disorder 
Varicose veins 
Migraines or other frequent headaches 
Hay fever, eczema or other aIlergies 
Skin disorders 
Fainting or giddiness 
poor eyesight (c\'cn when ~ring 
Details 
Yes I No 
Yes INo 
Yes I No 
Yes INo 
Yes INo 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes INo 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yesl No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes I No 
Yes 1:"'0 
Yes 1:"'0 
glasses!contactlenses) 
Please give date when eyesight was 
last tested (approx.) 
Impaired hearing 
2. 
3. 
Are you a registered disabled person? 
a) Have you been an in-patient in 
hospital or consulted your GP during 
the last five years? 
b) How many days of sickness have 
you had in the last 12 months? 
c) Are you taking any piIls, tablets or 
having injections, receiving any medical 
or psychiatric treatment or advice or 
awaiting surgery? 
4. How often do you visit your dentist? 
5. What was the date of your last 
immunisation against the following: 
(approx.) 
6. Date oflast x-ray 
7. General state of health; please 
comment on any aspects not covered 
above (i.e. accidents, injuries, 
disorders not mentioned). 
8. What is your average consumption of 
measure 
glass of wine/ 
beer) 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
expiry date? 
Yes/ No 
Yes /No 
a) alcohol 
b) tobacco 
If'Yes' what is you registration number and 
If 'Yes' please give details: 
What were the main causes? 
If 'Yes' please give details: 
When was your last visit? 
Tetanus 
Tuberculosis 
Polio 
Rubella (German Measles) 
(Anti-D Gammaglobulin) 
Hepatitis B 
Reason for x-ray 
units* per week 
per day 
(* A unit- single 
of spirit nne 
half a pint of 
9. Is there any additional information regarding your health not covered in the above questions? 
I declare that the answers given to the above questions are true to the best of my knowledge and I have not withheld any 
material facts which may have any bearing as to the state of my health. 
Signature Date 
Alcohol Use Questionnaire 
Subject Number 
---
Age 
---
Are you: Female / Male 
The following questions ask you about your habitual use of various types of alcoholic drinks. Please 
consider your drinking for the last 6 months in answering the questions, and take your time to give an 
accurate answer to each question. 
1. On how many days per week do you drink wine, or any wine-type product, ego sherry, port, 
martini? Please state your usual brand(s) 
--------------------
2. On those days you do drink wine (or similar), about how many glasses (pub measure) do you 
drink? If unsure, please estimate the number of bottles or parts of a bottle 
------
3. How many glasses (pub measure) of wine do you have in a week, in total? 
-----
4. On how many days per week do you drink beer or cider (at least half a pint)? __ _ 
Please state usual brand (eg. Carling, Harvey's, Strongbow etc.) ______________ _ 
5. On those days you do drink beer/cider, about how many pints do you typically have? ___ _ 
6. How many pints of beer/cider do you drink in a week, in total? ____ _ 
7. On how many days per week do you drink spirits (whisky, vodka, gin, rum etc.)? ____ Please 
state usual brand (eg. Smirnoff, Bells, Gordon's) ________________ _ 
8. On those days you do drink spirits, about how many shorts (pub measure) do you typically have? 
-----
If unsure, please estimate number of bottles or parts of a bottle ____ _ 
9. How many drinks of spirits do you have in a week, in total? ___ _ 
10. On how many days per week do you drink alcopops? ____ Please state usual brand (eg. 
Hooch, Bacardi Breezer, WKD etc.) _________________ _ 
11. On those days you drink alcopops, about how many bottles do you typically have? __ 
12. How many bottles of alcopops do you have each week, in total? ___ _ 
13. (10) When you drink, how fast do you.drink? (Here, a drink is a glass of wine, a pint of beer, a 
shot of spirits, straight or mixed). Please crrcle the correct response 
Drinks per hour: 7+ 6 5 4 3 2 1 
1 drink in 2 hours 
1 drink in 3 or more hours 
drunk · hit 6 onths? By 'drunk' we mean loss of co-14. (11) How many times have you been m teas m . 
ordination, nausea, and/or inability to speak clearly ___ _ 
15. (12) What percentage of times that you drink do you get drunk? ---
. h t drunk do you suffer from hangovers? ---16. What percentage of times t at you ge 
17. On a scale of 1-10, how bad are your hangovers? ----
Wh d lly drink alcohol? Please circle the correct response 18. en 0 you usua . 
most days / weekends / only on special occasions 
Subject Number: _______ _ Time: 
-----
Subjective mood ratings 
How do you feel NOW? Please draw a vertical mark on each line, in the position you 
feel best represents your current state. 
A 'normal' rating of these states would be near to the 'not at all' mark: 
not at 
all 
not at 
all 
Light headed 
Irritable 
A 'normal' rating of these states would be in the {Tliddle of the line: 
Stimulated 
not at 
all 
Alert 
not at 
all 
Relaxed 
not at 
all 
Contented 
not at 
all 
very 
much 
very 
much 
very 
much 
very 
much 
very 
much 
very 
much 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
Appendix 6 
Assessment of baseline memory CLezak 1983) 
List A desk 
ranger 
bird 
shoe 
stove 
mountain 
glasses 
towel 
cloud 
boat 
lamb 
gun 
pencil 
church 
fish 
List B drum 
curtain 
bell 
coffee 
school 
parent 
moon 
garden 
hat 
farmer 
nose 
turkey 
colour 
house 
river 
Appendix 7a 
Mean number of critical associations generated in response to veridical items for new 
and old lists 
New Lists Mean SEM 
Venus 0.5 0.223607 
bright 0.6 0.163299 
child 0.9 0.276888 
dream 1 0.298142 
nurse 1.3 0.448454 
clown 1.5 0.341565 
dance 1.8 0.38873 
flower 2.1 0.458258 
weather 2.1 0.406885 
train 2.3 0.422953 
monkey 2.5 0.562731 
magic 2.7 0.683943 
Old Lists Mean SEM 
mountain 0.6 0.163299 
music 1 0.298142 
thief 1.1 0.378594 
rough 1.1 0.406885 
black 1.2 0.290593 
fruit 1.7 0.422953 
sweet 2 0.210819 
shirt 2.2 0.940449 
chair 2.3 0.597216 
bread 2.4 0.476095 
spider 2.5 0.542627 
smoke 3 0.596285 
Appendix 7b 
Probability of baseline stem completion 
New Lists Mean SEM 
Venus 0 0 
monkey 0 0 
dance 0.1 0.1 
dream 0.2 0.133333 
magic 0.2 0.133333 
clown 0.2 0.133333 
train 0.3 0.152753 
nurse 0.3 0.152753 
child 0.3 0.152753 
bright 0.4 0.163299 
flower 0.4 0.163299 
weather 0.5 0.166667 
Old Lists Mean SEM 
thief 0 0 
mountain 0 0 
shirt 0 0 
chair 0.090909 0.090909 
rough 0.181818 0.121967 
sweet 0.272727 0.140836 
black 0.363636 0.15212 
bread 0.363636 0.15212 
music 0.454546 0.157459 
smoke 0.454546 0.157459 
fruit 0.5 0.157459 
spider 0.5 0.157459 
thief 0 0 
Appendix 7c 
Probability of false recall 
New Lists Mean SEM 
Venus 0.0625 0.0625 
dance 0.0625 0.0625 
nurse 0.0625 0.0625 
monkey 0.125 0.085391 
dream 0.125 0.085391 
bright 0.125 0.085391 
magic 0.25 0.111803 
clown 0.3125 0.119678 
train 0.3125 0.119678 
flower 0.4375 0.128087 
child 0.5 0.129099 
weather 0.5 0.129099 
Old Lists Mean SEM 
thief 0.0625 0.0625 
rough 0.0625 0.0625 
shirt 0.125 0.08539125 
mountain 0.25 0.1118034 
sweet 0.25 0.1118034 
black 0.25 0.1118034 
bread 0.25 0.1118034 
music 0.25 0.1118034 
spider 0.25 0.1118034 
chair 0.375 0.125 
fruit 0.5 0.1290994 
smoke 0.625 0.125 
thief 0.0625 0.0625 
